SFO-VII GUIDANCE-003: STREAMLINED PACKAGE ON

S E C R E T STATE 119331

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2029
TAGS: KACT PARM START RS US KZ UP BO
SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-003: STREAMLINED PACKAGE ON
MOBILE MISSILES

REF: A. GENEVA 0968 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-007)

B. GENEVA 1015 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-010)

C. GENEVA 1016 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-011)

D. STATE 98566 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-004)

E. STATE 106618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary,
VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Streamlined Package on Mobile Missiles
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1. (S) Background: The United States believes the START
Follow-on treaty must continue to recognize the inherent
difficulty of monitoring mobile ICBMs by including some
verification provisions and operational restrictions that
apply only to mobile ICBMs, but that the number and type
of such unique verification provisions and operational
restrictions can be reduced to the minimum needed for
effective monitoring. In its current SFO position, the
United States has proposed that, in addition to the
verification provisions that apply to all missiles in the
treaty, the treaty contain the following measures that
are unique to mobile ICBMs:

a. A limit on the total number of non-deployed mobile
ICBMs (80) and on non-deployed launchers for ICBMs (80)
commensurate with the number of non-deployed systems
Russia had during START Treaty implementation;

b. A limit on the number of non-deployed mobile missiles
(2) and non-deployed launchers (2) of each type covered
By the treaty at the maintenance facility associated with
operating bases for mobile missiles;

c. Special procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs
and their canisters and launchers;

d. Cooperative measures for deployed mobile ICBMs;

e. Placement of a unique identifier on each mobile ICBM
to assist in monitoring the total mobile ICBM inventory;
and

f. Advance notice of the exit of a new mobile ICBM from
its production facility, along with a remotely monitored
camera at the exit of the production facility to observe
the exit of missiles from the facility.


2. (S) Guidance: To address strong Russian resistance
To the U.S. proposed approach to mobile missile monitoring,
and taking into account Delegation requests for guidance
(Refs A, B and C),Washington has developed a more
streamlined approach which seeks to respond to Russia's
concern regarding what it perceives to be the asymmetric
nature of the U.S-proposed verification provisions, while
still providing effective verification of Russian mobile
missiles under the treaty. This streamlined approach
would further modify the current U.S. proposal as
follows:

a. Unique Identifier: The United States continues to
believe that, in order to assist in monitoring the total
number of mobile ICBMs produced, and tracking the
individual missiles throughout their life cycles, each
mobile ICBM and its launch canister should be marked with
a "unique identifier" (UID). The United States remains
willing, as offered in Ref D, to permit the use of the
unique tail number on each U.S. and Russian heavy bomber
as a UID for heavy bombers.

b. Production Notification: In lieu of continuous
monitoring at production facilities for mobile ICBMs, the
United States has previously proposed (ref D) that the
Russian Federation notify the United States, 60 hours
before the exit of a mobile ICBM from the Votkinsk final
assembly plant, of the impending exit of a mobile ICBM
and provide the appropriate missile UID. If this advance
notification requirement can be agreed, the United States
is prepared to drop its proposal for the placement of a
camera for remote monitoring at that facility. The
United States remains willing to offer reciprocal
Notifications of exits of missiles from an analogous
U.S. missile production facility.

c. Observation of the Final Cuts for Eliminations
(Response to Refs B and C):

The United States proposes that for all ICBMs and SLBMs,
only the elimination of the first stage, as well as the
associated launch canister if so equipped, is required
for the elimination of the missile. U.S. acceptance of
this requirement is predicated on inspectors having the
right to observe the final cuts of the motor casing for
the first stage of a mobile ICBM and of the launch
canister for that ICBM.

The United States could agree to a modified procedure for
elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs that would
shorten inspection time and facilitate Russia's use of
the remaining vehicle for purposes not inconsistent
with the treaty as follows: Inspectors would have the
right to observe the final step of the elimination
process, i.e., cutting off the mountings of the
erector-launcher mechanism (the front leveling jacks
would remain intact, but 0.78 meters of the chassis
would be cut off). Washington does not believe it
necessary to include data on eliminated launchers in
the MOU, or to inspect such launchers after they have
been eliminated in this manner. The United States
could agree to this elimination procedure if Russia
will provide assurances that it will not permit the
transfer of such eliminated launchers to parties
outside of Russia.


3. (S) Head of Delegation may draw on the following
points in presenting the streamlined position outlined in
para 2 above:

-- The United States continues to maintain that special
verification measures are needed to address the unique
difficulties associated with monitoring mobile missiles.
To address Russian concerns, we propose to keep unique
provisions to a minimum. Accordingly, we have further
simplified proposed provisions affecting mobile ICBMs and
mobile ICBM launchers while maintaining what we view to
be the minimum necessary for verification. These further
modifications to the U.S. position include:

a. With respect to the monitoring of mobile missile
production, we could accept having only a provision
requiring notification 60 hours before the exit of a
mobile ICBM from the mobile missile final assembly plant,
and remain willing to offer reciprocal notifications of
U.S. missile exits.

b. We have removed the requirement that the second and
third stages of the mobile ICBM be eliminated, and
removed the requirements for inspectors to observe the
entire elimination process for mobile ICBMs.

c. We have developed a modified procedure for elimination
of mobile launchers of ICBMs to reduce inspection time
and facilitate use of the eliminated launchers for
purposes not inconsistent with the treaty, so long as
Russia agrees not to permit their transfer to parties
outside of Russia.

End Guidance.
CLINTON