Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE120172
2009-11-20 20:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:
GLOBAL CONTEXT SECTION OF THE QDDR - SEEKING INPUT FROM THE
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UNCLAS STATE 120172
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ECON PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: GLOBAL CONTEXT SECTION OF THE QDDR - SEEKING INPUT FROM THE
FIELD
REF: STATE 103698
UNCLAS STATE 120172
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ECON PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: GLOBAL CONTEXT SECTION OF THE QDDR - SEEKING INPUT FROM THE
FIELD
REF: STATE 103698
1. Action request - see paragraph 5.
2. Defining the context in which the U.S. will be conducting its
foreign policy over the next ten to fifteen years is a key element of
the Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. This
section of the broader report seeks above all to identify the trends,
or "drivers," most relevant to the conduct of diplomacy and the
execution of development programs. It employs a time horizon of ten
years.
3. Second, this section of the broader QDDR will try to outline the
ways in which these trends actually might affect diplomatic and
development policymaking. In so doing, the report is seeking to
assess key opportunities and challenges. Put another way, we do not
intend for it to become a catalogue of threats or, just as important,
a simple synthesis of work undertaken elsewhere. It is instead, a
framework for the work that follows in other sections of the larger
report.
4. To make the Global Context section of the QDDR as useful to
policymakers as possible, the Department and USAID are seeking inputs
from diplomatic and development missions in the field. This offers
both a reality check to the planners and, we are hopeful,
perspectives that a Washington-based analysis simply cannot provide.
Although the following questions strike planners as particularly
important, they would welcome discussion of other issues that field
commentators deem relevant. (Note: please approach these queries
with a ten to twenty year timeline in mind, keeping responses to an
SBU level. End note.)
-- To what degree will/can technology empower individuals, or civil
society in the host country, to exercise a more active role in public
life? Are host country officials and citizens attuned to (or
indifferent) to this issue? Is the host government supportive of or
hostile to expansion of access to social networks or other similar
tools? What non-state actors will be playing critical roles over the
next two decades?
-- What attitude do critical publics in the host country display
toward the so-called rising powers - India, China, and Brazil, for
example - and how do they perceive other important international
players, including key international organizations?
-- What does the host country identify as the most important issues
(both internal and external) critical to its own development and to
international development writ large?
-- What is the host country position on climate change issues, or on
any resource conflict questions? What steps is the host country
government taking to deal with potential future demographic
challenges?
-- To what extent does "backsliding" pose a threat to local
democratic movement (or to what degree does the country perceive this
as a threat elsewhere)?
5. Action Request: To be most useful, please send any response to
the questions in paragraph four by December 1. Please slug response
for S/P - T. Andrews and, as noted previously, go no higher than SBU.
If needed, please provide a reftel number for any classified
response.
6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ECON PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: GLOBAL CONTEXT SECTION OF THE QDDR - SEEKING INPUT FROM THE
FIELD
REF: STATE 103698
1. Action request - see paragraph 5.
2. Defining the context in which the U.S. will be conducting its
foreign policy over the next ten to fifteen years is a key element of
the Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. This
section of the broader report seeks above all to identify the trends,
or "drivers," most relevant to the conduct of diplomacy and the
execution of development programs. It employs a time horizon of ten
years.
3. Second, this section of the broader QDDR will try to outline the
ways in which these trends actually might affect diplomatic and
development policymaking. In so doing, the report is seeking to
assess key opportunities and challenges. Put another way, we do not
intend for it to become a catalogue of threats or, just as important,
a simple synthesis of work undertaken elsewhere. It is instead, a
framework for the work that follows in other sections of the larger
report.
4. To make the Global Context section of the QDDR as useful to
policymakers as possible, the Department and USAID are seeking inputs
from diplomatic and development missions in the field. This offers
both a reality check to the planners and, we are hopeful,
perspectives that a Washington-based analysis simply cannot provide.
Although the following questions strike planners as particularly
important, they would welcome discussion of other issues that field
commentators deem relevant. (Note: please approach these queries
with a ten to twenty year timeline in mind, keeping responses to an
SBU level. End note.)
-- To what degree will/can technology empower individuals, or civil
society in the host country, to exercise a more active role in public
life? Are host country officials and citizens attuned to (or
indifferent) to this issue? Is the host government supportive of or
hostile to expansion of access to social networks or other similar
tools? What non-state actors will be playing critical roles over the
next two decades?
-- What attitude do critical publics in the host country display
toward the so-called rising powers - India, China, and Brazil, for
example - and how do they perceive other important international
players, including key international organizations?
-- What does the host country identify as the most important issues
(both internal and external) critical to its own development and to
international development writ large?
-- What is the host country position on climate change issues, or on
any resource conflict questions? What steps is the host country
government taking to deal with potential future demographic
challenges?
-- To what extent does "backsliding" pose a threat to local
democratic movement (or to what degree does the country perceive this
as a threat elsewhere)?
5. Action Request: To be most useful, please send any response to
the questions in paragraph four by December 1. Please slug response
for S/P - T. Andrews and, as noted previously, go no higher than SBU.
If needed, please provide a reftel number for any classified
response.
6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON