ICRC BRIEFING ON CONDITIONS AND OPERATIONS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 125484 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: SO PREF PHUM SUBJECT: ICRC BRIEFING ON CONDITIONS AND OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA (NOVEMBER 18, 2009) Classified By: PRM/AFR Director Margaret McKelvey for reason 1.4(d) ADDIS AND NAIROBI FOR REFCOORDS, GENEVA FOR RMA, USEU FOR THOMAS ¶1. (C) Summary. ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation for Somalia (based in Nairobi),Hugo Van den Eertwegh, provided a candid and somewhat disheartening update ON the situation in Somalia to interested Department staff from PRM, AF, INR, and L ON November 18. Van den Eertwegh has several decades of experience with the ICRC and, as is typical of ICRC delegates, is steeped in many intricate details of the situations. The humanitarian situation and its political context have deteriorated steadily in 2009 after a hopeful start to the year. While ICRC does not presently expect famine at the 1991-92 levels, there are pockets of famine and severe malnutrition that will be increasingly difficult to address. El Nino flooding and la Nina drought are paradoxical challenges that farmers and pastoralists may have to cope with in the next year. Most of the arable land is in al-Shabaab-controlled areas. There will be a 10% increase in ICRC programming in Somalia (currently some $50 million for 2009, initial 2010 budget at 54.9 million Swiss francs),and should WFP be unable to continue food distributions owing to lack of USG and other donor support, then ICRC would likely be forced to try to pick up a little bit of the slack, but ICRC would not/not be able to match WFP,s operation in scope or time. ICRC makes no direct payments to anyone other than its longtime staff of 27 and no payments to al-Shabaab. If they are asked for fees/taxes (including from the TFG),they report this to clan elders and rely ON the elders to intervene to allow humanitarian aid to pass with no fees/taxes. ¶2. (C) Summary Continued. Van den Eertwegh described the TFG as "a shell for Western policy" which is able to exist only thanks to the presence of AMISOM -- and especially to the courage of individual soldiers and leaders who are often unpaid by their governments -- a force that lacks the vision or power to do much and is not particularly well trained in targeting firepower, leading to the kind of indiscriminate shelling of civilians which has made Somalis at best dislike AMISOM and at worst see AMISOM as a partisan combatant force allied with the TFG. He suggested that a better approach might be to recognize and work with the Somali traditional leadership and more diffuse governance system that is not hierarchical in the Western sense but instead is very horizontal, albeit with periodic blips of greater influence by a given individual or clan. Asked to elaborate ON ICRC,s experience with/knowledge of al-Shabaab, Van den Eertwegh described the movement as consisting of three levels, with the "top" level being a sort of umbrella, but, at the same time, with the three levels operating somewhat independently of each other and according to their own dynamics. At the very small "top" are the international jihadists that include foreign fighters; in the middle is the nationalistic and often xenophobic Islamic movement; and at the base are loosely-organized opportunists such as clan/sub-clan leaders hoping to forward their interests ON a national scale. The international jihadists would like nothing better than to be attacked by the USG in order to rally Somalis behind them and make their battle a real jihad. The middle level would like to see an Islamic emirate ON Somali territory. Lower levels are more opportunistic, with rather weak allegiances to al-Shabaab. Over the long haul, Van den Eertwegh speculated, the international jihad movement in Somalia would never be huge and would eventually collapse ON itself. ON the other hand, it is very troubling to witness the rapid increase in skill of terrorist attacks that probably indicate some sophisticated help -- IEDs, suicide bombers, and the use of a UN car stolen from Baidoa to pass through the AMISOM perimeter during the September bombing that killed a number of AMISOM officers. End summary. ¶3. (U) Hugo Van den Eertwegh, ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation for Somalia (based in Nairobi),provided an update on the situation in Somalia from the ICRC perspective to interested Department staff from PRM, AF, INR, and L ON November 18. The ICRC has been operating in Somalia since 1977, supporting and working closely with the Somali Red Crescent Society (SCRS). It runs an extensive aid program in Somalia that provides medical care, water, livelihoods, emergency food aid, household items, family tracing, and International Humanitarian Law education. Van den Eertwegh has several decades of experience with the ICRC and, as is typical of ICRC delegates, is steeped in many intricate details of the situation, including clan