MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):

S E C R E T STATE 112291

SIPDIS
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2034
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR MTCR CONSIDERATION

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reasons: 1.4 (B),(D),(H).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.


2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris
provide the interagency cleared paper "Emerging Technologies
for MTCR Consideration" in paragraph 3 below to the French
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact
(POC) for distribution to all Partners. Info addressees also
may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In
delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is
sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the
Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the
MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional
IE papers have been provided via septels. END NOTE.


3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

SECRET//REL MTCR
Emerging Technologies for MTCR Consideration

Introduction

Emerging technologies used in the development, manufacture and
production of missiles force us to think about how they may
impact Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) controls.
Some of these changes are subtle, relying on improvements to
materials and methods of manufacture, while others are more
dramatic. As technological advances occur, and become more
commonly available, Partners need to consider whether to
change MTCR controls to keep pace. This paper seeks to
highlight technologies that are not covered by the MTCR Annex
but could make an important contribution to a country,s
missile program. It also will examine the limitations of some
current MTCR Annex controls that may reduce the ability to
prevent the proliferation of technologies useful in the
development of WMD delivery systems.

Electron Beam and Laser Welding

Both laser and electron beam welders offer precise control of
the welding process through complete scalability of the weld
beam, allowing welding of everything from thin foils to thick
parts. Although these technologies are widely used in
commercial applications, welding technology also is critical
to ballistic missile manufacturing where some materials may be
very thick and others may be very thin or made of reactive
metals. Both types of welders -- laser and electron beam --
are appropriate for a wide range of metals (steel, titanium,
aluminum, and others),and can be used to weld dissimilar
metals, a process that is extremely challenging using
traditional forms of welding. However, despite their critical
importance in ballistic missile manufacturing, they are not
controlled by the MTCR.

Electron beam welding (EBW) is a process in which a high-
velocity beam of electrons is directed at the materials to be
joined, heating the material to approximately 25,000 degrees C
and fusing them, while allowing for very fine control over the
weld properties. This creates a much stronger weld than can
typically be created using other welding methods. EBW is also
able to create these same high quality welds for thick
workpieces.

EBW is often performed in a vacuum or in a controlled
atmosphere where inert gases are introduced into the welding
chamber. This is done to displace oxygen from the atmosphere
that can react with the molten metals to create oxides that
weaken the weldments. High-purity welds are the key to
obtaining maximum material strength in the welded joint. The
tightly focused energy of the weld beam causes deep
penetration into the workpiece while minimizing the heat
affected zone (HAZ). This preserves much of the material
properties of the parent material for maximum strength.

Welders of this type comprise several components that together
form the weld system, including an electron beam gun and the
weld chamber. An electron beam gun is used to produce the
electrons and accelerate them. The weld chamber is a strong,
leak-proof cabinet that can withstand the pressures of being
put under vacuum while still providing an access for
installing and removing the workpiece to be welded. The weld
gun and working chamber will usually have separate vacuum
pumps. The workpiece will be manipulated many times within the
chamber through the use of computer numeric controls (CNC)
that are connected to servo motors.

EBW is especially useful for the manufacture of large casing
structures and propellant tanks for ballistic and cruise
missiles and in the welding of regeneratively cooled nozzles
for liquid rocket engines.

Laser Welders are similar to EBW except a laser is used to
project a focused beam of photons at the workpiece instead of
electrons. Solid state and gas lasers are commonly used. A
high power density beam concentrates its energy on a small
area. The energy of these photons is similar to that of
electron beam welding and is converted to heat when impacting
on the part. One potential downside to using laser welders is
the tendency of metals to scatter and reflect some of the
laser energy. Lasers do, however, provide a very controlled
weld and offer a small HAZ. Pulsed laser beams are used for
thinner metals while a continuous beam is used to weld thicker
metals. In this way all types of metals from foils to thick
plates can be successfully welded using lasers. Unlike
electron beam welders, some laser welders can be used outside
a vacuum or controlled atmosphere, making them somewhat more
versatile. Laser welders also can be mounted on robotic arms,
making them suitable for parts with areas that are difficult
to access.

Laser welding is used in the fabrication of missile launch
canisters, missile antenna systems, and to weld aerodynamic
surfaces to missile bodies.

Exploitation of Satellite Navigation Receivers in WMD
Delivery
Systems

Since the early 1990s, the MTCR Annex has included language
intended to control the proliferation of military and
commercial satellite navigation receivers that could be used
in platforms capable of carrying WMD. Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are frequently used in UAV
applications, including cruise missiles. However, cruise
missiles and UAVs can use receivers that are uncontrolled by
the Annex and are virtually indistinguishable from those used
in a variety of commercial applications. Controls designed to
restrict GNSS receivers useful in ballistic missiles based on
an operating velocity threshold can be effective, but care
must be taken to ensure consistent enforcement of these
velocity limitations.

