REQUEST GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA TO STOP LME

S E C R E T STATE 113007 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2029 TAGS: BU ETTC MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER SY MASS SUBJECT: REQUEST GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA TO STOP LME TRANSFER TO SYRIA REF: A. STATE 95661 ¶B. YEMENI EUC Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. This is an action request. Please see para. 3. ¶2. (S/NF) Background. On October 16, 2009, we alerted the Government of Bulgaria (GOB) that as of early August 2009, the Turkish firm TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. was preparing for the possible transfer of Bulgarian-origin AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators to Syria's Ministry of Defense (Ref A). A draft end-user certificate (EUC) identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of this military hardware and a Turkish firm was brokering the deal. On October 18, 2009, the GOB consulted with us on a transfer to Yemen for the same type and quantity of AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. was trying to get for Damascus and provided us the official EUC for review. Based on our review of the Yemeni EUC and previous ones, we assess that this EUC probably bears a forged signature. It is our understanding that the deal is now for a smaller number/trial size of the same helicopter mines. The involvement of the same Turkish broker, same type of mines, and likely forged EUC strongly suggests this shipment is actually for Syria. Washington wants to approach GOB officials and request they use all available means to prevent this transfer. END OF BACKGROUND. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶3. (S) Department requests Embassy Sofia approach appropriate Government of Bulgaria (GOB) officials to deliver the talking points in paragraph 5 and report response. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶4. (S) Embassy Sofia should seek to pursue the following objectives: -- Emphasize to GOB officials that we are concerned the helicopter mines going to Yemen may be going to Syria based on the fact that the shipment to Yemen has the same type of mines that we informed Sofia on last month that were intended for Syria; -- Emphasize to GOB officials that we assess the EUC for the Yemen shipment to be a forgery based on our analysis of the current EUC and previous ones; -- Explain that Yemen is an unlikely customer for antihelicopter mines at this time given its other defense procurement priorities; -- Urge the GOB to deny authorization for this transfer, based on the likelihood that Syria, not Yemen, is the actual end user. -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶5. (SECRET/REL BULGARIA) BEGIN TALKING POINTS. -- We have previously raised with you that a Turkish arms broker, as of early August 2009, was preparing to broker the possible transfer of Bulgarian-origin AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators to Syria's Ministry of Defense. -- The draft end-user certificate in the August 2009 deal identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of this military hardware and the Turkish firm TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. as the broker. -- We are concerned that the Yemeni EUC you provided us for review may bear a forged signature. -- We have compared signatures between this Yemeni EUC and what we assess are legitimate Yemeni EUCs and they did not match. -- The official EUC certified by the GOY had the same type of AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. was trying to get for Damascus, strongly suggesting the mines in this deal may be for Syria. -- Yemen is an unlikely customer for antihelicopter mines given its other procurement priorities and general lack of a helicopter threat. -- We urge you to deny authorization for this transfer given the likelihood that this deal is almost certainly for Syria, not Yemen, and the possibility that if delivered, Syria will provide some of these items to Lebanese Hizballah. -- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and other related matters. END TALKING POINTS. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow up is Lou Ganem, ISN/CATR. ¶7. (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, EUR, and T. CLINTON