politics. ¶4. (C) Reviewing events over the past year, Van den Eertwegh noted that 2009 started off with a spark of hope, but the situation has steadily fallen apart starting with what he described as a flawed election, an internationally-imposed and divisive president (Sheik Sharif),and an ever stronger and more sophisticated al-Shabaab resistance. He described the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as "a shell for Western policy", noting that Sheik Sharif did not really have the capacity, in his view, to bring along elements of the Islamic Courts Union, that TFG only controlled one to two streets of Mogadishu at any given time, and that the Ras Kamboni leadership is very opposed to TFG recruiting efforts. When asked about the TFG,s capacity to deliver health care in Somalia (one of the assistance elements being considered by the USG),he bluntly said, "They have zero capacity." Van den Eertwegh suggested that the West, rather than supporting the TFG, would be better served by recognizing that the Somali traditional leadership and governance system is not hierarchical in the Western sense but instead is very horizontal, albeit with periodic blips of greater influence by a given individual or clan, and by finding a way to maintain relations with these more diffuse governing structures. The strategy of the West to interact with Western-identified leaders has little influence in this form of inherently nomadic society. To help listeners better understand this structure, he invoked the image of the days-long meeting of many people sitting under a tree in discussions as happened with the creation of Somaliland. He suggested that this kind of flattened leadership structure leads to more liberal/individualistic thinking/behavior while the concentration of Somalis in urban areas as a result of conflict displacement has led to a certain conservative radicalization and changed clan/sub-clan dynamics and control to some extent. ¶5. (C) Van den Eertwegh attributed the survival to date of this particular TFG to the presence of AMISOM and especially to the courage of individual soldiers and leaders in AMISOM. Noting that even the very organized Ethiopian forces had been unable to prevail in Somalia, he said AMISOM lack the vision or power to do anything more than protect a few elements of the TFG. He decried the fact that the individual soldiers were often unpaid since the international support for AMISOM goes to their home governments (and fails to be passed on) and that they were not particularly well trained in targeting firepower, leading to the kind of indiscriminate shelling of civilians which has made Somalis at best dislike AMISOM and at worst see AMISOM as a partisan combatant force allied with the TFG. ¶6. (C) Turning to the humanitarian situation, Van den Eertwegh noted that humanitarian need was massive, though he admitted that tracking the numbers of displaced is very difficult when people have been displaced multiple times and when "displacement" has a somewhat different connotation in a nomadic society. He credited UNHCR with doing a very credible job of tracking the displaced under the circumstances. While he did not expect famine at the 1991-92 levels, he warned of pockets of famine and severe malnutrition that will be increasingly difficult to address. Drought and flooding are paradoxical challenges that farmers and pastoralists may have to cope with in the next year. In one area, two weeks of el Nino rains had created just enough pasture that pastoralists flocked to the area, creating instant clan conflict. Flooding of both the Shabelle and Juba Rivers is expected which could spoil January harvests. Charcoal-making as a coping mechanism is contributing to "desertification" which can be expected to make flooding worse. And if history is any guide, then la Nina drought can be expected to FOLLOW the el Nino floods. Most arable land is in al-Shabaab-held territory. Health agencies, he said, are already having difficulty providing services in the increasingly insecure environment. He noted that UNICEF has been particularly hard-hit, with its cold chain destroyed and therapeutic food (plumpy-nut) stolen. ¶7. (C) Asked to elaborate ON ICRC,s experience with/knowledge of al-Shabaab, Van den Eertwegh described the movement as consisting of three levels, with the "top" level being a sort of umbrella, but, at the same time, with the three levels operating somewhat independently of each other and according to their own dynamics. At the "top" are the international jihadists that include foreign fighters and the leaders of which are largely Issak and Dir; in the middle is the nationalistic and often xenophobic Islamic movement; and at the base are loosely-organized opportunists such as clan/sub-clan leaders hoping to forward their interests ON a national scale (e.g., Rahanweyn who have had relatively less power but could achieve more through allying with al-Shabaab). Van den Eertwegh said that members of al-Shabaab have differing goals depending ON the above levels. The international