GUIDANCE FOR USUN FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL JOINT

UNCLAS STATE 117021

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN KTFN PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR USUN FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL JOINT
MEETING ON THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE,
AL-QAEDA/TALIBAN COMMITTEE, AND 1540 COMMITTEE


1. This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 3, 4
and 5.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (U) On Friday, 13 November, the Chairman of the 1267
(Al-Qaeda/Taliban) Sanctions Committee (Austrian PermRep
Thomas Mayr-Harting),the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (Costa
Rican PermRep Jorge Urbina, and the Chairman of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (Croatian PermRep Ranko
Vilovic) will brief the UNSC on their ongoing efforts to
cooperate and coordinate activities, where appropriate. This
meeting presents an opportunity to recognize the fine work of
all three committees, and to underscore key challenges that
lie ahead.

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ACTION REQUEST
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3. (U) Department requests USUN deliver the following
remarks in response to the statement for the Security Council
Joint Meeting on the Counter-Terrorism Committee,
Al-Qaeda/Taliban Committee, and 1540 Committee:
Mr. President, I would like to thank the Chairmen for their
briefings. Their dedicated leadership is central to the
effectiveness of the 1267 Committee, the 1373 Committee, and
the 1540 Committee. Today we have an opportunity to focus on
the accomplishments of the three committees over the past
several months. But more importantly we want to underline
the importance of these committees and to invite all member
states to unreservedly cooperate with their efforts.
The United States supports the important role the United
Nations plays in reinforcing national and regional
counter-terrorism efforts. As President Obama said in his
September 23 address to the UNGA, the United States has "set
a clear and focused goal: to work with all members of this
body to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
extremist allies -- a network that has killed thousands of
people of many faiths and nations, and that plotted to blow
up this very building."
The Security Council-based work of the three committees, and
of the 1267 Monitoring Team and Counter-terrorism Executive
Directorate, along with the General Assembly's Global
Counter-terrorism Strategy and the Counter-terrorism
Implementation Task Force, constitute interlocking and
complementary pieces of the Global Community's response to
terrorism. This includes preventing non-state actors' access
to WMD-related materials. We also applaud the efforts of the
UNODC,s Terrorism Prevention Branch in its important mission
of promoting and assisting states to ratify and implement the
universal counterterrorism conventions and protocols.
1267
Ambassador Mayr-Harting, the United States appreciates the
leadership you have displayed as chair of the 1267 Committee.
We particularly welcome the personal commitment and
dedication you have shown in helping the Committee address
some very challenging questions. We also commend the work of
the Monitoring Team, which has played a vital role as an
independent and objective fact-finding body, and which has
supplied the Committee with important information on
individuals and entities on the Consolidated List, as well as
the practices of Member States.
Countering the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban
remains one of the most important challenges facing this
Council. The threat is real and it continues to evolve.
Without the efforts of Member States to work collectively,
the world would be much more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
What can we do to ensure this regime remains a vital and
effective multilateral tool to respond to this threat?
First, we can reaffirm the international community's
commitment to full implementation of the 1267 measures.
Imposing these targeted sanctions -- whether in the form of
an asset freeze, arms embargo, or travel ban -- has
unquestionably enhanced our security. The 1267 regime can
only function well if states actively participate in the
regime, such as by proposing new names for listing. We
should further develop this tool and ensure that it adapts to
the ever-changing nature of the threat.
Second, we should continue our efforts to ensure that the
Consolidated List is as accurate and up-to-date as possible,
ensuring that our procedures for imposing sanctions are fair
and clear. Resolutions 1735 and 1822 introduced new measures
to help the Committee confirm the accuracy of the list. The
Committee's work to implement what is perhaps the most
significant measure in 1822 -- the review of every name on
the Consolidated List by June 2010 -- will continue in the
coming months. By reviewing every listed individual and
entity on the Consolidated List, the Committee is emphasizing
the importance of keeping the List updated and fresh, so that
the international community can respond to new threats in a
manner that is efficient and effective. The United States is
committed to ensuring that this review is meaningful and
working with Member States to finish this review on time. We
encourage the Committee and Member States to carefully review
entries lacking sufficient identifiers to develop this
information in order to facilitate implementation of
sanctions of those individuals and entities that continue to
meet the criteria for listing. Improving identifiers for
listings will serve to bolster the overall credibility and
integrity of the List.
And, third, we should continue our efforts to ensure that the
sanctions are applied in a fair and transparent way.
Resolution 1822 and its predecessors introduced significant
enhancements to ensure fairness. The Council will negotiate,
in the coming weeks, a new resolution to renew the mandate of
the 1267 Monitoring Team and will take the opportunity to
enhance the regime and improve our ability to counter the
al-Qaeda and Taliban threat. The United States believes this
resolution should take additional steps to ensure that the
process for listing and delisting individuals is as fair and
transparent as possible. We believe there is room to improve
the way in which the 1267 Committee decides to list
individuals and how it considers requests from those seeking
to be removed from the list. We encourage the committee to
build upon the ambitious reforms articulated in UNSCR 1822
and to work towards strengthening the principles set out in
that resolution.
As global terrorism continues to evolve, so too must our
efforts to counter this threat anywhere and everywhere it
surfaces. We stand ready to help the Council and 1267
Committee address these challenges, and we are confident that
the resolve of the international community cannot be matched
by those who wish to do us harm.
1373
Regarding the Counter-terrorism Committee, I would like to
thank Ambassador Ranko Vilovic for filling in and doing an
exceptional job of guiding the work of this Committee. As
the interim Chair of the Counter-terrorism Committee,
Ambassador Vilovic fostered greater efficiency in the
Committee's work. Ambassador, we wish you well and we thank
you for your leadership.
The United States welcomes significant improvement in CTED,s
performance since Mike Smith took over leadership of the
group some two years ago. We are pleased to see more CTED
engagement outside of New York, in capitals and with experts
in the relevant ministries on the ground. This is where the
United States would like CTED to place even more emphasis.
We applaud CTED,s work in South Asia, in particular the
workshop it organized earlier this month in Dhaka with the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute that brought together police
and judicial officials from across South Asia for
