U.S. PROPOSED TEXT FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT

					  S E C R E T STATE 115348 
 
SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2029 
TAGS: PARM KACT START RS US KZ UP BO
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSED TEXT FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 
ON INTERIM MEASURES RELATING TO THEIR STRATEGIC 
OFFENSIVE ARMS 
 
Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI. 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
					

1. (U) This is an action request for Moscow (see
paragraph 3).



2. (S) BACKGROUND: The START Treaty will expire on
December 5, 2009, and the new START Follow-on treaty
currently being negotiated will not have entered into
force by that date. Therefore, the United States seeks to
agree with Russia on the continuation during this interim
period of certain verification and transparency measures
drawn from START. The U.S-proposed text for a Memorandum
of Agreement between the United States and Russia
Regarding Certain Interim Measures Relating to Their
Strategic Offensive Arms is in para 4 below. The United
States seeks to reach agreement on this text before START
expires.



3. (S) ACTION REQUESTED: Drawing on the background in
para 2 above, Ambassador Beyrle is requested to deliver to
appropriate host government officials on Monday, November
9 the text of the U.S.-proposed agreement in paragraph 4.
In so doing, he should indicate that the United States
seeks a response very soon regarding whether Russia agrees
this is the right step and whether Russia is willing to
receive a U.S. team in Moscow to negotiate the text. The
United States is prepared to send a small senior expert
team led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Karin L. Look to Moscow to negotiate the text of this
agreement during the week of November 16, 2009.
Ambassador Beyrle should be aware that Washington would
strongly prefer a seasoned Russian negotiator who knows
START very well, in order to facilitate rapid progress on
this negotiation. Ambassador Strel'tsov, who for a
significant period was the Russian head of the START Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission, would be an
excellent choice. As appropriate, Ambassador Beyrle
should find a way to suggest informally that Ambassador
Strel'tsov would be well suited to lead the negotiations
for Russia in Moscow.



4. (S) Begin text (Releasable to Russia):

U.S.-Proposed Text

November 4, 2009

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
REGARDING CERTAIN INTERIM MEASURES RELATING TO THEIR
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Recognizing that a treaty on measures for the further
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms will
not enter into force before the expiration of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START
Treaty), the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Russian Federation have agreed
to implement the measures described below with a view to
continuing the mutual transparency regarding their
strategic offensive arms provided for in the START Treaty.

The Parties agree to the following measures:



1. General Confidence Building Measures:

a) The Parties shall exchange information through
diplomatic channels, or take other measures on a voluntary
basis, with the aim of resolving questions that may be
raised by one Party concerning the other Party's strategic
offensive arms.

b) Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the
national technical means of verification of the other
Party when used in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law.

c) During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the
Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to encrypt
or otherwise deny access to telemetric information and
further undertakes to provide, upon request, copies of the
recorded telemetric data of the flight and supplementary
interpretative data, insofar as permissible under its
domestic laws. Notwithstanding the undertakings described
in the previous sentence, each party shall have the right
to encrypt the telemetric information that pertains to the
front section or its elements, consistent with paragraph 2
of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol of the START
Treaty, during no more than two flight tests of ICBMs or
SLBMs of an existing type under the START Treaty.



2. Notifications: Each Party shall provide to the other
Party the notifications provided for in the following
provisions of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to
the START Treaty (the Notifications Protocol): paragraphs
3, 8, and 9 of Section I; paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 9, of
Section II; paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Section IV;
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Section V; paragraph 1 of
Section VI; paragraphs 1, 4, and 6 of Section VII; and
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VIII. The Parties may also
provide additional notifications as they deem appropriate.



3. Transparency visits:

a) Each Party has the right to conduct up to five (5)
transparency visits at facilities that were declared under
the START Treaty as of December 4, 2009, and for which
site diagrams were exchanged. The purpose of a monitoring
visit shall be to promote transparency regarding the
ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or heavy bombers
located at that facility.

b) The visiting team shall consist of no more than
eight persons drawn from those individuals included in the
START list of inspectors as of December 4, 2009. Their
names shall be provided to the hosting Party no less than
ten days in advance of their arrival at the point of
entry. The Party receiving such names shall provide visas
and, where necessary, such other documents as may be
required to ensure that each person may enter and remain
in the territory of the other Party throughout the
in-country period.

c) The hosting Party shall treat with due respect such
visiting persons in its territory in connection with the
conduct of these visits, and shall take all appropriate
steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and
dignity of such persons.



4. In implementing this Memorandum, the Parties agree to
apply the definitions in the Annex on Terms and Their
Definitions from the START Treaty, to the extent
applicable.

This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date of
its signature and shall remain in force for a period of 6
months, unless superseded earlier by a treaty on measures
for the further reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms.

DONE at _________ on __________, in two originals, each in
the English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

End Text.
CLINTON