jihadists, who are by far the smallest element, are Taliban-like, are looking to help forge a global umma and unity in the face of a common enemy, and see Somalia as a scene to ON which to fight this larger battle. They would love nothing more than to drag the USG into the Somali conflict in order to rally Somalis behind them and would "love to be attacked" because it would then make their battle a real jihad. The middle level would like to see an Islamic emirate ON Somali territory. Lower levels are more opportunistic and are using their positions within al-Shabaab to gain political power and control of their part of the country. ¶8. (C) Van den Eertwegh thought it would be possible for the international community to work politically over time with these "lower" groups as their allegiances to al-Shabaab are rather weak. (And given the Somali character, one can always strike a "business" deal/negotiate an alliance of convenience in Somalia!). Over the long haul, Van den Eertwegh speculated, the international jihad movement in Somalia "will never be that huge," and would eventually collapse ON itself. He described al-Shabaab as very "un-Somali", noting that public executions, stoning, and anti-khat edicts have little support among the Somali people who are fearful of the unpredictable nature of al-Shabaab with prohibited activities/clothing shifting from one day to the next.. Somalis have also never been welcoming to "outsiders", limiting the likelihood that al-Shabaab would ever be able to rule effectively in Somalia, or that al Qaeda foreigners would survive there. ON the other hand, it is very troubling to witness the rapid increase in skill of terrorist attacks that probably indicate some sophisticated help -- IEDs, suicide bombers, and the use of a UN car stolen from Baidoa to pass through the AMISOM perimeter during the September bombing that killed a number of AMISOM officers. ¶9. (C) Against this background, ICRC is providing targeted assistance as possible and supporting the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS). Van den Eertwegh noted that ICRC, with some 27 long-term staff in Somalia, has a good institutional memory and is able to operate effectively working through local suppliers. ICRC makes no direct payments to anyone other than its staff and no payments to al-Shabaab. If they are asked for fees/taxes (including from the TFG),they report this to clan elders and rely ON the elders to intervene to allow humanitarian aid to pass with no fees/taxes. That said, Van den Eertwegh said that ICRC obviously cannot prevent armed elements such as al-Shabaab from later taking items from beneficiaries. ICRC tries to minimize any diversions by "keeping low to the ground" and getting feedback to ensure programs are conducted according to plan. They practice "due diligence" and feel fairly confident that their aid is reaching the intended beneficiaries. ICRC has had to make some concessions ON standard operating procedures in order to work in Somalia. First, they travel with armed guards from the local clans where they are passing through, and second, they do not use the Red Cross emblem. Van den Eertwegh felt these concessions made sense in the Somali context and were justified in light of what ICRC is able to accomplish there. He expressed hope that both practices, which are fundamentally in conflict with ICRC,s identity, could ultimately be ended. ¶10. (C) Van den Eertwegh stressed the importance of ICRC maintaining its traditional neutrality. When asked whether ICRC would consider support to al-Shabaab defectors, the answer was categorically negative. Any ICRC assistance to defectors would immediately be perceived as support to the "enemy" and would jeopardize the work that ICRC is able to do in al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Van den Eertwegh suggested that demobilization of al-Shabaab fighters would more appropriately fall under AMISOM,s mandate. He also cautioned that defectors can be fickle, noting that Ethiopia had trained 3,000 Somali troops who almost immediately went over to the other side. Any defectors demobilized by AMISOM should be moved to third countries to prevent their also re-entering the fray. ¶11. (SBU) For 2010, Van den Eertwegh is anticipating a 10% increase in ICRC programming in Somalia (currently some $50 million for 2009, initial 2010 budget at 54.9 million Swiss francs). This will cover additional health clinics/feeding centers operated with the SRCS to address increasing malnutrition. He stressed that ICRC does not want to get too big (all humanitarian programs together are valued at some $1.5 billion),preferring that its programs remain complementary to the UN,s rather than overlapping. In subsequent discussions with ICRC, Director of Operations Pierre Krahenbuhl said that if WFP were unable to continue food distributions owing to lack of USG and other donor support, then ICRC would likely be forced to try to pick up some of the slack, but that ICRC would not be able to match WFP,s operation in scope or time. CLINTON