counter-terrorism training, which was delivered by experts
from the UN, Commonwealth Secretariat, and bilateral
partners. The United States encouraged CTED to organize more
practical, on-the-ground activities, thus taking advantage of
the UN,s ability to offer a multilateral platform for
expert-to-expert networking and delivery of assistance by
experts from member states, regional organizations, and NGOs.
CTED,s work in South Asia is a great example of the UN
using its convening power to work on a regional level where
there are few actors with the same degree of legitimacy and
neutrality to ensure widespread acceptance. We encourage
CTED and the wider UN to explore similar opportunities in
North Africa.
Mr. President, the United States welcomes efforts to develop
a more holistic UN counterterrorism program that a) is more
integrated with the wider UN efforts to promote international
peace and security and b) involves working with states around
the world to build the capacities needed to confront a range
of inter-related transnational security challenges, including
terrorism. This effort involves not just the UNSC, but the
UNGA and other relevant UN bodies. In this context, the
United States looks forward to further participation of the
UNSC committees and their expert groups in the CTITF.
We welcome the recent visit by UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Pillay to the CTC and her constructive recommendations
for strengthening existing approaches to underscore the role
of human rights in the fight against terrorism in the work of
CTC/CTED. As President Obama said in his inaugural address,
there need not be a tradeoff between our security and our
ideals. The United States looks forward to working with
partners both in and outside UNSC to ensure that the UN is
playing its part to ensure that national counter-terrorism
measures are grounded in the respect for human rights and the
promotion of the rule of law, and that cooperation between
the CTC/CTED and the UN human rights bodies is further
strengthened.
With strong leadership at the helm of CTED, the United States
is looking forward in 2010 to ensuring that the CTC itself
becomes a more dynamic body and a forum where the practical
challenges of implementing UNSCR 1373 at national and
regional levels are debated more regularly and the
committee's work is made more relevant to CT practitioners on
the ground.
It has been more than eight years since the adoption of 1373,
and the time is right to ratchet up efforts, including
through increased outreach by the CTC, to ensure that
implementation remains a priority for countries around the
world.
1540
Regarding the 1540 Committee, I would like to take a moment
to praise Ambassador Urbina for his leadership and enthusiasm
in guiding the work of this Committee. As Chair of the 1540
Committee, Ambassador Urbina has promoted greater
transparency and supported a range of ideas to make the
Committee's work more effective and relevant. The agreed
work program he put forth is to be adopted again in January,
and we believe the four Committee-led working groups -- on
monitoring of implementation, provision of assistance,
cooperation among regional and intergovernmental
organizations, and coordination of transparency and outreach
-- have been very successful. Moreover, he and his
delegation presided over the Comprehensive Review of the
Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, an event that by
any measure proved to be a great success.
Ambassador, we wish you well and we thank you for your
leadership. You will leave behind a Committee with a strong
mandate and a clear vision.
In the six months, time since these three Committees
addressed the Council, the world has seen a growing interest
in the work of the 1540 Committee. With the unanimous
adoption of resolution 1887 on September 24, this Council
sent a loud and clear message that resolution 1540 is an
essential tool for building the non-proliferation regime. As
President Obama made evident during the Security Council
Summit, my government -- at the very highest levels -- views
the Security Council's efforts on non-proliferation as vital
to our common efforts to prevent the spread and use of
weapons of mass destruction.
Resolution 1887 affirms the need for full implementation of
Resolution 1540, welcomes the work that the 1540 Committee
has done to date on funding mechanisms, and reinforces the
Security Council's commitment to ensure effective and
sustainable support for the Committee's activities, including
capacity building.
Within a week of adopting resolution 1887, the Committee
conducted its Comprehensive Review of the Status of
Implementation on Resolution 1540, as called for in
resolution 1810. This three-day event offered an inclusive
forum to all States and relevant inter-governmental bodies to
share experiences and express their views on various aspects
of implementation of the resolution. The review was
accompanied by a civil society event that included dozens of
nongovernmental organizations and industry leaders, resulting
in a wealth of ideas for the committee to consider further
measures to facilitate 1540 implementation. The
presentations and statements made during the Comprehensive
Review demonstrated that the 1540 Committee has moved beyond
being considered a temporary stop-gap measure to stem
proliferation to become a centerpiece in our common battle
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States is moving quickly with twelve co-sponsors
on a broad initiative to better coordinate trilateral mission
capacity-building in Vienna related to UNSCR 1540 among the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the UN Office of
Drugs and Crime. During a September 30 meeting, OSCE
participating states adopted the first chapter of a UNSCR
1540 "Best Practice Guide on Transshipment and Export
Controls," and subsequently met on October 20-21 to further
discuss the broader regional strategy initiative.
We urge the 1540 Committee to enhance similarly broad
cooperation with international, regional and non-governmental
organizations.
Success of the 1540 Committee lies in its ability to move
forward with its work program to fully implement 1540,s
provisions. We urge the Committee to streamline the
assistance request process to make requests more transparent
and to ensure that requests are answered in a timely and
efficient manner. As part of this effort, the United States
is committed to establishing a voluntary fund to help provide
the support and expertise necessary to facilitate
implementation of Resolution 1540. We will seek to make a
meaningful contribution to such a trust fund once it is
established, provided it contains effective transparency and
accountability mechanisms. A voluntary UN trust fund would
help identify and ultimately fix gaps in national export laws
and detection systems and could, in that manner, prevent
materiel, technology, and financial resources from making
their way to governments and terrorists seeking to build
these weapons.
In conclusion, regarding all three CT-related bodies, there
needs to be more cross-fertilization among them. Good
practices in one should be adopted more regularly by others.
This does not happen often enough. We would especially like
to commend the successful outreach efforts by the 1540
committee, including through the unprecedented three-day open
meeting the 1540 Committee organized this fall as part of its
comprehensive review of member states' implementation of
resolution 1540, as well as its successful efforts to reach
out to civil society and involve it in the committee's work.
All of the Council's CT-related committees should remain
mindful of the need to enhance the transparency of their
work, make it more accessible to the wider UN community and
national actors, regional organizations, and civil society.
We encourage further engagement by the three committees with
Member States on a broad range of issues to ensure the
committees' work is fully understood and relevant to Member
States' efforts to combating terrorism.