The Potential Threat: The U.S. Global Positioning System
(GPS, with both military and commercial signals) is the only
fully operational GNSS presently available, although Russia,
Europe, and China are developing similar systems. The
intrinsic accuracy of GNSS is high, even using just the
commercial signals, which provides for overall missile system
accuracies on the order of a few meters. Moreover, these
errors do not grow with time of operation or range of the
platform, as do inertial navigation system (INS) errors.
Therefore, GNSS data is often used in missile navigation
systems, including for cruise missiles and UAVs, to
periodically correct for INS errors. Countries such as Iran
and Syria could potentially use GNSS receivers to achieve
weapon accuracies more than an order of magnitude higher than
possible using only INS.

Controls on GNSS Equipment in the MTCR Annex: GNSS
receivers, and Inertial Navigation Systems that incorporate
GNSS equipment, applicable for use in missiles are controlled
in the MTCR Annex under Items 9.A.7, and 11.A.3. MTCR Annex
Item 11.A.3. currently controls GNSS receivers designed or
modified for use in Category I systems or designed for
airborne applications that are capable of providing navigation
information at speeds in excess of 600 meters per second,
employing decryption to gain access to GNSS secure
signal/data, or being specially designed to employ anti-jam
features. MTCR Annex Items 11.A.3.b.2. and 11.A.3.b.3. have
helped prevent the proliferation of military-grade receivers
that make use of the encrypted GPS military signals and of
antennas that reduce the effective power of jamming sources.
However, Item 11.A.3.a -- which controls GNSS receivers that
are designed or modified for use in platforms having ranges
greater than 300 km and capable of carrying 500 kg in payload
-- covers relatively little because GNSS receivers are rarely
designed or modified for MTCR applications. Additionally, the
performance of GNSS receivers, or navigation systems
incorporating GNSS receivers, does not degrade with the range
or payload capability. Therefore, a GNSS receiver designed
for a shorter-range UAV or cruise missile would also be usable
in a Category I system. Moreover, many uncontrolled receivers
can be used in UAVs and cruise missiles without any
modification, and engineers from most countries of concern
(many of whom attend international GNSS conferences) should
have no trouble connecting the relevant outputs to the
vehicle,s autopilot after obtaining the receiver.

Item 11.A.3.b.1. -- which controls receivers capable of
providing navigation information at speeds in excess of 600
m/s -- has the potential to serve as an effective control on
ballistic missile use of GNSS since reentry vehicles, even for
short range ballistic missiles, achieve substantially higher
speeds. However, manufacturers have implemented this
restriction unevenly over the years, allowing the speed
restriction to be removed after sale in some cases. For
example, the manufacturer of one receiver provides it with the
MTCR control limit of 600 m/s as the default speed limit, but
allows the user to reprogram this limit. A potential solution
to this reprogramming problem would be to implement this limit
in firmware, which would be less susceptible to tampering,
rather than in the software. However, given that the number
of countries now producing chips for GNSS receivers -- and the
receivers themselves -- continues to grow, the effectiveness
of 11.A.3.b.1. could significantly diminish given the
difficulty of ensuring that all the potential manufacturers
include the same limitations in their equipment. Furthermore,
shareware receiver designs -- including even those being
developed in universities -- are likely to add to this
problem.

Additionally, the 600 meters per second criterion in Item
11.A.3.b.1. was designed to capture GNSS receivers used in
ballistic missiles and high-speed cruise missiles, while the
criteria for decryption and anti-jam features in Items
11.A.3.b.2. and 11.A.3.b.3. were geared toward GNSS receivers
designed for military or governmental use. However, the
current control text does not cover commercial GNSS receivers
usable in slower moving UAVs, including many cruise missiles.
(Note: 600 meters per second is approximately Mach 1.76,
while the vast majority of UAVs, including a wide variety of
cruise missiles, operate below Mach 1.0.) Partners should
be aware that most commercial GNSS units sold for airborne
applications do not meet the MTCR parameters but are
nevertheless useful for and used in Category I and II UAV and
cruise missile systems.

Accelerometers and Gyros

Accelerometers and gyroscopes with performance poorer than
those subject to control under the MTCR can still be useful
for accurate navigation of Category I and II missiles and
UAVs. MTCR Annex Item 9.A.3. controls accelerometers with a
specified scale factor and bias repeatability, and 9.A.4.
controls gyros of a specified drift rate stability. However,
particularly for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),including
cruise missiles, there is an increasing use of integrated
navigation systems incorporating an inertial navigation system
(INS) with a GNSS receiver. These systems use the GNSS
receiver to correct for errors in the output of the INS
accelerometers and gyros. Therefore, it is possible to
incorporate non-MTCR-controlled gyros and accelerometers with
large time dependent errors into a highly accurate GNSS-aided
INS for use in Category I and II UAVs, including cruise
missiles. For example, many compact INS units for small UAVs
currently use MEMS gyros and accelerometers that do not meet
the MTCR parameters, yet in conjunction with a GNSS receiver
can provide accurate navigation. These low-accuracy gyros and
accelerometers are widely available.

