SFO-VII GUIDANCE-001: RESPONSES TO SVO-GVA-VI

S E C R E T STATE 116297 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RFGS-3,5,6 AND 8) SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2029 TAGS: KACT PARM START RS US KZ UP BO SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-001: RESPONSES TO SVO-GVA-VI RFGS-3,5,6 AND 8 REFS: A. GENEVA 942 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-003) ¶B. GENEVA 962 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-006) ¶C. GENEVA 957 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-004) ¶D. GENEVA 975 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-005) ¶E. GENEVA 993 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-008) Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SLBM Elimination -------------- 1.(S) Background: In Ref A, delegation requested approval for a revised SLBM launcher elimination proposal that would apply in practice to Russia only. Under the revised proposal, once the launch tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed from the submarine (which would remain at the location for implementation of the elimination process and would remain visible to NTM during the entire elimination process), the SLBM launchers would cease to be subject to the treaty's aggregate limit on SLBMs and their associated launchers. The elimination procedure would also require removal of the missile section from the submarine, but there would be no time limit associated with that action. As Washington understands the proposal, until the missile section is removed, the launchers would continue to be declared in the MOU, though they would not count against the treaty's limits. ¶2. (S) Guidance: Washington has reviewed the delegation's recommendation and concurs with incorporating as another acceptable elimination method the delegation's Ref A proposal for launcher elimination procedures with the proviso that there should in addition be a defined time limit for the completion of the elimination procedure. Delegation is therefore authorized to negotiate ad ref to Washington a specified but reasonable period of time for completion of the elimination of the submarine launchers to resolve the issue. Washington notes that, in recent years, even with CTR assistance from the United States, Russia has had minor difficulties meeting the 270 day time period because the Russian government has not always ensured that the shipyard under contract to CTR was held accountable for complying with START's timeline and procedures for elimination of the missile compartments. CTR has been able to verify through visits to the elimination site that the missile launch tubes were �00A;eliminated. ¶3. (S) Delegation is authorized and encouraged to inform the Russian Delegation that the United States does expect to continue providing CTR assistance for the elimination of Russian SLBM launchers, which should help to mitigate Russian concerns about meeting a specified time period for elimination. -------------- Ban on Transfers of SOA -------------- ¶4. (S) Background: In Ref B, Delegation recommended that it be given authority to accept the Russian-proposed term "third parties" instead of the U.S.-proposed term "third States" in the U.S-proposed Treaty Article XIV text stating, in part, that "the Parties agree not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to third States." In making the recommendation, the Delegation requested that Washington consider whether there could be any unintended negative consequences associated with agreeing to the Russian-proposed wording. (Washington notes that Article XIV also includes the exception for the U.S. pattern of cooperation with the U.K., and Russia has not objected to that exception.) ¶5. (S) Guidance: Washington authorizes the Delegation to accept the Russian proposed wording "third parties." With the exception of the existing pattern of cooperation with the U.K., Washington has no intention of transferring strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to other States, supranational organizations (such as NATO) or non-state parties, and the Delegation is authorized to so inform the Russian Delegation. Moreover Washington strongly supports such a broad ban on the transfer of SOA by Russia to any such parties. Washington notes that, in an era of concern about the desire of non-state actors such as terrorist groups to acquire WMD and the means to deliver them, the broader focus of the Russian-proposed language is appropriate. -------------- -------------- Categories of Inspection Activities and Annual Quotas -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Guidance: Washington concurs with the Delegation's recommendation in Ref D to develop two new types of inspection activities. Washington joins the Delegation in noting that because the proposed Type-1 inspection would now combine the objectives of two different previous types of inspections (Data update and NWI),a number of practical factors will have to be provided for in developing the procedures for conducting such inspections, including, in addition to those identified by the Delegation, implementation of pre-inspection movement restrictions, sequencing of inspection activities, and possible rest periods for inspectors since inspections may extend to 48 hours in duration. In this regard, Washington believes each Type 1 inspection should be conducted such that the data update portion is conducted first, allowing preparations for the NWI portion to begin if possible while the DUI portion is being conducted. Washington also believes that, because of the potential for some inspections to extend beyond 24 hours in duration, the maximum number of inspectors allowed for all types of inspections (Type 1 and 2) should be no fewer than 10. ¶7. (S) With respect to inspections at mobile ICBM bases, Washington believes that inspection teams should have the right to designate separate RAs for the purpose of the NWI and DUI phases of a single Type 1 inspection. ¶8. (S) Washington concurs with the Delegation's recommendation to retain the limit of no more than two inspections of a given type may be conducted at any single facility during a year, and that elimination inspections should not be counted within the Type 2 annual quota. ¶9. (S) Washington does not concur with the Delegation's recommendation to negotiate annual quotas for Type 1 and Type 2 inspections of no fewer than 10 inspections for each type inspection per year. Instead, the Delegation is authorized to negotiate a quota of no fewer than twelve Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections per year. -------------- -------------- Window for Inspection after Conversion or Elimination -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) Background and Guidance: In Ref E, delegation requested approval of 30-day, instead of 20-day, time period to carry out an inspection following the completion of the conversion or elimination process, except in the case of ICBMS for mobile launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs. Washington approves the delegation's request, with the understanding that this change in the time period for inspections will have no bearing on the time periods in the treaty regarding how long certain items need to be left in the open visible to NTM. End Guidance. CLINTON