4. (U) Department further requests USUN draw from the
following points, if needed, should the case of Luis Posada
Carriles and five Cuban Spies be raised (likely by the
Governments of Cuba and/or Venezuela),following the SC joint
briefing. Cuba and Venezuela have in the past been placed on
the speakers' list for the Joint Public Meetings on the CTC,
1267, and 1540 Committee Security Council briefings, and have
used such opportunities to raise such issues. Begin remarks:

POSADA:

-- Contrary to the statements you have heard, the United
States has taken a number of actions with respect to Luis
Posada Carriles ("Posada").

-- The United States' actions are consistent with
international law as well as our domestic legal framework
that provides for due process and various constitutional
safeguards.

-- As with democracies around the world that follow the rule
of law, these safeguards provide that an individual cannot be
brought to trial or extradited unless sufficient evidence has
been established that he committed the offense charged. In
the United States, this standard is described as "probable
cause."

-- Let me give you a brief overview of steps the United
States has taken with respect to Posada within this legal
framework:

-- Posada entered the United States illegally in early 2005.

-- Posada was detained by immigration authorities in the
United States on May 17, 2005, and he was, in accordance with
U.S. law, placed in removal proceedings.

-- The immigration judge who handled the removal proceedings
ordered that Posada be removed from the United States on
September 27, 2005.

-- This order remains in effect. The United States has been
seeking ways to carry out the terms of the order consistent
with U.S. regulations that implement the obligations of the
United States under the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

-- Specifically, at the time the immigration judge ordered
Posada removed, the immigration judge also determined that
Posada could not be removed to either Cuba or Venezuela as it
was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he were
so transferred. As a matter of U.S. immigration law, the
United States is not in a position to remove Posada to either
country. (For use if appropriate.)

