ICRC BRIEFING ON CONDITIONS AND OPERATIONS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 125484

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: SO PREF PHUM
SUBJECT: ICRC BRIEFING ON CONDITIONS AND OPERATIONS IN
SOMALIA (NOVEMBER 18, 2009)

Classified By: PRM/AFR Director Margaret McKelvey for reason 1.4(d)

ADDIS AND NAIROBI FOR REFCOORDS, GENEVA FOR RMA, USEU FOR
THOMAS


1. (C) Summary. ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation for Somalia
(based in Nairobi),Hugo Van den Eertwegh, provided a candid
and somewhat disheartening update on the situation in Somalia
to interested Department staff from PRM, AF, INR, and L on
November 18. Van den Eertwegh has several decades of
experience with the ICRC and, as is typical of ICRC
delegates, is steeped in many intricate details of the
situations. The humanitarian situation and its political
context have deteriorated steadily in 2009 after a hopeful
start to the year. While ICRC does not presently expect
famine at the 1991-92 levels, there are pockets of famine and
severe malnutrition that will be increasingly difficult to
address. El Nino flooding and la Nina drought are
paradoxical challenges that farmers and pastoralists may have
to cope with in the next year. Most of the arable land is in
al-Shabaab-controlled areas. There will be a 10% increase in
ICRC programming in Somalia (currently some $50 million for
2009, initial 2010 budget at 54.9 million Swiss francs),and
should WFP be unable to continue food distributions owing to
lack of USG and other donor support, then ICRC would likely
be forced to try to pick up a little bit of the slack, but
ICRC would not/not be able to match WFP,s operation in scope
or time. ICRC makes no direct payments to anyone other than
its longtime staff of 27 and no payments to al-Shabaab. If
they are asked for fees/taxes (including from the TFG),they
report this to clan elders and rely on the elders to
intervene to allow humanitarian aid to pass with no
fees/taxes.


2. (C) Summary Continued. Van den Eertwegh described the
TFG as "a shell for Western policy" which is able to exist
only thanks to the presence of AMISOM -- and especially to
the courage of individual soldiers and leaders who are often
unpaid by their governments -- a force that lacks the vision
or power to do much and is not particularly well trained in
targeting firepower, leading to the kind of indiscriminate
shelling of civilians which has made Somalis at best dislike
AMISOM and at worst see AMISOM as a partisan combatant force
allied with the TFG. He suggested that a better approach
might be to recognize and work with the Somali traditional
leadership and more diffuse governance system that is not
hierarchical in the Western sense but instead is very
horizontal, albeit with periodic blips of greater influence
by a given individual or clan. Asked to elaborate on ICRC,s
experience with/knowledge of al-Shabaab, Van den Eertwegh
described the movement as consisting of three levels, with
the "top" level being a sort of umbrella, but, at the same
time, with the three levels operating somewhat independently
of each other and according to their own dynamics. At the
very small "top" are the international jihadists that include
foreign fighters; in the middle is the nationalistic and
often xenophobic Islamic movement; and at the base are
loosely-organized opportunists such as clan/sub-clan leaders
hoping to forward their interests on a national scale. The
international jihadists would like nothing better than to be
attacked by the USG in order to rally Somalis behind them and
make their battle a real jihad. The middle level would like
to see an Islamic emirate on Somali territory. Lower levels
are more opportunistic, with rather weak allegiances to
al-Shabaab. Over the long haul, Van den Eertwegh
speculated, the international jihad movement in Somalia would
never be huge and would eventually collapse on itself. On
the other hand, it is very troubling to witness the rapid
increase in skill of terrorist attacks that probably indicate
some sophisticated help -- IEDs, suicide bombers, and the use
of a UN car stolen from Baidoa to pass through the AMISOM
perimeter during the September bombing that killed a number
of AMISOM officers. End summary.

3. (U) Hugo Van den Eertwegh, ICRC Deputy Head of
Delegation for Somalia (based in Nairobi),provided an update
on the situation in Somalia from the ICRC perspective to
interested Department staff from PRM, AF, INR, and L on
November 18. The ICRC has been operating in Somalia since
1977, supporting and working closely with the Somali Red
Crescent Society (SCRS). It runs an extensive aid program in
Somalia that provides medical care, water, livelihoods,
emergency food aid, household items, family tracing, and
International Humanitarian Law education. Van den Eertwegh
has several decades of experience with the ICRC and, as is
typical of ICRC delegates, is steeped in many intricate
details of the situation, including clan politics.

