Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE11248
2009-02-06 21:14:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SCHEDULED VISIT BY A MISSILE-RELATED DELEGATION

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL KN YM 
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P 062114Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02 STATE 011248 062128Z
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 011248 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL KN YM

SUBJECT: SCHEDULED VISIT BY A MISSILE-RELATED DELEGATION
FROM NORTH KOREA'S KOMID TO YEMEN (S)

REF: A. 08 STATE 043685

B. 08 SANAA 00835

C. 08 SANAA 002018

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM,
REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).

S E C R E T STATE 011248 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL KN YM SUBJECT: SCHEDULED VISIT BY A MISSILE-RELATED DELEGATION FROM NORTH KOREA'S KOMID TO YEMEN (S) REF: A. 08 STATE 043685 ¶B. 08 SANAA 00835 ¶C. 08 SANAA 002018 Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Sanaa, please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S) Background, Purpose, and Objective: In April 2008, the United States shared information with the ROYG that in early March 2008, a Yemeni delegation was planning to travel to North Korea to meet with representatives from the North Korea weapons trading firm Korea Mining and Development Corporation (KOMID) (Ref A). In December 2008, the ROYG responded that its efforts to investigate this matter had been hindered by a lack of information and provided a list of questions about the specific itinerary, composition, and affiliations of the Yemeni delegation (Ref B). Although we cannot provide Yemeni authorities with answers to these questions, we would like to follow-up on this case and share with them additional details concerning continuing contacts between KOMID and Yemen. Specifically, we understand that three delegations from North Korea were scheduled to travel to Sanaa on January 9 and 10, 2009. Our information indicates these delegations are associated with KOMID and that some of the individuals planning to travel to Yemen previously had been involved in North Korean ballistic missile projects in Iran. ¶3. (S) This DPRK-Yemen cooperation is of particular concern in light of the ROYG's August 2002 commitment to the United States that Yemen would not import from any source, including North Korea, missiles or missile-related material. Based on this commitment, the United States waived penalties that otherwise would have been required under the U.S. missile sanctions law against Yemeni entities for engaging in missile-related cooperation with North Korea. This cooperation would also be a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which prohibits all states from acquiring missiles and missile-related items from North Korea and acquiring technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of missiles. ¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Sanaa approach appropriate Yemeni officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph five below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET REL YEMEN) -- We would like to raise with you a matter of potential missile proliferation concern. -- You will recall that in May 2008, we provided you with information indicating that a Yemeni delegation planned to travel to North Korea to meet with representatives of North Korea's primary weapons trading firm Korea Mining and Development Corporation (KOMID). -- We raised this activity again with you in December 2008 and requested an update on the status of your investigation into this case. You responded by requesting additional details about these interactions with North Korea. -- We now have information indicating that three delegations from North Korea were scheduled to travel to Sanaa on January 9 and 10, 2009. -- We understand that these delegations are associated with KOMID and that some of the individuals planning to travel to Yemen previously had been involved in North Korean ballistic missile projects in Iran. -- We remain concerned that this January 2009 travel by KOMID is another signal of renewed missile-related cooperation between Yemen and North Korea. -- We would appreciate any clarification you can provide on this matter, particularly in light of your government's August 2002 commitment not to import from any source, including North Korea, missiles or missile-related material. -- In addition, we are concerned this cooperation would also be a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which prohibits all states from acquiring missiles and missile-related items from North Korea and acquiring technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of missiles. -- We look forward to continuing cooperation on nonproliferation matters. End talking points/non-paper ¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and NEA/ARP. ¶7. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON NNNN End Cable Text

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