NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 116396 SENSITIVE SIPDIS GENENVA FOR CD DEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL RS TSPA UNPUOS SUBJECT: NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE SECURITY DIALOGUE REF: A. A) STATE 54933 ¶B. B) MOSCOW 1474 ¶C. C) 05 STATE 89792 ¶D. D) 07 MOSCOW 1002 ¶E. E) UNVIEVIENNA324 ¶F. F) STATE 58525 STATE 00116396 001.2 OF 007 ¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 7 below. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: A U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, was transmitted to Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inviting Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, Iridium-Cosmos collision, and expressing the United States' interest in resuming the pursuit of bilateral talks on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) with Russia. In an aide-memoire from Russia dated September 29, 2009, Russia responded positively to the U.S. non-paper, and expressed its desire to resume dialogues between Russian and U.S. experts on space-related issues. Russia subsequently proposed a meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva. Washington would like to counter-propose to conduct two half-day meetings on January 20-21, 2010, in Paris. This would allow both the U.S. and Russia sufficient time for preparations. Washington would also like to propose the addition of several items to the proposed agenda, as well as to request responses in advance of the meeting to the questions posed by the USG during the June 8, 2009, meeting on the margins of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On June 2, 2009, the Russian MFA Department for Security and Disarmament (DVBR) responded positively to the U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, which invited Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, collision of an Iridium communications satellite and an inoperable Russian military spacecraft (Ref A). The U.S. non-paper also noted interest in resuming the pursuit of bilateral U.S.-Russia pragmatic and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) (Ref B). Previous U.S.-Russian dialogues on space security issues were held in Washington, D.C., in April 2005 and in Paris in January 2007 (Refs C and D). ¶4. (SBU) During a June 8 meeting in Vienna on the margins of the annual meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),Brigadier General Susan Helms, Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic Command, briefed the Russian COPUOS delegation on the collision and led a discussion on the opportunity for bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia on space TCBMs (Ref E). At that time, the U.S. handed over a list of questions for consideration by the Russian Federation (found in paragraph 7 of Ref F). At the end of this meeting, Russia suggested the need for a specialized experts meeting on the topic. ¶5. (SBU) The U.S. received an aide-memoire from Russia dated September 29, 2009, expressing its desire to resume the dialogue between Russian and U.S. experts on space-related issues (paragraph 11). This aide-memoire also proposed several agenda items for the dialogue. Since receiving this aide-memoire, a Russian embassy official relayed Moscow's proposal that a dialogue take place on November 14, 2009, in Geneva, Switzerland. ¶6. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper (paragraph 8) provides a counter-proposal to their November 14 date and venue that will allow the USG sufficient time for preparations. It is important that this dialogue take place before the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, scheduled during February 8-19, 2010, so that the U.S. and Russia have the opportunity to coordinate positions prior to the discussion of the COPUOS agenda item on the "Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space STATE 00116396 002.2 OF 007 Activities." The U.S. interagency delegation for the space security dialogue will include representatives from NASA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Strategic Command, and the Department of State. END BACKGROUND. ¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is requested to pass the U.S. non-paper (contained in paragraph 8 below) and draft agenda (contained in paragraph 9) to appropriate host government officials at the MFA and to provide copies to the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos). Embassy may draw upon and handover the contingency talking points in paragraph 10 and is asked to report its delivery and any GoR reaction at the time of delivery. END ACTION REQUEST. ¶8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER: Non-Paper November 11, 2009 The United States is pleased to respond to the Russian Federation's Aide-Memoire of September 29, 2009, proposing a meeting between U.S. and Russian experts on space-related issues, and Moscow's subsequent proposal for a November 14 meeting in Geneva relayed by the Russian Federation's Embassy in Washington, D.C. The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has expressed a willingness to resume this important dialogue. As Russia's Aide-Memoire notes, it - and for that matter, the United States - will require adequate time for careful preparation and to ensure participation by appropriate experts. Therefore, the United States would counter-propose to hold two half-day meetings on January 20-21, 2010, in Paris, France. We propose that the United States host the first half-day of discussions on January 20 at the U.S. Embassy, and that Russia host the second half-day on January 21 at its Embassy. The United States has reviewed Russia's proposed agenda items and generally agrees with its proposals, but with the addition of three new agenda items. First, the United States believes it is important for each of us to exchange perspectives regarding the challenges to our shared national security interests in a congested, complex, and potentially contested space domain. Second, the United States proposes an agenda item to explore the continuity of our respective positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space activities," to be discussed at the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in February 2010. Third, the United States proposes an agenda item to discuss opportunities for expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation related to problems regarding cross-cutting/multi-agency issues such as additional measures to enhance spaceflight safety. To ensure the most complete review of the agenda, the United States believes this meeting should include appropriate interagency government experts, including experts from our respective military space forces as well as from civilian space agencies. In order to facilitate our space security dialogue, the United States would appreciate receiving in advance of the meeting Russia's answers to our questions (attached at Annex B to the U.S.