4. (C) Reviewing events over the past year, Van den
Eertwegh noted that 2009 started off with a spark of hope,
but the situation has steadily fallen apart starting with
what he described as a flawed election, an
internationally-imposed and divisive president (Sheik
Sharif),and an ever stronger and more sophisticated
al-Shabaab resistance. He described the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) as "a shell for Western policy", noting that
Sheik Sharif did not really have the capacity, in his view,
to bring along elements of the Islamic Courts Union, that TFG
only controlled one to two streets of Mogadishu at any given
time, and that the Ras Kamboni leadership is very opposed to
TFG recruiting efforts. When asked about the TFG,s capacity
to deliver health care in Somalia (one of the assistance
elements being considered by the USG),he bluntly said, "They
have zero capacity." Van den Eertwegh suggested that the
West, rather than supporting the TFG, would be better served
by recognizing that the Somali traditional leadership and
governance system is not hierarchical in the Western sense
but instead is very horizontal, albeit with periodic blips of
greater influence by a given individual or clan, and by
finding a way to maintain relations with these more diffuse
governing structures. The strategy of the West to interact
with Western-identified leaders has little influence in this
form of inherently nomadic society. To help listeners better
understand this structure, he invoked the image of the
days-long meeting of many people sitting under a tree in
discussions as happened with the creation of Somaliland. He
suggested that this kind of flattened leadership structure
leads to more liberal/individualistic thinking/behavior while
the concentration of Somalis in urban areas as a result of
conflict displacement has led to a certain conservative
radicalization and changed clan/sub-clan dynamics and control
to some extent.

5. (C) Van den Eertwegh attributed the survival to date of
this particular TFG to the presence of AMISOM and especially
to the courage of individual soldiers and leaders in AMISOM.
Noting that even the very organized Ethiopian forces had been
unable to prevail in Somalia, he said AMISOM lack the vision
or power to do anything more than protect a few elements of
the TFG. He decried the fact that the individual soldiers
were often unpaid since the international support for AMISOM
goes to their home governments (and fails to be passed on)
and that they were not particularly well trained in targeting
firepower, leading to the kind of indiscriminate shelling of
civilians which has made Somalis at best dislike AMISOM and
at worst see AMISOM as a partisan combatant force allied with
the TFG.

6. (C) Turning to the humanitarian situation, Van den
Eertwegh noted that humanitarian need was massive, though he
admitted that tracking the numbers of displaced is very
difficult when people have been displaced multiple times and
when "displacement" has a somewhat different connotation in a
nomadic society. He credited UNHCR with doing a very
credible job of tracking the displaced under the
circumstances. While he did not expect famine at the 1991-92
levels, he warned of pockets of famine and severe
malnutrition that will be increasingly difficult to address.
Drought and flooding are paradoxical challenges that farmers
and pastoralists may have to cope with in the next year. In
one area, two weeks of el Nino rains had created just enough
pasture that pastoralists flocked to the area, creating
instant clan conflict. Flooding of both the Shabelle and Juba
Rivers is expected which could spoil January harvests.
Charcoal-making as a coping mechanism is contributing to
"desertification" which can be expected to make flooding
worse. And if history is any guide, then la Nina drought can
be expected to follow the el Nino floods. Most arable land
is in al-Shabaab-held territory. Health agencies, he said,
are already having difficulty providing services in the
increasingly insecure environment. He noted that UNICEF has
been particularly hard-hit, with its cold chain destroyed and
therapeutic food (plumpy-nut) stolen.

7. (C) Asked to elaborate on ICRC,s experience
with/knowledge of al-Shabaab, Van den Eertwegh described the
movement as consisting of three levels, with the "top" level
being a sort of umbrella, but, at the same time, with the
three levels operating somewhat independently of each other
and according to their own dynamics. At the "top" are the
international jihadists that include foreign fighters and the
leaders of which are largely Issak and Dir; in the middle is
the nationalistic and often xenophobic Islamic movement; and
at the base are loosely-organized opportunists such as
clan/sub-clan leaders hoping to forward their interests on a
national scale (e.g., Rahanweyn who have had relatively less
power but could achieve more through allying with
al-Shabaab). Van den Eertwegh said that members of
al-Shabaab have differing goals depending on the above
levels. The international jihadists, who are by far the
smallest element, are Taliban-like, are looking to help forge
a global umma and unity in the face of a common enemy, and
see Somalia as a scene to on which to fight this larger
battle. They would love nothing more than to drag the USG
into the Somali conflict in order to rally Somalis behind
them and would "love to be attacked" because it would then
make their battle a real jihad. The middle level would like
to see an Islamic emirate on Somali territory. Lower levels
are more opportunistic and are using their positions within
al-Shabaab to gain political power and control of their part
of the country.

