RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST FOR MEGAPORTS

UNCLAS STATE 016717 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT JA SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST FOR MEGAPORTS RECIPROCITY REF: TOKYO 231 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paras 2-3. ¶2. (SBU) As outlined in reftel, officials in the Government of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly requested Megaports "reciprocity" and information-sharing (reftel) in the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB). Embassy Tokyo's response should emphasize the following objectives: -- Stress the continuing position of the U.S. Government that implementing Megaports "reciprocity" or any other additional security measures for Japan-bound cargo from the United States should not/not be a requirement for moving forward with our bilateral cooperation on Megaports. -- Note that considerable and successful reciprocity already exists between Japan and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken and will continue to take operational measures to enhance that cooperation (see points below for more on these). If Japan believes that the current level of cooperation is insignificant, seek specific proposals for modifications. -- If Japan continues to push "reciprocity" for Megaports, emphasize that DOE's Megaports Initiative is not a bilateral or reciprocal program -- it is a global program. If Japan truly wishes to implement reciprocity for Megaports, then Japan would need to embark on international nonproliferation cooperation to provide equipment, training, and technical support to foreign partners around the world. Ask if this is what Japan has in mind. ¶3. (SBU) In delivering this message, Embassy is encouraged to draw from the following talking points, which have been cleared by the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Energy (DOE): -- Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI),U.S. officials stationed at four Japanese ports work to identify and, in concert with Japanese officials, further inspect high-risk cargo destined to the United States. -- Japanese officials also work in U.S. locations in concert with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials to target containers bound to Japan. Japanese officials are stationed in the Port of LA/LB, and the National Targeting Center for Cargo. -- CSI is a reciprocal program. As such, DHS remains committed to sharing available information on Japanese-bound containers that either originate or are transshipped through the United States. -- DHS has accommodated 100 percent of Japanese requests for information or inspection of suspect or high-risk containers and will continue to provide outbound manifest information on shipments bound to Japan. Further, DHS will commit to sharing with Japanese targeters the results of all scans conducted on suspect or high-risk containers destined for Japan and will commit to using both non-intrusive imaging and radiation detection technologies to conduct such scans. IF JAPAN CONTINUES TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, SUCH AS MEGAPORTS RECIPROCITY: -- Based on your experiences at LA/LB and the National Targeting Center, we would like your thoughts on what has worked well, and what modifications you would suggest to enhance the current level of cooperation. -- (If Japan asks for Megaports equivalent): We understand your request for reciprocity for Megaports. As agreed upon in previous discussions, reciprocity is not a requirement for moving forward with our bilateral cooperation on Megaports. -- However, we are intrigued by your interest in replicating our program. Does Japan have a similar program under consideration? What countries have you approached in terms of participation? What level of support do you intend to provide under your program in terms of equipment and training? When do you anticipate your program becoming operational? Suggest we jointly explore countries which may be beneficial in terms of expansion opportunities. CLINTON