U.S. POLICY ON FUTURE CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN IRAQ

S E C R E T STATE 122448 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PINS ECON IZ SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON FUTURE CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN IRAQ REF: A: WHITEHOUSE 312206Z MAR 09 B: STATE 34650 APR 09 Classified By: NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. This cable describes the new U.S. policy on the future civilian provincial presence in Iraq. It builds upon previous cables outlining the U.S. drawdown strategy and policy on political engagement in Iraq, and it has been cleared by DoD and the NSC. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) The President's strategies for responsible drawdown and political engagement (Refs A and B),approved on February 25 and March 13, 2009, respectively, identify key priorities with relevance for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The responsible drawdown strategy states that "U.S. civilian programs mitigate some risks in the military drawdown and should be continued as available resources and security permit." The strategy further cites the need to "maintain strong intelligence and diplomatic presence to give early warning of potential problem areas and to sustain strong ties to local leaders" (Ref A). The policy on political engagement calls for the pursuit of the objectives above through "robust U.S. civilian efforts, via our Embassy and our PRTs" (Ref B). These statements of policy on civilian presence formed the basis for the decision outlined below. ¶3. (C) The Department of State, DOD, and NSC view our civilian presence in the provinces as critical for enabling the United States to forecast, prevent, mitigate, or contain instability outside Baghdad, as well as to seize strategic opportunities for influence and investment. They recognize that this presence, while important, is not the only mechanism for civilian engagement in Iraq. The presence shall be robust and flexible enough to engage in the following activities: help Iraqi governmental institutions and civil society strengthen their capacity to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services; serve as an 'honest-broker' to mediate and manage Arab-Kurd tensions and to avoid Sunni Arab-GOI breakdown; report on political, economic, and security developments; act as a platform for key international actors including UNAMI; limit and counter malign foreign influence; encourage foreign investment and economic diversification; and, support displaced persons. ¶4. (C) At the request of the Department of State, Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Donilon chaired a meeting on October 15, 2009, to discuss the configuration of the future civilian provincial presence in Iraq as part of the ongoing NSC-led interagency "Partnership Planning for Iraq" that has been reviewing U.S. programs, assistance and presence in Iraq through 2011 and beyond. ¶5. (U) The participants agreed to the following: -- (C) By August 31, 2010, there will be sixteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, as called for in the President's drawdown strategy detailed in Ref A. -- (C) Between September 1, 2010 and September 30, 2011, Embassy Baghdad will work in coordination with the U.S. Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and its successor organization to reduce the number of PRTs from sixteen to seven. These seven locations are Basrah, Irbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar and Najaf. These seven locations were chosen because of their continuing strategic importance to the future stability of Iraq. -- (C) By the end of January, 2010, the Department of State will submit to the NSC a transition plan outlining this phased reduction, which will be fully coordinated with DOD. The plan will identify a date after April 30, 2011, when the Department of State will assume full responsibility for all costs, support, and operations (including security) for five of the seven provincial presences in Basrah, Irbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala. -- (C) For the remaining two provincial presences in Anbar and Najaf, State will continue to staff and the Defense Department will continue to provide life support, movement, and security through September 30, 2011. These PRTs will close by that date unless a compelling strategic reason for extension is identified by Deputies. Such a rationale would need to be identified by mid-2010, in order to incorporate any further decision into the FY 12 budget process for the appropriate agencies with continued responsibilities for life support, movement and security. -- (C) At an appropriate juncture, the location of two consulates, one in Basrah and one in another location, should be formalized with the Government of Iraq. The location of the second consulate must be discussed at a later date by Deputies in the context of our overall political strategy in Iraq. Post should take care not to prejudge or telegraph the outcome of the Deputies' decision on the second location until the Deputies discuss the matter. -- (C) The PRTs, which will provisionally be called Provincial Diplomatic Teams (PDTs) when State assumes full responsibility for them, will be renamed to signify the transition from a joint military-civilian operation to a civilian-led mission engaged in traditional diplomatic activities. -- (C) The lifespan of the PDTs shall be determined at a later date by Deputies at the recommendation of U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The decision on the number of PDTs was taken after serious consideration, given the high start up costs, and was based on an assessment that the PDTs would be required for at least a few years. CLINTON