-proposed agenda) posed on June 8, 2009, during our bilateral discussions in Vienna on the margins of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),in which Brigadier General Susan Helms, Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic Command, briefed the Russian COPUOS delegation on the Iridium-Cosmos collision and led a discussion on the opportunity for bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia on space transparency and confidence-building measures. As we prepare for this prospective meeting, the United States STATE 00116396 003.2 OF 007 believes it would be useful for us to take without delay two pragmatic steps to enhance spaceflight safety. The first step is the identification of specific points of contact for transmitting and receiving timely exchanges of satellite collision hazard warnings through the direct communication between our two governments. When a country's satellite and a space object (e.g., debris) are projected to pass each other within a distance of one kilometer or less in low earth orbit or five kilometers or less in geostationary orbit, the U.S. Government attempts to so notify either the governmental or commercial satellite operator(s) to ensure flight safety. As the time of the closest conjunction nears, more analysis is accomplished to see if the distance of closest approach has changed due to orbital dynamics effects, for example, gravitational forces. The U.S. Government will provide updates as they become available. In this regard, the United States wishes to inform Russia that the U.S. Government Point of Contact for exchanges of collision hazard warnings is the Mission Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The JSpOC Mission Commander can be contacted at: Telefax: 1 (805) 605-3507 Email: JSpOCSSAConjunctionAssessment@vandenberg.af.m il Telephone: 1 (805) 605-3514 The United States requests similar contact information for the Russian government's Point of Contact. As a second pragmatic step, the United States proposes that familiarization visits by U.S. and Russian military space operators should proceed as soon as possible in accordance with the strategic framework for military-to-military engagement established between the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces on July 6, 2009. The United States believes that the highest priority should be given to scheduling reciprocal visits by satellite movement control specialists. The U.S. point of contact for these visits is: USSTRATCOM/J5, Plans and Policy Telephone: 1 (402) 232-6603 Telefax: 1 (402) 294-1035 The United States looks forward to receiving Moscow's response to our proposed dates and venue for resuming this timely dialogue and welcomes Russia's thoughts on the U.S.-proposed agenda. END TEXT OF NON-PAPER. ¶9. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA: PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE SECURITY DIALOGUE DAY ONE (U.S. Host): ¶1. Introductions ¶2. U.S. and Russian perspectives on challenges - including threats - to shared national security interests in outer space ¶3. Russian and U.S. views regarding the use of outer space in support of national security interests ¶4. Approaches to ensuring the safety of outer space activities a. Russia's responses to U.S. questions provided on June 8, 2009 (Annex A) b. U.S. and Russian perspectives on the "long term sustainability of outer space activities," an agenda item of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee STATE 00116396 004.2 OF 007 on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ¶5. Opportunities for expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation related to problems regarding cross-cutting/multi-agency issues a. U.S. and Russian views on additional measures to enhance spaceflight safety b. Other matters DAY TWO (Russia Host): ¶6. Russia's proposals for transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space (Annex B) a. Russian proposals b. U.S. perspectives c. Options for implementation of mutually-agreed TCBMs on a bilateral basis ¶7. Discussions on outer space TCBM matters in the UN General Assembly's First Committee a. Review of past attempts to co-sponsor a TCBM Resolution in the 62nd and 63rd sessions of the General Assembly b. The opportunity for U.S.-Russian collaboration at the 65th session of the General Assembly ¶8. Russian and U.S. perspectives regarding the European Union's draft "Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" Annex A: Questions provided to the Russian Federation by the United States on June 8, 2009 a. What space surveillance and space situational awareness capabilities does Russia currently operate/utilize? b. What are Russia's future plans for its space situational awareness capabilities? c. Your March 5, 2009, non-paper mentioned the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities, such as the sharing of data related to orbital parameters of space vehicles. To promote spaceflight safety, the U.S. already shares orbital parameters freely on the space-track.org website to 37,000 registered users from 110 nations. i. Does Russia intend to share data in a similar manner or only bilaterally? ii. Does Russia intend to share information on all satellites or only collision debris data? iii. What data would Russia be willing to share (two-line element sets, maneuver plans, debris field data, pre-launch parameters, etc.)? d. Your non-paper also stated that Russia would like "consultations regarding ambiguous situations of concern for spacefaring nations." i. What types of concerns would be considered in this category? Would these situations include emergency notification of a potential conjunction, loss of control of a satellite that is drifting, or orbital debris information? ii. How would Russia like to bring such ambiguous situations to the attention of spacefaring nations? Through what channels (e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military channels)? e. The U.S. intends to monitor and assess potential collisions for all 800 maneuverable satellites against all other satellites, looking for possible conjunctions. Would Russia like to be notified of any possible conjunctions with your satellites that we predict? Through what channels (e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military channels)? f. Since all spacefaring nations are concerned with preventing more collisions in space, do you agree that we should focus most closely on this topic area at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space? Do you also agree that other multilateral fora (e.g., Conference on Disarmament, UN General Assembly First Committee) are the most appropriate STATE 00116396 005.2 OF 007 venues for substantive discussions on other transparency and confidence-building measures that could help ensure predictability, enhance