-- Moreover, the United States sought and obtained a criminal
indictment charging Posada with violations of our immigration
laws. On April 8, 2009, new criminal charges were brought
against Posada in that case, accusing him of lying about his
involvement in certain terrorist bombings in Havana, Cuba.
The case is currently scheduled for trial early next year.

-- In the meantime, Posada remains subject to the order of
removal issued by the immigration judge and is without legal
status in the United States.

-- He is also subject to an Order of Supervision from the
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE),which imposes certain restrictions on
Posada, including reporting and monitoring requirements.

-- In sum, with respect to Posada, the United States
continues to be engaged in an ongoing series of actions,
consistent with our legal requirements and due process.

FIVE CUBAN SPIES:

-- In the case of the five Cubans accused of spying, the
facts of the case help address the misrepresentations issued
by the Cuban Government and others in relation to this case:

-- The Cuban Five were tried in U.S. federal court and were
accorded all guarantees of due process provided under the
U.S. Constitution. They were ultimately convicted for being
unregistered agents of the Cuban government. Three of the
defendants were also convicted of attempting to obtain
non-public national defense information, and one was
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. In fact, the
defendants never denied that they were covert agents of the
Cuban regime.

-- The defendants have made full use of their extensive due
process rights, benefiting from their vast procedural
protections and the provision of U.S. government-funded legal
assistance. The defendants continue to take advantage of
their rights as guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.
Millions of Cubans on the island have been waiting for a
half-century for the rights these defendants were afforded in
the United States.

-- A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit
initially determined that the defendants should have been
granted a pre-trial change of venue, but in August 2007, the
full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta
held that the defendants did receive a fair trial.

-- On June 4, 2008, another panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided all remaining issues
raised by the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions of all five defendants, holding that all of the
legal arguments challenging their convictions were without
merit, and that sufficient evidence supported each
conviction. The panel affirmed the sentences for the other
two defendants, including the life sentence of the defendant
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in connection with
the Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down.

-- The panel also vacated sentences for three of the five
defendants and remanded their cases so that new sentences
could be imposed. On October 13, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida reduced Antonio Guerrero,s
life sentence to 21 years and 21 months. The remaining two
defendants are scheduled to receive new sentences in
December.

-- The five convicted Cuban spies are serving sentences in
federal institutions throughout the U.S. They are held among,
and have the same privileges available to, the general prison
population. Under the Federal Bureau of Prisons, provision,
inmates are allowed visits by immediate family members and
other approved relatives; friends and associates with
pre-established relationships; as well as their attorneys and
Cuban consular officials. All prospective visitors, other
than immediate family members, may be subject to a background
check and approval by institution staff.

-- The five convicted Cuban spies have received numerous,
lengthy visits from eligible family members. According to
State Department visa reports, relatives of the five have
been issued visas on more than 120 occasions for visitation
purposes. However, two of the wives of the "Cuban 5"
participated in the spy network, and as such, it has affected
their eligibility to be granted visas to enter the United
States. The USG has determined that it is not possible, due
to the national security risk she poses, to provide Olga
Salanueva with a visa to enter the United States. Salanuvea
was originally deported from the United States in 2000 for
activity related to espionage.


End remarks.


5. (U) Finally, Department requests that mission draw from
the following points if the issue of Venezuelan support for
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the
National Liberation Army (ELN) is raised. Mission may also
draw on points below regarding the U.S.-Colombian Defense
Cooperation Agreement, if reference is made to the
installation of U.S. military bases in Colombia.

Begin Remarks:

-- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's ideological sympathy
for the FARC and the ELN for the past decade has limited
Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia and others in combating
terrorism.

-- In January 2008, Chavez called for, and the Venezuelan
National Assembly approved, a resolution calling for
international recognition of the FARC and ELN as belligerent
forces, not terrorist groups.

-- Chavez has repeatedly made statements glorifying the FARC,
including by calling the group's former second-in-command a
"good revolutionary."

-- Venezuela has further provided safehaven to FARC fighters,
and has made little effort to systematically police the
1400-mile Venezuelan-Colombia border to prevent the movement
of groups of armed terrorists or to interdict arms or the
flow of narcotics.

-- As a result, the FARC, ELN, and remnants of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have regularly crossed into
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort
protection money and kidnap Venezuelans to finance their
operations.

DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

-- The U.S. and Colombia on October 30 signed the Defense
Cooperation Agreement, which facilitates U.S. access to
Colombian bases in support of mutually approved activities
within Colombia only.

-- The agreement harmonizes existing bilateral cooperation on
eliminating narcotics production and trafficking, illicit
smuggling of all types, and augments assistance efforts for
humanitarian and natural disasters.

-- This agreement explicitly indicates that all activities
will be consistent with the principles of sovereignty,
non-interventionism, and territorial integrity. It has no
regional or extraterritorial application.

End Remarks


6. (U) Department appreciates Mission's assistance.
CLINTON