(S) FOLLOWING-UP WITH TURKEY ON AK MAKINA'S

S E C R E T STATE 113752 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2034 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL IR TU SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING-UP WITH TURKEY ON AK MAKINA'S EFFORTS TO SUPPLY MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN REF: A. STATE 003403 ¶B. ANKARA 000070 ¶C. ANKARA 000095 ¶D. ANKARA 000293 ¶E. STATE 027957 ¶F. ANKARA 000452 ¶G. STATE 066578 ¶H. ANKARA 000935 Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO; REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: On several occasions in 2009, we have alerted Turkish authorities to sales of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the Turkish firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Iran's liquid propellant missile developer (Reftels). In these discussions, we have emphasized that Ak Makina's relationships with these Iranian companies posed clear ballistic missile proliferation risks and urged Turkish authorities to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of supply for machine tools to Iran's missile program. When we most recently raised this case in June 2009, Turkish officials said they were monitoring closely the activities of Ak Makina and had rejected a number of export licenses this year involving this firm (Refs G and H). ¶3. (S) We now would like to follow-up with the GOT on this case and provide Turkey details on efforts by Ak Makina to circumvent export controls in several countries to supply its customers in Iran. Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Ak Makina was working to procure CNC machine tools from firms in Germany and the Czech Republic due to its inability to purchase machine tools from a company in South Korea following an export licensing denial. In these most recent efforts, Ak Makina concealed from the manufacturers that the customers for these machines were located in Iran. Given our concerns regarding Ak Makina's efforts to supply missile-related entities in Iran, we want to ask Turkish officials to investigate this information and request an update on the measures the GOT is taking to prevent Ak Makina from using its base of operations in Turkey to facilitate machine tool sales to Iran. ¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Ankara approach appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. �00A;¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET/REL TURKEY) -- On several occasions over the last year, we have raised with you our concerns regarding the sales of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the Turkish firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Iran's liquid propellant missile developer, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). -- We noted that Ak Makina's relationships with these Iranian companies posed clear missile proliferation risks and urged you to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of supply for machine tools to Iran's missile program. -- During our most recent discussions of this case in June 2009, you noted that your government continues to monitor closely the activities of Ak Makina and that a number of export licenses involving this firm had been rejected this year. -- We thank you for these efforts and would appreciate an update on Ak Makina's activities from your perspective. We also would like to share with you details on efforts by Ak Makina to circumvent export controls in several countries to supply its customers in Iran. -- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Ak Makina was working to procure a CNC machine tool manufactured by the Czech manufacturer Kovosit MAS. -- The machine sought from Kovosit MAS is likely a five-axis CNC milling machine controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group. -- During the same time period, Ak Makina also was working to procure several CNC machine tools manufactured by Hyundai-Kia Machine Europe Gmbh located in Offenbach, Germany. -- These machines sought by Ak Makina from Hyundai-Kia Machine Europe GmbH included an SKT 400LC CNC heavy duty lathe and several KIT-400 series CNC turning machines. -- In its dealings with both Kosovit MAS and Hyundai-Kia Machine Europe GmbH, Ak Makina concealed that the customers for these machines were the Iranian entities Kara Gostar Engineering Company and Machine Sazi Tabriz. -- We also understand that Ak Makina is seeking these machine tools from Kovosit MAS and the German branch of Hyundai-Kia because it was unable to purchase Hyundai-Kia machines from South Korea due to a denial of an export license by South Korean authorities. -- In light of our past concerns regarding Ak Makina's efforts to supply missile-related entities in Iran, we ask that you investigate this information. -- We look forward to continued cooperation on export control and nonproliferation issues. End talking points/non-paper ¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR. ¶7. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON