SFO-VII GUIDANCE-004

S E C R E T STATE 122735

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2029
TAGS: KACT PARM START RS US KZ UP BO
SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-004

REF: A. GENEVA 943 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-002)

B. GENEVA 957 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-004)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Nuclear Armaments for Heavy Bombers
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1.(S) Background: In Ref A, Delegation recommended that
the U.S. modify its original proposal on nuclear armaments
for heavy bombers by adding a requirement for each side to
declare, store in a central storage facility, and permit
the inspection of, non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs
(LRNA) (or their airframes considered to contain LRNA).
However, the Russian side has been consistent in voicing
its strong opposition to permitting inspection in its
weapons storage areas, which is the key element of both
the original U.S. position on nuclear armaments for heavy
bombers, and the delegation's proposed modification.
Russia has instead proposed an attribution rule for heavy
bomber nuclear armaments, suggesting that each heavy
bomber be attributed with one nuclear weapon, but making
clear that Russia was open to considering a different
attribution should the United States wish to propose
one.


2. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation is
instructed to inform the Russian delegation that
Washington is prepared to accept an attribution rule for
nuclear armaments associated with heavy bombers on the
conditions that the attribution for each deployed heavy
bomber is three nuclear armaments, and that three heavy
bombers can be selected and inspected during each category
one inspection conducted at a heavy bomber base.

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Inspection Issues
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3. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation is
authorized to make the proposals described in paragraphs
4-5 below in return for Russian acceptance of the U.S.
proposal that each party be permitted up to twelve Type 1
and eight type 2 inspections each year.


4. (S) In exchange for Russian agreement to 20 inspections
as described in paragraph 3, Washington concurs with the
Delegation's recommendation in Ref B to offer that one
launcher that contains a deployed ICBM or SLBM be
designated for a nuclear warhead inspection (NWI),
provided inspectors are also granted the right to
designate and inspect one ICBM or SLBM launcher that is
empty. Delegation should ensure that the treaty or its
protocol makes it clear that a launcher declared to be "
empty" means a launcher that does not contain a missile.
A launcher that contains a missile without a front
section, or a missile with zero warheads on it, would be
declared as a deployed ICBM or SLBM having zero warheads
deployed on it. The ICBM or SLBM launcher selected for
confirmation that it is empty need not be from the same
SLBM or from the same flight of ICBMs that is selected for
the warhead inspection.


5. (S) Also in the context of Russian agreement to 20
inspections as described in paragraph 3, delegation is
further authorized to agree that two inspections may be
conducted at no more than four facilities during a year.

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Mobile ICBM Elimination
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6. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation
is authorized to drop the right of inspectors to be
present during the final elimination procedure for the
elimination of the first stage of a mobile ICBM provided
that inspectors are able to confirm both the unique
identifier associated with the missile and its associated
launch canister, and that the procedures permit inspectors
to confirm visually that the missile has, in fact, been
eliminated in an inspection of the eliminated missile that
can be conducted following the completion of the
elimination procedures.

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MOU DATA
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7. (S) Washington concurs with the delegation
recommendation, provided via email, to populate the MOU at
the time of treaty signature with the most recent START
MOU data (which will be six months old),provided Russia
agrees with an obligation for each party to update that
data within 45 days after signature.


8. (S) With respect to the Russian concern, reported by
the delegation via email, on reporting warhead data in the
MOU, delegation is instructed first to note that warhead
data can only be exchanged after Treaty entry into force.
Furthermore, Delegation is authorized to agree with the
Russian proposal that the MOU contain only aggregate
warhead data for each base (rather than warhead data for
each individual missile),on the condition that Russia
agree to the releasability of the MOU data similar to the
procedures used under START for MOU data releasability.
End Guidance.
CLINTON