8. (C) Van den Eertwegh thought it would be possible for the
international community to work politically over time with
these "lower" groups as their allegiances to al-Shabaab are
rather weak. (And given the Somali character, one can always
strike a "business" deal/negotiate an alliance of convenience
in Somalia!). Over the long haul, Van den Eertwegh
speculated, the international jihad movement in Somalia "will
never be that huge," and would eventually collapse on itself.
He described al-Shabaab as very "un-Somali", noting that
public executions, stoning, and anti-khat edicts have little
support among the Somali people who are fearful of the
unpredictable nature of al-Shabaab with prohibited
activities/clothing shifting from one day to the next..
Somalis have also never been welcoming to "outsiders",
limiting the likelihood that al-Shabaab would ever be able to
rule effectively in Somalia, or that al Qaeda foreigners
would survive there. On the other hand, it is very troubling
to witness the rapid increase in skill of terrorist attacks
that probably indicate some sophisticated help -- IEDs,
suicide bombers, and the use of a UN car stolen from Baidoa
to pass through the AMISOM perimeter during the September
bombing that killed a number of AMISOM officers.

9. (C) Against this background, ICRC is providing targeted
assistance as possible and supporting the Somali Red Crescent
Society (SRCS). Van den Eertwegh noted that ICRC, with some
27 long-term staff in Somalia, has a good institutional
memory and is able to operate effectively working through
local suppliers. ICRC makes no direct payments to anyone
other than its staff and no payments to al-Shabaab. If they
are asked for fees/taxes (including from the TFG),they
report this to clan elders and rely on the elders to
intervene to allow humanitarian aid to pass with no
fees/taxes. That said, Van den Eertwegh said that ICRC
obviously cannot prevent armed elements such as al-Shabaab
from later taking items from beneficiaries. ICRC tries to
minimize any diversions by "keeping low to the ground" and
getting feedback to ensure programs are conducted according
to plan. They practice "due diligence" and feel fairly
confident that their aid is reaching the intended
beneficiaries. ICRC has had to make some concessions on
standard operating procedures in order to work in Somalia.
First, they travel with armed guards from the local clans
where they are passing through, and second, they do not use
the Red Cross emblem. Van den Eertwegh felt these
concessions made sense in the Somali context and were
justified in light of what ICRC is able to accomplish there.
He expressed hope that both practices, which are
fundamentally in conflict with ICRC,s identity, could
ultimately be ended.

10. (C) Van den Eertwegh stressed the importance of ICRC
maintaining its traditional neutrality. When asked whether
ICRC would consider support to al-Shabaab defectors, the
answer was categorically negative. Any ICRC assistance to
defectors would immediately be perceived as support to the
"enemy" and would jeopardize the work that ICRC is able to do
in al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Van den Eertwegh suggested
that demobilization of al-Shabaab fighters would more
appropriately fall under AMISOM,s mandate. He also cautioned
that defectors can be fickle, noting that Ethiopia had
trained 3,000 Somali troops who almost immediately went over
to the other side. Any defectors demobilized by AMISOM
should be moved to third countries to prevent their also
re-entering the fray.

11. (SBU) For 2010, Van den Eertwegh is anticipating a 10%
increase in ICRC programming in Somalia (currently some $50
million for 2009, initial 2010 budget at 54.9 million Swiss
francs). This will cover additional health clinics/feeding
centers operated with the SRCS to address increasing
malnutrition. He stressed that ICRC does not want to get too
big (all humanitarian programs together are valued at some
$1.5 billion),preferring that its programs remain
complementary to the UN,s rather than overlapping. In
subsequent discussions with ICRC, Director of Operations
Pierre Krahenbuhl said that if WFP were unable to continue
food distributions owing to lack of USG and other donor
support, then ICRC would likely be forced to try to pick up
some of the slack, but that ICRC would not be able to match
WFP,s operation in scope or time.
CLINTON