(U) Secretary Clinton?s February 12, 2009,

S E C R E T STATE 014421 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: EG IS IR MEPP UN SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton?s February 12, 2009, Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit ¶1. Classified by NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶2. (U) February 12, 2009; 13:00 p.m.; Washington, DC. ¶3. (U) Participants: U.S. The Secretary NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman Egypt Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Sameh Shoukry ¶4. (S) SUMMARY. Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit met on February 12 and engaged in a warm discussion on the need to strength the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship. The FM was delighted when the Secretary accepted Egypt?s invitation to attend the upcoming March 2 Donor?s Conference in Cairo and urged a presidential visit in Cairo or Washington soon. Regarding peace efforts in the region, Aboul Gheit said the United States had only two options, either pick up the Clinton Parameters of December 2000 or the Annapolis process from where it left off. On Iran and Syria, Aboul Gheit urged caution in any attempt to engage both countries. The FM urged the United States not to actively oppose the candidacy of Hosny Farouk for UNESCO Director General. Both leaders agreed on the need to get the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral assistance program back on track. END SUMMARY. -------------- EMBRACING CHANGE -------------- 5.(S) Aboul Gheit opened the meeting by conveying warm greetings from President Mubarak. He was effusive in his praise of Secretary Clinton and expressed hope that a "very difficult" eight-year period in the relationship was over. He noted that Egypt is "eager to embrace change." The Secretary emphasized the United States strong, continuing commitment to work with Egypt. -------------- GAZA DONORS CONFERENCE -------------- ¶6. (S) Aboul Gheit then turned to the March 2 Gaza Donors conference, stating that President Sarkozy and PM Berlusconi would attend. Noting that it would be an "excellent follow up" to the Mitchell visit, he asked the Secretary to attend the conference and for the United States to be a co-sponsor. The Secretary confirmed her attendance and underscored that the United States wanted to work closely with Egypt on the framework for the conference in order to ensure a positive outcome. The Secretary stated that the United States wanted the conference to send a message about Egypt's leadership and to make clear to others in the region the importance we attach to Egypts role and our support for like-minded states that share Egypts strategic approach. -------------- THE UNITED STATES IS BACK -------------- 7.(S) Delighted with the Secretarys response, an effusive Aboul Gheit urged the Secretary to deliver a speech at the conference and assured that she would be received by President Mubarak. He said that although Sarkozy and Berlusconi would be there at the same time, that the attention should be on the Secretary, to symbolize the return of the United States to the Israeli-Arab negotiations. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit noted that the Europeans had begun to assert themselves during the U.S. transition period; the Secretarys presence in Cairo would clearly convey the message that "the United States is back." -------------- -- PROPOSED MEETINGS AT FRINGE OF DONOR CONFERENCE -------------- -- 8.(S) In terms of other meetings in Cairo, Aboul Gheit suggested that the Secretary meet with the GCC+3. He also suggested a GCC+3 meeting with the P5+1, noting that this had been a very useful gathering to send signals to Iran and others. Aboul Gheit proposed that if the Secretary were to arrive in the afternoon of March 1, that she could do one of these sessions then, with the following session the following evening. The Secretary responded positively but noncommittally, saying that she would have to check her schedule. "We want to send a signal that we know who our friends are," the Secretary said. -------------- PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL VISIT -------------- 9.(S) Aboul Gheit asked when "we can allow our two presidents to meet," and encouraged that it be soon. He conveyed that President Mubarak would be willing to travel to the United States or to host the President in Cairo, adding, You decide." He noted that given the President's promise to deliver a speech in a Muslim country, Cairo would be the perfect venue, given that it is the seat of al-Azhar University and the center of the Arab world. Other countries like Morocco or Indonesia, while important, he noted, are peripheral to the real Arab heartland, which is what the President hopes to reach. In terms of audience, the FM said "I can provide 20,000 people" in a secure venue, listening to the Presidents message. The Secretary agreed to convey the invitation. She cautioned that President Obama is currently constrained by the work needed to address the economic challenges, "but I will faithfully represent your arguments." -------------- ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶10. (S) Aboul Gheit raised the issue of U.S. assistance to Egypt, asking that the USG "re-open the Egypt program." "Decisions were taken unilaterally," he said, which is not how allies and friends should deal with one another. While Egypt had remained "polite," the FM said that Egyptians had "distanced themselves" in this regard. He urged that the United States and Egypt work to mend this aspect of the relationship. The Secretary expressed understanding, acknowledging that there had been both cuts in the program and programmatic decisions made by the United States. "I'm going to look into this," she promised. She noted that Congress is also a factor in the assistance relationship, and underscored the need to examine how to "get Members of Congress to see you as a friend and ally." -------------- PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION -------------- ¶11. (S) Aboul Gheit said that Omar Soliman had reported to him that a longer-term calming should be ready for announcement on February 17 or 18. The Israelis are now informed. On February 22, Egypt