Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE123108
2009-12-01 21:06:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:
SHIELD S19-09: IRAN SEEKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #3108 3352110 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 012106Z DEC 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1071
S E C R E T STATE 123108
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC TY IR
SUBJECT: SHIELD S19-09: IRAN SEEKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PRECURSOR FROM TURKISH FIRM
REF: A. 08 PARIS 735
B. 07 PARIS 2601
Classified By: Classified By: Tina Kaidanow, DAS, EUR/FO
Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
S E C R E T STATE 123108
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC TY IR
SUBJECT: SHIELD S19-09: IRAN SEEKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PRECURSOR FROM TURKISH FIRM
REF: A. 08 PARIS 735
B. 07 PARIS 2601
Classified By: Classified By: Tina Kaidanow, DAS, EUR/FO
Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. has obtained information
indicating that Iran's Raja Shimi Industrial Factories is
seeking the Australia Group (AG) controlled chemical weapons
(CW) precursor dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish firm Ak
Kim Kimya. As a respected AG member, the GOT will understand
the significant proliferation potential posed by supplying
Raja Shimi with AG-controlled chemicals, such as DMA. Raja
Shimi's production capabilities and its role in Iran's
suspected CW program have been key discussion topics at
several past AG meetings (reftels). Therefore, we would like
to alert the GOT to Ak Kim Kimya's dealings with Raja Shimi
and urge the GOT to prevent the transfer of AG-controlled
chemicals to Iran. We would also like to inform the GOT
about domestic legal obligations that may require us to
report any transaction between Ak Kim Kimya and Iran to
Congress. END BACKGROUND.
3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests that Post
deliver the points in paragraph 4 to appropriate host
government officials and report a response. The points may
be left as a non-paper.
4. (SBU) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL TURKEY)
-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we
would like to raise a matter of chemical weapons (CW)
proliferation concern and request the Government of Turkey's
assistance in investigating the following activity.
-- We have information that the Iranian entity Raja Shimi
Industry Factories is seeking to purchase Australia Group
(AG) controlled dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish company
Ak Kim Kimya Sanaya ve Ticaret A.S.
-- The address for Ak-Kim Kimya is Suleyman Seba Cad. Acisu
Sok Taslik, Apartment Number 13, 34357, Macka, Istanbul,
Turkey.
-- Although it has legitimate civilian uses, dimethylamine
can also be used as a chemical precursor for the nerve agent
Tabun, which is why the chemical is on the Australia Group's
control list of chemical weapons precursors.
-- As you know, in its Chemical Weapons Convention Schedule
3 declaration, Iran identified Raja Shimi as a chemical
production facility owned by the Iranian Defense Ministry.
-- We are concerned that this precursor could be intended
for, or diverted to, Iran's chemical weapons program.
-- We also want to alert you that the United States, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires
us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress
identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who
have transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea, and
Syria certain items of proliferation concern, including items
that are on the Australia Group's lists.
-- We appreciate our continued close nonproliferation
cooperation, and would appreciate any information the Turkish
Government could share regarding this matter.
End talking points/non-paper.
5. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S19-09 and
slug for ISN.
7. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance.
CLINTON
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC TY IR
SUBJECT: SHIELD S19-09: IRAN SEEKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PRECURSOR FROM TURKISH FIRM
REF: A. 08 PARIS 735
B. 07 PARIS 2601
Classified By: Classified By: Tina Kaidanow, DAS, EUR/FO
Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. has obtained information
indicating that Iran's Raja Shimi Industrial Factories is
seeking the Australia Group (AG) controlled chemical weapons
(CW) precursor dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish firm Ak
Kim Kimya. As a respected AG member, the GOT will understand
the significant proliferation potential posed by supplying
Raja Shimi with AG-controlled chemicals, such as DMA. Raja
Shimi's production capabilities and its role in Iran's
suspected CW program have been key discussion topics at
several past AG meetings (reftels). Therefore, we would like
to alert the GOT to Ak Kim Kimya's dealings with Raja Shimi
and urge the GOT to prevent the transfer of AG-controlled
chemicals to Iran. We would also like to inform the GOT
about domestic legal obligations that may require us to
report any transaction between Ak Kim Kimya and Iran to
Congress. END BACKGROUND.
3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests that Post
deliver the points in paragraph 4 to appropriate host
government officials and report a response. The points may
be left as a non-paper.
4. (SBU) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL TURKEY)
-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we
would like to raise a matter of chemical weapons (CW)
proliferation concern and request the Government of Turkey's
assistance in investigating the following activity.
-- We have information that the Iranian entity Raja Shimi
Industry Factories is seeking to purchase Australia Group
(AG) controlled dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish company
Ak Kim Kimya Sanaya ve Ticaret A.S.
-- The address for Ak-Kim Kimya is Suleyman Seba Cad. Acisu
Sok Taslik, Apartment Number 13, 34357, Macka, Istanbul,
Turkey.
-- Although it has legitimate civilian uses, dimethylamine
can also be used as a chemical precursor for the nerve agent
Tabun, which is why the chemical is on the Australia Group's
control list of chemical weapons precursors.
-- As you know, in its Chemical Weapons Convention Schedule
3 declaration, Iran identified Raja Shimi as a chemical
production facility owned by the Iranian Defense Ministry.
-- We are concerned that this precursor could be intended
for, or diverted to, Iran's chemical weapons program.
-- We also want to alert you that the United States, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires
us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress
identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who
have transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea, and
Syria certain items of proliferation concern, including items
that are on the Australia Group's lists.
-- We appreciate our continued close nonproliferation
cooperation, and would appreciate any information the Turkish
Government could share regarding this matter.
End talking points/non-paper.
5. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S19-09 and
slug for ISN.
7. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance.
CLINTON