(S) FOLLOWING-UP WITH TURKEY ON AK MAKINA'S

S E C R E T STATE 113752

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2034
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL IR TU
SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING-UP WITH TURKEY ON AK MAKINA'S
EFFORTS TO SUPPLY MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 003403

B. ANKARA 000070

C. ANKARA 000095

D. ANKARA 000293

E. STATE 027957

F. ANKARA 000452

G. STATE 066578

H. ANKARA 000935

Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO;
REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please
see paragraph 4.


2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: On several occasions
in 2009, we have alerted Turkish authorities to sales of
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the
Turkish firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Iran's
liquid propellant missile developer (Reftels). In these
discussions, we have emphasized that Ak Makina's
relationships with these Iranian companies posed clear
ballistic missile proliferation risks and urged Turkish
authorities to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as
a source of supply for machine tools to Iran's missile
program. When we most recently raised this case in June
2009, Turkish officials said they were monitoring closely the
activities of Ak Makina and had rejected a number of export
licenses this year involving this firm (Refs G and H).


3. (S) We now would like to follow-up with the GOT on this
case and provide Turkey details on efforts by Ak Makina to
circumvent export controls in several countries to supply its
customers in Iran. Specifically, we understand that in
September 2009, Ak Makina was working to procure CNC machine
tools from firms in Germany and the Czech Republic due to its
inability to purchase machine tools from a company in South
Korea following an export licensing denial. In these most
recent efforts, Ak Makina concealed from the manufacturers
that the customers for these machines were located in Iran.
Given our concerns regarding Ak Makina's efforts to supply
missile-related entities in Iran, we want to ask Turkish
officials to investigate this information and request an
update on the measures the GOT is taking to prevent Ak Makina
from using its base of operations in Turkey to facilitate
machine tool sales to Iran.


4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Ankara approach
appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.


5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET/REL TURKEY)

-- On several occasions over the last year, we have raised
with you our concerns regarding the sales of computer
numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the Turkish
firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Iran's liquid
propellant missile developer, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG).

-- We noted that Ak Makina's relationships with these Iranian
companies posed clear missile proliferation risks and urged
you to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a
source of supply for machine tools to Iran's missile program.

-- During our most recent discussions of this case in June
2009, you noted that your government continues to monitor
closely the activities of Ak Makina and that a number of
export licenses involving this firm had been rejected this
year.

-- We thank you for these efforts and would appreciate an
update on Ak Makina's activities from your perspective. We
also would like to share with you details on efforts by Ak
Makina to circumvent export controls in several countries to
supply its customers in Iran.

-- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Ak
Makina was working to procure a CNC machine tool manufactured
by the Czech manufacturer Kovosit MAS.

-- The machine sought from Kovosit MAS is likely a five-axis
CNC milling machine controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement
and Nuclear Suppliers Group.

-- During the same time period, Ak Makina also was working to
procure several CNC machine tools manufactured by Hyundai-Kia
Machine Europe Gmbh located in Offenbach, Germany.

-- These machines sought by Ak Makina from Hyundai-Kia
Machine Europe GmbH included an SKT 400LC CNC heavy duty
lathe and several KIT-400 series CNC turning machines.

-- In its dealings with both Kosovit MAS and Hyundai-Kia
Machine Europe GmbH, Ak Makina concealed that the customers
for these machines were the Iranian entities Kara Gostar
Engineering Company and Machine Sazi Tabriz.

-- We also understand that Ak Makina is seeking these machine
tools from Kovosit MAS and the German branch of Hyundai-Kia
because it was unable to purchase Hyundai-Kia machines from
South Korea due to a denial of an export license by South
Korean authorities.

-- In light of our past concerns regarding Ak Makina's
efforts to supply missile-related entities in Iran, we ask
that you investigate this information.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation on export control
and nonproliferation issues.

End talking points/non-paper


6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR.


7. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON