PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL SOMALI REFUGEE FLOWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 132604 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019 TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL DJ ET EU KE SO YM SUBJECT: PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL SOMALI REFUGEE FLOWS Classified By: PRM/AFR Director Margaret McKelvey ¶1. (C) ACTION REQUEST: In view of likely significant refugee outflows from Somalia to neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa in early 2010, addressees are requested to urgently provide their best advice on how the USG can work with host governments, including in consultation with other relevant donors, to ensure that reluctant hosts will indeed receive fleeing Somalis. U.S. Mission Geneva is requested to urgently engage UNHCR on prepositioning of supplies and drawing up funding appeals. Please see paras. 10 - 13. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Humanitarian conditions inside Somalia have recently taken a notable turn for the worse (even by the standards of a conflicted failed state),which is likely to generate additional refugees in a region that is already far less welcoming to those seeking safety and asylum than it has been in the past. Security and access for humanitarians have deteriorated in the areas of south-central Somalia currently controlled by the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) al-Shabaab that encompass roughly half of the more than three million Somalis judged to be in need of food aid to survive. Al-Shabaab elements have tightened control and decreed that the UN World Food Program (WFP) should cease distributing foreign food aid as of January 1; WFP has pulled back for an undetermined period in view of the threats. Even without the latest al-Shabaab threat, WFP and other humanitarian agencies were lacking support from the U.S. and other donors owing to terrorism concerns. Without access to humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of Somalis (if not more) are expected to move toward Somaliland and Puntland as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen. All of these are preoccupied to a degree with their own internal struggles as well as drought and can be expected to resist new arrivals. To try to forestall additional violence, loss of life, and destabilization, planning for emergency response is urgently needed. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND FACTORS -------------- ¶3. (U) Somali refugees total an estimated 550,000 persons throughout the continent of Africa and beyond, most of whom are in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti. As a protracted refugee situation due to Somalia conflict and insecurity dating back to the early 1990s, Somalis are now the largest group of African refugees, and the outflow from Somalia is expected to swell starting early in 2010. The people of south-central Somalia largely live without the protection of a working government, and in fear of conflict and food insecurity that has already induced increased displacement and refugee flows to neighboring countries in 2009. Most of Somalia is rated by U.S. and UN famine early warning systems as either highly or extremely food insecure. Fighting and civilian casualties continue in Mogadishu and in other areas of south-central Somalia, notably a November 2009 conflict in the Afmadow district of Somalia, bordering Kenya, that displaced an estimated 2,200 people. During a September 2009 monitoring trip to refugee camps in Kenya, refugee program officers from State,s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration heard from some Somali new arrivals that they left Somalia because of a fear of Al-Shabaab methods/punishments. The anti-government and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Al-Shabaab continues to attempt to impose Islamic Sharia law in the parts of southern and central Somalia that it controls, including parts of Mogadishu and the port city of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab represents an extreme fundamentalist form of Islam and in late 2009 has attempted to punish Somali people for listening to music, women for wearing bras, and, in recent weeks, has organized a public stoning of a teenage female victim accused of adultery because she was raped. ¶4. (U) In 2009, more than 53,000 new Somali refugees arrived at the Dadaab Camps in Kenya, with a high of more than 8,000 new arrivals in January 2009 and a low of approximately 1,200 during the rainy season month of November 2009. In Ethiopia, Somali new arrivals have averaged about 1,500 refugees per month in 2007, 2008 and 2009. There are an estimated 150,000 Somali refugees in Yemen where Somalis receive prima facie refugee status by the Yemeni Government. In addition, there are more than 11,000 Somali refugees registered with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Djibouti; however, STATE 00132604 002 OF 003 there are an unknown number of Somalis fleeing violent conflict and insecurity to urban areas of Djibouti and who do not register with UNHCR as refugees. ¶5. (C) Expectations for a worsening humanitarian crisis strongly suggest that there will be another large outpouring of Somalis in early 2010. Continuing conflict, drought and high food prices have resulted in a staggering 3.3 million people in Somalia in need of food aid. Already there are an estimated 1.5 million Somali internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside of Somalia. WFP has faced a lack of access to populations in need of food aid due to conflict and threats to its staff by al-Shabaab in many parts of southern and central Somalia throughout 2009. Most recently, al-Shabaab issued a dictate that as of January 1, 2010, no foreign food is to be distributed in areas that it controls. While the United States has consistently been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, renewal of some U.S. humanitarian programs, including provision of food aid through WFP, has been delayed while we review conditions on the ground to determine how to best deliver humanitarian assistance consistent with U.S. policy and law regarding possible benefit to an FTO. The anticipated outflow of Somali refugees is considered particularly challenging in light of a less welcoming atmosphere for Somali refugees in some neighboring countries during 2009. ¶6. (C) Kenya, host to 300,000 or more Somali refugees, has kept its border with Somalia officially closed since January 2007 -- in violation of its OAU Convention obligations to allow asylum seekers to enter -- citing terrorism/security concerns. Somalis have nonetheless been able to continue to bribe their way into Kenya, and, incongruously, the Government of Kenya (GOK) fingerprints and registers them. There are 266,000 mostly Somali refugees in three severely overcrowded camps near the Somalia border called the Dadaab Camps, and more than 40,000 Somalis in the Kakuma Camp in a desert-like environment in northwestern Kenya. Despite multiple diplomatic efforts by the USG, some other donors, and UNHCR, the GOK continues to resist establishing a fourth camp in Dadaab or to re-open other sites that once housed Somali refugees, and has thus far only provisionally agreed to an expansion of one of the existing camps. Kenya had proposed creating a so-called safe haven inside Somalia itself (Comment: A non-starter because historically safe havens have proven not to work to protect people and there is no military force that could be engaged to occupy and secure such an enclave. End Comment.) and/or moving more Somali refugees from the Dadaab Camps to Kakuma Camp; however, UNHCR considers Kakuma Camp to be about 10,000 refugees away from reaching its maximum capacity, especially given the harsh arid conditions of the area. Should Sudan revert to civil war as many fear, Kakuma Camp would be needed to help house an influx of Sudanese refugees. Kenyan recruitment of refugees to fight inside Somalia has been another challenge to humanitarian principles. Kenya is also experiencing a severe drought and its own sharp ethnic conflict with 2007-2008 post election violence matters still unresolved and many observers convinced that another major outbreak of communal violence is imminent. This means that the GOK may be both distracted from dealing with the Somalia/Somali refugee situation and fearful of more Somali refugees and its own Somali population. ¶7. (C) In Ethiopia, three out of four existing refugee camps hosting Somalis are considered by the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) to have reached maximum capacity. The fourth, Bokolmayo Camp, is considered to be approximately 10,000 refugees from capacity. Ethiopia had been reluctant to acknowledge refugee flows into the area around Bokolmayo Camp and was not prepared to allow UNHCR to register them until 2008 as the GOE prepared to withdraw from the war in Somalia. Like Kenya and much of the rest of the Horn, Ethiopia is also experiencing a severe drought and food shortages. This, at a time when the GOE has been restricting political space and is less receptive to USG criticisms. ¶8. (C) A modest but steady flow of refugees continue to make their way from Somalia to Djibouti. The Government of Djibouti (GODJ) has been less welcoming of Somalis recently, with a GROD policy announcement in 2009 to deny young, single male Somalis entry to Djibouti even if they claim to be seeking asylum. In November the GODJ forcibly repatriated to Mogadishu 43 Somali asylum seekers who were rescued at sea and disembarked in Djibouti. ¶9. (C) Somalis in Yemen are comparatively well received, and STATE 00132604 003 OF 003 this may in fact encourage inflows. Yemen is increasingly viewed as a troubled, fragile state with north-south divisions gaining new salience and a heightened rebellion by Houthi tribesmen. Recently some Somalis seeking to cross into Saudi Arabia were reportedly impressed by the Houthis into fighting against the Government of Yemen (ROYG). We are concerned that Yemen, preoccupied by its own conflicts and terrorism threats, may also be a less willing partner on refugee response. -------------- ACTION REQUESTS -------------- ¶10. (C) During this time when neighboring countries may be less likely to welcome additional Somali refugees, the USG is committed to continuing to seek protection for Somali refugees. The top protection concern will be for Somalis to be able to access first asylum, including in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia. The challenge will be to work with refugee-hosting governments and localities ahead of time to try to prevent denied entry or pushing asylum seekers back. Top assistance concerns for Somali refugees will be adequate water and sanitation, requiring agreement from host governments for potential sites with available water and sufficient space to allow for sanitary conditions. Other assistance elements such as shelter material and non-food items, and even food, can and should be prepositioned. Among the range of critical and difficult protection issues, we seek to prevent the recruitment and attacks by any of the various Somali factions, including in cooperation with host government authorities. Finally, ensuring first asylum and funding what will likely be an expensive emergency refugee response are both well beyond the means of the USG alone and will demand greater multilateral cooperation. ¶11. (C) For Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and Sana'a: Please provide your best advice on how we can help secure cooperation from host authorities to plan for arrival of additional asylum seekers, and/or their agreement to receive asylum seekers humanely when they arrive. How should the USG present the appeal? Where are the pressure points? Recognizing that the Kenyans, for example, have not been moved so far by USG offers of help on the border security front, are there things that the USG could reasonably offer hosts to help secure their agreement? (Note: Given that the USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia, Emboffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue. End Note.) As we receieve posts' feedback, PRM will develop together with posts talking points for communication with host governments that will also include information about PRM refugee assistance in host countries. ¶12. (C) For Geneva: Mission is requested to meet urgently with UNHCR staff at an appropriately senior level to discuss plans and budgets for increased refugee flows, including pressing for urgent prepositioning of non-food items and release -- confidentially if need be to avoid raising host concerns -- appeals for financial support so that donors can have adequate lead time to prepare a response. The Mission is also requested to informally engage missions of the largest donors to UNHCR regarding expectations and increased funding needs associated with the anticipated refugee outflows. As above, given that the USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia, Missionoffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue. ¶13. (SBU) For USUN/Rome: Mission is requested to provide an update on WFP planning for refugee feeding efforts, including information on the pipeline for the PRROs in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti that cover refugees. As above, given that the USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia, Missionoffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue. ¶14. (U) PRM thanks Embassies and Missions in advance for responses as soon as possible but no later than January 6. PRM Washington POC is Program Officer Janet Deutsch at deutschje@state.gov (or deutschje@state.sgov.gov) or 202-663-1031. Regional Refugee Coordinator at Embassy Addis Ababa is Inga Heemink at heeminki@state.gov or IVG 750-4330. CLINTON