stability, and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding in the conduct of space activities? g. The U.S. and Russia are the most capable nations at tracking space objects and are in the best position to predict conjunctions that could have significant impact on all users of space. What is Russia doing to predict possible conjunctions? Does it intend to notify owner/operators of possible conjunctions? h. Is Russia willing to engage in bilateral discussions, military-to-military technical information exchanges, and/or visits regarding space data sharing? Annex B: Russia's proposals for Transparency and Confidence Building Measures for Outer Space Activities - as noted in Paragraph 10 of Russia's July 13, 2009, submission to the UN Secretary General. (UN General Assembly document A/64/138/Add.1 of September 19, 2009) (a) Exchange of information on: (i) The main directions of States' outer space policy; (ii) Major outer space research and use programs; (iii) Orbital parameters of outer space objects; (iv) Foreseeable dangerous situations in space; (b) Familiarization visits: (i) Expert visits, including visits to space launch sites, flight command and control centers and other facilities of outer space infrastructure; (ii) Invitation of observers to launches of spacecraft; (iii) Demonstrations of rocket and space technologies; (c) Notification of: (i) Planned spacecraft launches; (ii) Scheduled spacecraft maneuvers which could result in dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other States; (iii) The beginning of descent from orbit of unguided space objects and the predicted impact areas on Earth; (iv) The return from orbit into the atmosphere of a guided spacecraft; (v) The return of a spacecraft with a nuclear source of power on board, in the case of malfunction and danger of radioactive materials descending to Earth; (d) Consultations: (i) To clarify the information provided on outer space research and use programs; (ii) On ambiguous situations, as well as on other issues of concern; (iii) To discuss the implementation of agreed transparency and confidence building measures in outer space activities; (e) Thematic workshops on various outer space research and use issues, organized on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with the participation of scientists, diplomats, military and technical experts. END TEXT OF PROPOSED AGENDA. ¶10. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS: -- The U.S. regrets that it is unable to accept Russia's proposal for a meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva. A meeting in late January would allow for better preparation and ensure the participation of appropriate U.S. experts. -- In addition, a meeting late January would enable our delegations to explore the continuity of our respective positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space activities," prior to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which convenes on February 9, 2010. -- U.S. participants in the proposed meeting would include STATE 00116396 006.2 OF 007 experts from the U.S. Department of State (including the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science),the U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Strategic Command, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. -- The U.S. delegation would be headed by Mr. Frank Rose, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Policy and Verification Operations. END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS. ¶11. (SBU) BEGIN RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE: AIDE-MEMOIRE Moscow September 29, 2009 The Russian side has carefully studied the ideas and proposals contained in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of May 28, 2009 (received from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on June 2, 2009), as well as those set forth at the meeting of Russian and U.S. experts in Vienna on June 8, 2009. We agree with the U.S. side that the intensive development of outer space activities is outstripping the development of the infrastructure for monitoring near-Earth orbits. As a result, the technical resources that countries have at their disposal do not allow them to continuously follow all launched spacecraft and to predict the occurrence of hazardous situations in outer space, including potential collisions of satellites with fragments of space junk or with each other. Such situations are particularly dangerous for manned space flights, especially for the International Space Station. The collision that occurred between Russian and U.S. satellites on February 10, 2009, is a serious warning of the possibility that such incidents could happen in the future. We agree that lessons must be learned from this, and we reaffirm our willingness to resume the dialogue between Russian and U.S. experts on space-related issues. Apart from the issues set forth in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of May 28, 2009, we would consider it useful to discuss the following subjects at the meeting of experts; ¶1. The two sides' views regarding the use of outer space; ¶2. The two sides' conceptual approaches to ensuring the safety of outer space activities; ¶3. transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space; ¶4. Russian proposals for TCBMs presented in the report of the UN Secretary General (UN General Assembly document A/62/114 of August 3, 2007); ¶5. the new Russian proposal for TCBMs - international exchange of information on predicted hazardous situations in outer space; the conditions required for its implementation; ¶6. interaction between Russia and the U.S. on TCBM-related matters at sessions of the UN General Assembly; ¶7. the possibility and advisability of drafting a UN document on TCBMs based on our countries' proposals; ¶8. Russian and U.S. approaches to the EU's proposal for developing a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. At present we are studying the U.S. side's questions regarding a possible exchange of information on the situation in outer space, which were conveyed to us in Vienna during the fifty-second (2009) session of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We have in mind a discussion of these matters in the course of further contacts. The Russian side hopes for the U.S. side's constructive response to these ideas and, as a first step, proposes setting a tentative timeframe, a possible agenda, and a place to hold a new meeting of Russian and U.S. experts. We would like to receive the U.S. side's proposals concerning this matter, taking into account the time required for careful preparation of a meeting. STATE 00116396 007.2 OF 007 END RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE. ¶12. (U) The Department thanks the Embassy for their assistance. Please slug responses for ISN/MDSP-RBuenneke, OES/SAT-DTurner, and EUR/PRA-MHardiman. CLINTON