will host all of the Palestinian factions in Cairo to launch a reconciliation process that "could last days or weeks, if not months." The "quiet" and the reconciliation process should allow the PA, Abu Mazen, and Salam Fayyad "some relief" from the threats of illegitimacy, as a start to restoring their authority. The Secretary urged that we be kept informed of how this is progressing, as we needed to understand what the conditions for Palestinian reconciliation will be. ¶12. (S) Responding to the Secretary's comments about "lost ground and lost time," Aboul Gheit noted that, in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the United States had only two options: either pick up the Clinton Parameters of December 2000, or pick up the Annapolis process from where it left off. "There is no third way." The Secretary asked about the Arab League Initiative. It is still there, the FM acknowledged, but the Israelis never picked up on it, with the issue of refugees being more difficult than the issue of Jerusalem. Israel cannot accept the formulation on refugees, he said, but maybe it can be set aside temporarily. He emphasized the need for Egypt to understand what the United States was doing regarding negotiations, referring to the failed 2000 Camp David summit when "we didn't know what was happening." -------------- IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND ARAB POLITICAL DISARRAY -------------- ¶13. (S) In response to the Secretary's questions about Palestinian reconciliation efforts, Aboul Gheit spoke of a "region in the midst of a war" -- a cold war that often turns hot and then back to cold. This is largely due to the fact that Iran wants to extend its influence across the region and to "collect cards" to use in bargaining over its nuclear program. Iran has IRGC forces "everywhere." Iran uses Hamas and Hizballah. "Sadly," even some Arabs are collaborating with Iran, such as Syria and Qatar. Imagine, he noted, Qatar is a "principality" of only "60,000 maybe 100,000 people, and it is creating havoc in the region." He noted that there are more Egyptian guest workers in Qatar than Qatari citizens. Iran also promoted "two wars in two years," he said, referring to Gaza and the 2006 Lebanon war. Iran is destabilizing the region and must be confronted everywhere. ¶14. (S) Aboul Gheit urged that the United States, should it decide to engage, do so "with eyes wide open." He predicted that the USG would discover by the end of 2009 that the Iranians did not deliver anything and that the Iranians "express what they don't believe." The Secretary emphasized that, indeed, the USG was going into this process well aware of the difficulties. But any engagement should demonstrate clearly that Iran either can deliver or that it won't deliver. At this point, people question whether the United States is to blame for Iranian intransigence, but engagement should show exactly where the problems are. ¶15. (S) Aboul Gheit added that that the threat of sanctions is not sufficient, and the threat of war contradicts the message the Administration is trying to send to the Muslim world. So he suggested being "very, very firm" in any talks with the Iranians. He mused about whether, ultimately, the United States should agree to enrichment on Iranian soil that is heavily patrolled by comprehensive international supervision. -------------- SYRIA -------------- ¶16. (S) On Syria, Aboul Gheit noted that Egypt is aware that the United States wants to try a new approach. He said that Egypt is planning an effort to reconcile Arab differences among ourselves. He cautioned that the USG should be cautious with Syria, noting that the Syrians seek to escape the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to obtain assurances about the future of their regime, seek a return of the Golan Heights, and want acknowledgement of their predominance in Lebanon. The Syrians should be "forced to pay a price" for any of these, and not be given any of these up front. He concluded by urging the United States to tell the Syrians to "stay away from the Iranians." -------------- UNHELPFUL QATAR -------------- ¶17. (S) Finally, Aboul Gheit said, "there is Qatar." Qatar is financing "everything." Qatar claims to have frozen the Arab peace plan and to have ordered the Arab states to cut off ties to Israel. What is motivating Qatar is an image of "the great state of Qatar" -- a Qatar that hosts the Lebanese factions for a Doha accord, the Sudanese for another Doha accord, the various Arabs to respond to the Gaza crisis, and so on. The FM opined that the only country that can check Qatar's behavior is the United States. The United States needs to say, you are troubling our allies and confusing our policies." The FM suggested that the Emir and the Prime Minister need to feel that "Washington is cold." -------------- HOSNY CANDIDACY FOR UNESCO DG -------------- ¶18. (S) Aboul Gheit raised the issue of Egyptian Cultural Minister Farouk Hosny's UNESCO DG candidacy. "I hope, I hope, I hope, if you can't support him, that you won't oppose him." The Secretary said that we had real concerns about Hosnys statements. Moreover, as we ask the Israelis to take a lot of hard decisions regarding negotiations and facts on the ground, we do not need additional problems. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said that perhaps he could solve the issue with the Israelis, by promising them that, if Hosny is elected, his first visit as UNESCO DG would be to Israel. The Secretary responded that Israeli concurrence could help, but we still had our own concerns. She recommended that Egypt seek other candidates. -------------- PROPOSED FRENCH SUMMIT IN APRIL -------------- ¶19. (S) Aboul Gheit and the Secretary briefly conferred on the idea of a French-hosted summit in early April, and agreed that it was premature to commit to such a step. The Secretary noted that the Israeli political calendar made the timing especially awkward. -------------- EGYPTS PUSH FOR INCLUSION IN G-8/G-20 -------------- 20.(C) Aboul Gheit made a pitch for Egypt to be included in an expanded G-20 and that the group of five "outreach" countries to the G-8 be expanded to include Egypt on a permanent basis. The Secretary said that she would look into the issue. CLINTON