UK TO HOST MULTILATERAL FUEL ASSURANCES

UNCLAS STATE 015931 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MNUC PREL PRAM SUBJECT: UK TO HOST MULTILATERAL FUEL ASSURANCES CONFERENCE MARCH 17-18 IN LONDON REF: UNVIE 40 ¶1. (U) This message provides guidance requested in Reftel. See para 2. ¶2. (SBU) UNVIE is requested to approach UK Mission interlocutors at the most appropriate level and convey the following points: -- The United States welcomes UK efforts to push forward the adoption of multilateral fuel assurances, and we hope the upcoming conference on "Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" will be successful in educating the participants and clarifying the relevant issues. -- While the current UK draft is not, in general, objectionable as a list of criteria that should be considered as the discussion matures, we believe it will not be practical to achieve consensus on a document of this complexity in a two-day conference and could well prove counterproductive. -- Should principles be considered, they should be based on broader conceptual areas of economic security, energy security, and national security in a way that provides transparency into the global nuclear market. -- We believe an attempt to adopt so complex a text of criteria on the sensitive issues raised by multilateral fuel assurances could prejudge consideration of these issues in the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) and could make it more difficult to resolve them. -- Tabling the current text could well turn the conference into a drafting exercise, and amendments could be proposed that would be unacceptable to either of our governments. -- Attempting to negotiate a text could harden and reinforce existing divisions on multilateral fuel assurances and make it more difficult to resolve them at the IAEA BOG. -- It could also be seen as a preview to the upcoming Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) decision on controls of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and make it more difficult to get the consensus decision the NSG is looking for. -- An unsuccessful attempt to adopt a statement of principles acceptable to all participants could give rise to the perception that the conference had failed. -- Given the linkages and the importance of this conference at this critical juncture of the discussions, we therefore urge the UK not to seek endorsement by the conference of a statement of principles. -- If, despite these concerns, the UK continues to perceive the need for a public document, we recommend that the UK issue a brief and broad set principles (rather than criteria or a list of existing nonproliferation instruments) in a statement by the chair that would not require agreement by the participants. If asked/as needed: -- We could not, for example, accept any amendment to the text that explicitly or implicitly endorsed deflagging of nuclear material contributed to a fuel bank. Supplier states must be able to apply their export control laws to material they contribute. -- Neither could we accept any language, in the context of NPT Article IV or otherwise, expressly legitimizing the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to states that do not already have these capabilities. ¶3. (U) Mission is requested to report the reaction of its UK counterparts no later than February 20. POC is Burrus (Buzz) Carnahan, ISN/NESS, 202-647-0689. CLINTON