KEEPING SULTAN HASHEM IN U.S. CUSTODY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 011819 NOFORN SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING PARA 1 MARKING AND NOFORN CAPTION) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019 TAGS: IZ KJUS PGOV PHUM PINS SUBJECT: KEEPING SULTAN HASHEM IN U.S. CUSTODY REF: BAGHDAD 4059 STATE 00011819 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: NEA DAS Richard Schmierer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This cable provides guidance in response to the Action Request in reftel. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy sought Department guidance (reftel) on any grounds, consistent with U.S. legal obligations, to delay or withhold transfer of physical custody of Sultan Hashem to the GOI after January 1, 2009, if faced with a renewed transfer request from Iraqi authorities. Sultan Hashem was convicted by the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) of genocide and related charges in June 2007 in the Anfal trial and sentenced to death by hanging. Additionally, in December 2008 the IHT convicted him of crimes against humanity for his actions in Basrah and Maysan provinces during the 1991 Intifada and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. Upon a transfer request from competent Iraqi authorities (presumably a request from the Prime Minister as in past IHT death sentence cases),the USG may: 1) transfer Hashem to Iraqi authorities; or 2) if President Talabani lodges a competing request that the USG maintain custody, evaluate whether President Talabani,s specific request creates a basis to argue that transfer is not required until the USG can clarify whether a valid request has been made. Post should consider the extent to which it can work with the GOI to shape the content and timing of a particular request, which may help to minimize political fallout. Finally, if Post thinks the Prime Minister and President would be open to ways to defuse this issue, Post may wish to consider approaching the GOI in advance of any request and proposing that Hashem,s case be addressed as a routine transfer of custody, with any execution decision left pending further GOI consensus building. The Embassy is authorized to select the option it believes would be the least destabilizing. End Summary. (SBU) Background: In the fall of 2007, Prime Minister (PM) Maliki requested the U.S. to transfer Hashem and his Anfal co-defendants, Ali Hassan al-Majid &Chemical Ali8, and Hussein Rashid (together the &Anfal 38) for execution. The Presidency Council, however, asked that Hashem not be transferred because it had not ratified his death sentence. The PM countered that IHT sentences do not require ratification. The USG position then was that this was a constitutional dispute that the Iraqis should resolve, and, in the interim, the USG should retain physical custody. No further movement has occurred to resolve the dispute, and the issue at hand is what options are available to the USG upon receipt of a new request for a transfer of custody in light of legal and policy considerations, including the entry into force of the Security Agreement (SA) with the GOI. Hashem is a prominent Sunni who is viewed with favor by many in the Sunni community as not having participated in the worst of the Saddam Hussein regime,s excesses. There is concern that his execution could lead to a political crisis. ¶3. (C/NF) The GOI may consider U.S. responsiveness to its requests for custody of detainees as an early test of our willingness to respect its sovereignty and to implement the SA in good faith; it may also have an impact on the proposed referendum on the SA. Any specfic request for transfer of physical custody of Hashem, his fate,and Talabani,s view that the PM is ignoring the Presidency Council,s authority in this matter may also have political consequences for national elections this year and for national reconciliation more generally. Finally, the policy approach taken with regard to Hashem is likely to have consequences for the disposition of other detainees who may appear to present a &special case,8 including other IHT convicts, or U.S. citizen detainees like Munaf and Omar. This cable provides general guidance. Specific guidance will depend in part on the details of any request received from PM Maliki (or another competent Iraqi authority) and the reaction of President Talabani. Post should consider whether it can influence the content or timing of any communications from Maliki and Talabani to help arrive at a less volatile situation. ¶4. (C/NF) Legal background As stated above, Sultan Hashem was tried and sentenced under STATE 00011819 002.2 OF 002 Iraqi law, and held in the physical custody of U.S. forces pursuant to a June 2004 MOU between MNF-I and the Ministry of Justice concerning detention of IHT defendants. Regardless of the legal framework under which Iraq might make a request for Hashem's custody (e.g., under the MOU or the Security Agreement),we have not identified a substantive legal basis to decline an authoritative request for a transfer. There does not appear to be a basis under the Geneva Conventions or other international legal instruments for refusing to transfer Hashem upon receipt of an authoritative GOI request for transfer of custody. (C/NF)If faced with competing requests from the GOI on the disposition of Sultan Hashem, there may be a legitimate procedural basis to delay a transfer for some limited period of time to assess and possibly object to the competing requests, but the USG would have to assess the political risks and benefits of raising such objections. ¶5. (C/NF) Policy options. Upon a request from the PM (or another competent Iraqi authority) for transfer of the physical custody of Sultan Hashem, one option is to agree to the request on the grounds that, whether or not framed as a transfer pursuant to SA Art. 22(4),the PM has authority to speak for the GOI on such issues. If post is inclined to pursue this option, it should consider whether the potential for political fallout in Iraq could be mitigated by shaping the particular request, and whether the USG can influence the particulars of the request. For example, it may be preferable to receive a request for transfer of physical custody as opposed to a transfer for execution. A request citing the Maysan conviction, which would allow Hashem to be addressed separately from the other Anfal convicts, might be less controversial. Post may want to consider whether it would be possible to frame a request for transfer of physical custody that could be divorced from execution; for example, by working to couple the transfer request with an understanding between the PM and Talabani that the execution decision will be delayed pending further consensus building. (C/NF) If Embassy Baghdad receives a request for transfer of physical custody of any or all of the three co-defendants, and it is concerned that the request does not represent an authoritative request and may provoke a political crisis, Embassy Baghdad should immediately inform the Department of the circumstances and request guidance. Normally we would not question the ability of an official such as the Iraqi PM to make an authoritative request, and questioning his authority in this case may have political costs. If, however, for example, the request is made when there is clearly no consensus view as between the Prime Minister and the Presidency Council, or through unusual channels, there may be a procedural basis to delay briefly in acting on the request while engaging with the GOI to resolve any concerns. Although the USG does not desire to hold the Anfal defendants, or other detainees in Iraq longer than absolutely necessary, the USG should take the time to satisfy itself that a proper request has been made, and to work with Iraq to mitigate the possibility of a political crisis. ¶6. (C/NF)Post may wish to consider pre-emptively approaching the GOI prior to receipt of any request, if it could facilitate resolution of the situation. If Post determines that the Prime Minister and President may be open to defusing the situation, Post could suggest that the disposition of Sultan Hashem,s case be addressed through normal channels to be developed to implement detention operations generally under the SA. A possible negative aspect of this option is that even if the GOI accepts the U.S. approach, the GOI may have difficulty finalizing such procedures if doing so is seen as determinative of the outcome of Hashem's case, which may lead to delays in transfers of detainees generally. ¶7. (C/NF) If the Embassy determines that delaying transfer is not in U.S. interests, it may comply with a valid request from the GOI. CLINTON