PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL SOMALI REFUGEE FLOWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 132604

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL DJ ET EU KE SO YM
SUBJECT: PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL SOMALI REFUGEE FLOWS

Classified By: PRM/AFR Director Margaret McKelvey


1. (C) ACTION REQUEST: In view of likely significant
refugee outflows from Somalia to neighboring countries in the
Horn of Africa in early 2010, addressees are requested to
urgently provide their best advice on how the USG can work
with host governments, including in consultation with other
relevant donors, to ensure that reluctant hosts will indeed
receive fleeing Somalis. U.S. Mission Geneva is requested to
urgently engage UNHCR on prepositioning of supplies and
drawing up funding appeals. Please see paras. 10 - 13.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Humanitarian conditions inside Somalia have
recently taken a notable turn for the worse (even by the
standards of a conflicted failed state),which is likely to
generate additional refugees in a region that is already far
less welcoming to those seeking safety and asylum than it has
been in the past. Security and access for humanitarians have
deteriorated in the areas of south-central Somalia currently
controlled by the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) al-Shabaab that encompass roughly half of
the more than three million Somalis judged to be in need of
food aid to survive. Al-Shabaab elements have tightened
control and decreed that the UN World Food Program (WFP)
should cease distributing foreign food aid as of January 1;
WFP has pulled back for an undetermined period in view of the
threats. Even without the latest al-Shabaab threat, WFP and
other humanitarian agencies were lacking support from the
U.S. and other donors owing to terrorism concerns. Without
access to humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of Somalis (if
not more) are expected to move toward Somaliland and Puntland
as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen. All of
these are preoccupied to a degree with their own internal
struggles as well as drought and can be expected to resist
new arrivals. To try to forestall additional violence, loss
of life, and destabilization, planning for emergency response
is urgently needed. End Summary.

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BACKGROUND FACTORS
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3. (U) Somali refugees total an estimated 550,000 persons
throughout the continent of Africa and beyond, most of whom
are in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti. As a protracted
refugee situation due to Somalia conflict and insecurity
dating back to the early 1990s, Somalis are now the largest
group of African refugees, and the outflow from Somalia is
expected to swell starting early in 2010. The people of
south-central Somalia largely live without the protection of
a working government, and in fear of conflict and food
insecurity that has already induced increased displacement
and refugee flows to neighboring countries in 2009. Most of
Somalia is rated by U.S. and UN famine early warning systems
as either highly or extremely food insecure. Fighting and
civilian casualties continue in Mogadishu and in other areas
of south-central Somalia, notably a November 2009 conflict in
the Afmadow district of Somalia, bordering Kenya, that
displaced an estimated 2,200 people. During a September 2009
monitoring trip to refugee camps in Kenya, refugee program
officers from State,s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration heard from some Somali new arrivals that they left
Somalia because of a fear of Al-Shabaab methods/punishments.
The anti-government and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) Al-Shabaab continues to attempt to impose
Islamic Sharia law in the parts of southern and central
Somalia that it controls, including parts of Mogadishu and
the port city of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab represents an extreme
fundamentalist form of Islam and in late 2009 has attempted
to punish Somali people for listening to music, women for
wearing bras, and, in recent weeks, has organized a public
stoning of a teenage female victim accused of adultery
because she was raped.


4. (U) In 2009, more than 53,000 new Somali refugees arrived
at the Dadaab Camps in Kenya, with a high of more than 8,000
new arrivals in January 2009 and a low of approximately 1,200
during the rainy season month of November 2009. In Ethiopia,
Somali new arrivals have averaged about 1,500 refugees per
month in 2007, 2008 and 2009. There are an estimated 150,000
Somali refugees in Yemen where Somalis receive prima facie
refugee status by the Yemeni Government. In addition, there
are more than 11,000 Somali refugees registered with the UN
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Djibouti; however,

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there are an unknown number of Somalis fleeing violent
conflict and insecurity to urban areas of Djibouti and who do
not register with UNHCR as refugees.


5. (C) Expectations for a worsening humanitarian crisis
strongly suggest that there will be another large outpouring
of Somalis in early 2010. Continuing conflict, drought and
high food prices have resulted in a staggering 3.3 million
people in Somalia in need of food aid. Already there are an
estimated 1.5 million Somali internally displaced persons
(IDPs) inside of Somalia. WFP has faced a lack of access to
populations in need of food aid due to conflict and threats
to its staff by al-Shabaab in many parts of southern and
central Somalia throughout 2009. Most recently, al-Shabaab
issued a dictate that as of January 1, 2010, no foreign food
is to be distributed in areas that it controls. While the
United States has consistently been the largest provider of
humanitarian assistance in Somalia, renewal of some U.S.
humanitarian programs, including provision of food aid
through WFP, has been delayed while we review conditions on
the ground to determine how to best deliver humanitarian
assistance consistent with U.S. policy and law regarding
possible benefit to an FTO. The anticipated outflow of
Somali refugees is considered particularly challenging in
light of a less welcoming atmosphere for Somali refugees in
some neighboring countries during 2009.


6. (C) Kenya, host to 300,000 or more Somali refugees, has
kept its border with Somalia officially closed since January
2007 -- in violation of its OAU Convention obligations to
allow asylum seekers to enter -- citing terrorism/security
concerns. Somalis have nonetheless been able to continue to
bribe their way into Kenya, and, incongruously, the
Government of Kenya (GOK) fingerprints and registers them.
There are 266,000 mostly Somali refugees in three severely
overcrowded camps near the Somalia border called the Dadaab
Camps, and more than 40,000 Somalis in the Kakuma Camp in a
desert-like environment in northwestern Kenya. Despite
multiple diplomatic efforts by the USG, some other donors,
and UNHCR, the GOK continues to resist establishing a fourth
camp in Dadaab or to re-open other sites that once housed
Somali refugees, and has thus far only provisionally agreed
to an expansion of one of the existing camps. Kenya had
proposed creating a so-called safe haven inside Somalia
itself (Comment: A non-starter because historically safe
havens have proven not to work to protect people and there is
no military force that could be engaged to occupy and secure
such an enclave. End Comment.) and/or moving more Somali
refugees from the Dadaab Camps to Kakuma Camp; however, UNHCR
considers Kakuma Camp to be about 10,000 refugees away from
reaching its maximum capacity, especially given the harsh
arid conditions of the area. Should Sudan revert to civil
war as many fear, Kakuma Camp would be needed to help house
an influx of Sudanese refugees. Kenyan recruitment of
refugees to fight inside Somalia has been another challenge
to humanitarian principles. Kenya is also experiencing a
severe drought and its own sharp ethnic conflict with
2007-2008 post election violence matters still unresolved and
many observers convinced that another major outbreak of
communal violence is imminent. This means that the GOK may
be both distracted from dealing with the Somalia/Somali
refugee situation and fearful of more Somali refugees and its
own Somali population.


7. (C) In Ethiopia, three out of four existing refugee camps
hosting Somalis are considered by the Government of Ethiopia
(GOE) to have reached maximum capacity. The fourth,
Bokolmayo Camp, is considered to be approximately 10,000
refugees from capacity. Ethiopia had been reluctant to
acknowledge refugee flows into the area around Bokolmayo Camp
and was not prepared to allow UNHCR to register them until
2008 as the GOE prepared to withdraw from the war in Somalia.
Like Kenya and much of the rest of the Horn, Ethiopia is
also experiencing a severe drought and food shortages. This,
at a time when the GOE has been restricting political space
and is less receptive to USG criticisms.


8. (C) A modest but steady flow of refugees continue to make
their way from Somalia to Djibouti. The Government of
Djibouti (GODJ) has been less welcoming of Somalis recently,
with a GROD policy announcement in 2009 to deny young, single
male Somalis entry to Djibouti even if they claim to be
seeking asylum. In November the GODJ forcibly repatriated to
Mogadishu 43 Somali asylum seekers who were rescued at sea
and disembarked in Djibouti.


9. (C) Somalis in Yemen are comparatively well received, and

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this may in fact encourage inflows. Yemen is increasingly
viewed as a troubled, fragile state with north-south
divisions gaining new salience and a heightened rebellion by
Houthi tribesmen. Recently some Somalis seeking to cross
into Saudi Arabia were reportedly impressed by the Houthis
into fighting against the Government of Yemen (ROYG). We are
concerned that Yemen, preoccupied by its own conflicts and
terrorism threats, may also be a less willing partner on
refugee response.

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ACTION REQUESTS
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10. (C) During this time when neighboring countries may be
less likely to welcome additional Somali refugees, the USG is
committed to continuing to seek protection for Somali
refugees. The top protection concern will be for Somalis to
be able to access first asylum, including in the Puntland and
Somaliland regions of Somalia. The challenge will be to work
with refugee-hosting governments and localities ahead of time
to try to prevent denied entry or pushing asylum seekers
back. Top assistance concerns for Somali refugees will be
adequate water and sanitation, requiring agreement from host
governments for potential sites with available water and
sufficient space to allow for sanitary conditions. Other
assistance elements such as shelter material and non-food
items, and even food, can and should be prepositioned. Among
the range of critical and difficult protection issues, we
seek to prevent the recruitment and attacks by any of the
various Somali factions, including in cooperation with host
government authorities. Finally, ensuring first asylum and
funding what will likely be an expensive emergency refugee
response are both well beyond the means of the USG alone and
will demand greater multilateral cooperation.


11. (C) For Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and Sana'a:
Please provide your best advice on how we can help secure
cooperation from host authorities to plan for arrival of
additional asylum seekers, and/or their agreement to receive
asylum seekers humanely when they arrive. How should the USG
present the appeal? Where are the pressure points?
Recognizing that the Kenyans, for example, have not been
moved so far by USG offers of help on the border security
front, are there things that the USG could reasonably offer
hosts to help secure their agreement? (Note: Given that the
USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian
requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia,
Emboffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue. End
Note.) As we receieve posts' feedback, PRM will develop
together with posts talking points for communication with
host governments that will also include information about PRM
refugee assistance in host countries.


12. (C) For Geneva: Mission is requested to meet urgently
with UNHCR staff at an appropriately senior level to discuss
plans and budgets for increased refugee flows, including
pressing for urgent prepositioning of non-food items and
release -- confidentially if need be to avoid raising host
concerns -- appeals for financial support so that donors can
have adequate lead time to prepare a response. The Mission
is also requested to informally engage missions of the
largest donors to UNHCR regarding expectations and increased
funding needs associated with the anticipated refugee
outflows. As above, given that the USG has not yet decided
how to address humanitarian requirements in al-Shabaab
controlled parts of Somalia, Missionoffs should not/not
discuss USG policy on that issue.


13. (SBU) For USUN/Rome: Mission is requested to provide an
update on WFP planning for refugee feeding efforts, including
information on the pipeline for the PRROs in Kenya, Ethiopia,
and Djibouti that cover refugees. As above, given that the
USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian
requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia,
Missionoffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue.


14. (U) PRM thanks Embassies and Missions in advance for
responses as soon as possible but no later than January 6.
PRM Washington POC is Program Officer Janet Deutsch at
deutschje@state.gov (or deutschje@state.sgov.gov) or
202-663-1031. Regional Refugee Coordinator at Embassy Addis
Ababa is Inga Heemink at heeminki@state.gov or IVG 750-4330.
CLINTON