SFO-VII GUIDANCE-001: RESPONSES TO SVO-GVA-VI

S E C R E T STATE 116297

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RFGS-3,5,6 AND 8)

SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2029
TAGS: KACT PARM START RS US KZ UP BO
SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-001: RESPONSES TO SVO-GVA-VI
RFGS-3,5,6 AND 8

REFS: A. GENEVA 942 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-003)

B. GENEVA 962 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-006)

C. GENEVA 957 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-004)

D. GENEVA 975 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-005)

E. GENEVA 993 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-008)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary,
VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SLBM Elimination
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1.(S) Background: In Ref A, delegation requested
approval for a revised SLBM launcher elimination
proposal that would apply in practice to Russia only.
Under the revised proposal, once the launch tube hatches
and their associated superstructure fairings are removed
from the submarine (which would remain at the location for
implementation of the elimination process and would
remain visible to NTM during the entire elimination process),
the SLBM launchers would cease to be subject to the treaty's
aggregate limit on SLBMs and their associated launchers.
The elimination procedure would also require removal of
the missile section from the submarine, but there would
be no time limit associated with that action. As Washington
understands the proposal, until the missile section is
removed, the launchers would continue to be declared in
the MOU, though they would not count against the treaty's
limits.


2. (S) Guidance: Washington has reviewed the
delegation's recommendation and concurs with
incorporating as another acceptable elimination method
the delegation's Ref A proposal for launcher elimination
procedures with the proviso that there should in addition
be a defined time limit for the completion of the
elimination procedure. Delegation is therefore authorized
to negotiate ad ref to Washington a specified but reasonable
period of time for completion of the elimination of the
submarine launchers to resolve the issue. Washington notes
that, in recent years, even with CTR assistance from the
United States, Russia has had minor difficulties meeting
the 270 day time period because the Russian government has
not always ensured that the shipyard under contract to CTR
was held accountable for complying with START's timeline and
procedures for elimination of the missile compartments.
CTR has been able to verify through visits to the
elimination site that the missile launch tubes were
eliminated.


3. (S) Delegation is authorized and encouraged to inform
the Russian Delegation that the United States does expect
to continue providing CTR assistance for the elimination
of Russian SLBM launchers, which should help to mitigate
Russian concerns about meeting a specified time period
for elimination.

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Ban on Transfers of SOA
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4. (S) Background: In Ref B, Delegation recommended that
it be given authority to accept the Russian-proposed term
"third parties" instead of the U.S.-proposed term "third
States" in the U.S-proposed Treaty Article XIV text
stating, in part, that "the Parties agree not to transfer
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of
the Treaty to third States." In making the recommendation,
the Delegation requested that Washington consider whether
there could be any unintended negative consequences
associated with agreeing to the Russian-proposed wording.
(Washington notes that Article XIV also includes the
exception for the U.S. pattern of cooperation with the
U.K., and Russia has not objected to that exception.)


5. (S) Guidance: Washington authorizes the Delegation to
accept the Russian proposed wording "third parties."
With the exception of the existing pattern of cooperation
with the U.K., Washington has no intention of transferring
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of
the Treaty to other States, supranational organizations
(such as NATO) or non-state parties, and the Delegation is
authorized to so inform the Russian Delegation. Moreover
Washington strongly supports such a broad ban on the
transfer of SOA by Russia to any such parties.
Washington notes that, in an era of concern about the
desire of non-state actors such as terrorist groups to
acquire WMD and the means to deliver them, the broader
focus of the Russian-proposed language is appropriate.

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Categories of Inspection Activities and Annual Quotas
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6. (S) Guidance: Washington concurs with the
Delegation's recommendation in Ref D to develop two
new types of inspection activities. Washington joins
the Delegation in noting that because the proposed
Type-1 inspection would now combine the objectives of
two different previous types of inspections
(Data update and NWI),a number of practical factors
will have to be provided for in developing the
procedures for conducting such inspections, including,
in addition to those identified by the Delegation,
implementation of pre-inspection movement restrictions,
sequencing of inspection activities, and possible rest
periods for inspectors since inspections may extend to
48 hours in duration. In this regard, Washington
believes each Type 1 inspection should be conducted such
that the data update portion is conducted first, allowing
preparations for the NWI portion to begin if possible
while the DUI portion is being conducted. Washington also
believes that, because of the potential for some
inspections to extend beyond 24 hours in duration, the
maximum number of inspectors allowed for all types of
inspections (Type 1 and 2) should be no fewer than 10.


7. (S) With respect to inspections at mobile ICBM bases,
Washington believes that inspection teams should have the
right to designate separate RAs for the purpose of the
NWI and DUI phases of a single Type 1 inspection.


8. (S) Washington concurs with the Delegation's
recommendation to retain the limit of no more than two
inspections of a given type may be conducted at any
single facility during a year, and that elimination
inspections should not be counted within the Type 2
annual quota.


9. (S) Washington does not concur with the Delegation's
recommendation to negotiate annual quotas for Type 1 and
Type 2 inspections of no fewer than 10 inspections for
each type inspection per year. Instead, the Delegation
is authorized to negotiate a quota of no fewer than twelve
Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections per
year.

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Window for Inspection after Conversion or Elimination
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10. (S) Background and Guidance: In Ref E, delegation
requested approval of 30-day, instead of 20-day, time
period to carry out an inspection following the
completion of the conversion or elimination process,
except in the case of ICBMS for mobile launchers of
ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs. Washington
approves the delegation's request, with the
understanding that this change in the time period
for inspections will have no bearing on the time
periods in the treaty regarding how long certain
items need to be left in the open visible to NTM.

End Guidance.
CLINTON