Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE12250
2009-02-10 21:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

FOR AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT TO SIGN AN ADDENDUM

Tags:  KNNP PGOV PREL GG 
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VZCZCXYZ0033
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2250 0412117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 102101Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0000
UNCLAS STATE 012250 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: FOR AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT TO SIGN AN ADDENDUM
TO EXISTING U.S.-GEORGIA ANTI-NUCLEAR SMUGGLING JOINT
ACTION PLAN.

UNCLAS STATE 012250 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP PGOV PREL GG SUBJECT: FOR AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT TO SIGN AN ADDENDUM TO EXISTING U.S.-GEORGIA ANTI-NUCLEAR SMUGGLING JOINT ACTION PLAN. ¶1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Tbilisi. Please see paragraph 3. ¶2. (U) BACKGROUND: On February 2, 2007, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft signed the Joint Document of U.S. and Georgian Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. This document identified 52 steps to be taken to improve Georgia's anti-nuclear smuggling capabilities. As of February 2009, the Government of Georgia (GOG) has completed or made significant progress on most of these steps. The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) team has also secured funding from U.S. and international assistance providers for five projects to help Georgia implement the steps in this Joint Document. On October 26, 2008, the NSOI team returned to Tbilisi to negotiate an addendum to the Joint Document to more accurately reflect Georgia's current anti-smuggling needs, particularly those needs resulting from the August 2008 conflict. The GOG recently approved the final text of this Addendum and agreed to participate in an official signing ceremony organized by Embassy Tbilisi on February 26, 2009. The Georgian delegation indicated that the deputy ministers of all the relevant agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice) would sign on behalf of the GOG. Like the original Joint Document, the Addendum is a political but not legally-binding agreement, and it will encourage additional efforts on the part of the GOG to improve its anti-nuclear smuggling capabilities and provide a framework for targeted outreach to international donors to support these efforts. The full text of this Addendum is in para 4. END BACKGROUND. ¶3. (U) Action request for Embassy Tbilisi: Department requests Ambassador John F. Tefft sign the Addendum to the February 2007 Joint Document on behalf of the U.S. at a signing ceremony hosted by Embassy Tbilisi on February 26, ¶2009. ¶4. (SBU) Begin text of Addendum to the Joint Document of U.S. and Georgian Delegations as finally agreed: Addendum to the Joint Document of Georgian and U.S. Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggli
ng February 26, 2009 On February 2, 2007, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Georgia John F. Tefft and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Gela Bezhuashvili signed in Tbilisi the Joint Document of U.S. and Georgian Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. Since that time, the Government of Georgia has taken significant steps to address the needs identified in that document and the Government of the United States has secured commitments of assistance from several U.S. and international donors to assist Georgia in implementing those steps. In light of the degradation of Georgia's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling caused by the events of August 2008, delegations of the Governments of the United States of America and Georgia have agreed to supplement the Joint Document with this Addendum, which specifies additional and revised steps that should be taken to restore and further improve Georgia's capabilities. PREVENTION Securing Orphaned and other Dangerous Radioactive Sources - Designate a ministry or agency with clear authority for the management of disused radioactive sources. - Complete the consolidation of sources that are currently in temporary storage into the new interim storage facility as soon as possible. (Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources; Andronikashvili Institute of Physics; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). - Establish a joint working group between the Customs Control Department at the Revenue Service of the Georgian Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, and the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) at the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources to develop procedures for responding to radioactive material detections at the state border. As part of this effort, this working group will define existing needs at the border and present them to the U.S. side for discussion. DETECTION Improved Border Security and Capabilities of Law Enforcement Bodies - Provide the MOIA, Patrol Police, Border Police, Customs Service, and other agencies with which they interact, reliable, robust, secure, and compatible communications technology and infrastructure. - Enhance the capability of the Georgian Coast Guard to monitor Georgia's sea space. This may include: --Additional patrol vessels; --Portable radiation detection equipment; --Communications equipment; --Other equipment and infrastructure; and --Training. - Develop a plan for monitoring of Georgia's green borders with aviation assets. - Equip the Patrol Police and other relevant MOIA units with radiation detection equipment and provide appropriate training. - Equip the Customs Service with appropriate radiation detection equipment and provide related training. - Establish a center to provide centralized repair, maintenance, and calibration service for the radiation detection equipment of all agencies. RESPONSE Prosecution and Nuclear Forensics - Commit to follow the standards for responding to incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material contained in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series Documents and other relevant international guidelines. Georgia may need additional equipment or training to carry out some of these steps. - Develop a written radiological and nuclear response plan to codify implementation of these standards. - Conduct regular exercises to ensure the effective implementation of this plan. - Participate in the Nuclear Forensic Workshop for the Caucasus region sponsored by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and planned for December 2008. International Cooperation and Information Sharing - Participate actively in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. (MFA and other relevant Georgian agencies) - Work with the governments of third countries to enhance regional cooperation to facilitate investigation and prosecution of illicit traffickers. The delegations agreed that the Government of Georgia would continue to work expeditiously to implement those steps in the Joint Document of February 2, 2007, as well as the steps enumerated above, that it is capable of carrying out on its own, and where assistance is needed, the Government of the United States of America would continue to seek to identify sources, within either the U.S. government or the international community, to provide such assistance. End text. ¶5. (U) Department greatly appreciates Post's assistance. ¶6. (U) Department Point of Contact: Daniela Carcani (CarcaniD@state.gov),phone 202-736-4917. CLINTON

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