Ball Bearings

The MTCR Annex controls radial ball bearings (Item 3.A.7.)
with an ISO 492 tolerance class 2 (or ANSI/ABMA Std 20
Tolerance Class ABEC-9 or other national equivalents) or
better and of a specified size. The size specification was
geared toward capturing ball bearings usable in liquid
propellant rocket engine turbo-pumps. However, for a variety
of reasons, to include factors related to the production
process for ball bearings and grading requirements, liquid
rocket engine turbopump manufacturers in actuality use lower
tolerance ball bearings.

In addition, radial ball bearings have other important
missile-related uses. Spinning mass gyros used in inertial
navigation systems frequently use ball bearings with a tighter
tolerance than those used in liquid-propellant turbopumps, but
of a different size than specified in the MTCR Annex: gyro
manufacturers commonly use ABEC-9 class bearings or bearings
manufactured or refinished to even closer tolerances, but the
relatively small mechanical loads on these precision
instruments do not warrant large-sized bearings as used in
turbopump applications. The typical outside diameter for a
gyro ball bearing is less than 15 mm, while the MTCR Annex
regulates bearings between 25 and 100 mm.

Both of these examples indicate that there are a wide variety
of ball bearings, usable in MTCR Category I systems that do
not meet the MTCR Annex parameters for tolerance and/or size
in Item 3.A.7. All MTCR Partners need to be aware of this
when reviewing requests to export ball bearings.

Software for Modeling, Simulation or Design Integration

MTCR Annex Item 16.D.1. controls software specially designed
for modeling, simulation, or design integration of the systems
specified in 1.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.
Per the technical note for item 16.D.1., the modeling software
includes in particular the aerodynamic and thermodynamic
analysis of the systems. The U.S. currently is seeing an
increase in the amount of modeling, simulation and design
software that is being used for missiles, due in part to the
high cost of testing and the improvement in commercial
modeling software. This trend is troubling because we believe
programs of concern could exploit the MTCR,s narrow
definition
of "specially designed" to obtain this software. If the
interpretation of "specially designed" is implemented
consistent with current MTCR Annex Terminology, many software
packages, which could be used for the development of MTCR
Category I and II systems, would be left uncontrolled by the
MTCR because few pieces of software have "no other purpose"
than for use in the modeling of systems in item 1.A., or sub-
systems in items 2.A or 20.A.

Hybrid Rocket Motors

Hybrid rocket motors contain elements of both solid and liquid
systems, with the fuel being solid and the oxidizer being
liquid. Item 2.A.1. controls individual rocket stages usable
in systems specified in 1.A. as Category I items regardless of
motor type. Item 2.A.1.c. controls liquid propellant rocket
engines and solid propellant rocket motors as Category I
items. However, hybrid rocket motors (and specially designed
components usable in the systems specified in 1.A., 19.A.1. or
19.A.2.) are controlled under Item 3.A.6. as Category II
items. Because of the high performance capability of hybrid
rocket motors -- and their potential to be used in MTCR
Category I missile development programs -- Partners need to
carefully scrutinize applications to export hybrid rocket
motors (and associated components, software and technology)
and to be clear about their actual end-use.

As we have learned from the example of Space Ship One -- the
first manned private rocket ship and winner of the
international human spaceflight competition -- hybrid rockets
can be used to push vehicles into orbit. Space Ship One also
demonstrated that hybrid rocket motors can easily exceed the
total impulse performance thresholds listed in paragraph
2.A.1.c. The success of Space Ship One, using hybrid rocket
motors, also suggests the potential for a country/entity that
desires to build a Category I rocket motor for use in
ballistic missiles to try to obtain hybrid rocket motors or
software or technology controlled under Category II, Items
3.D.2. and 3.E.1. They could use the Item 3 technology (i.e.,
hybrid rocket motor technology) to gain an understanding of
Category I systems and as a stepping stone to building a
propulsion sub-system for a Category I system. Moreover, by
seeking Category II technology (Item 3),rather than the more-
difficult-to- obtain Category I technology (Item 2) which is
subject to a strong presumption of denial, their procurement
efforts may be less likely to raise red flags with licensing
officers.

Penetration Aids

Several devices and equipment to aid ballistic missile re-
entry vehicle (RV) penetration may be employed on ballistic
missile systems. Often these devices use old techniques, but
technologies for these devices and equipment also are
constantly improved to keep pace with advancements in
electronics, radars and defense systems. A penetration aid
can be defined as any device deliberately used to increase a
missile or a warhead,s chances of penetrating a target,s
defenses. This discussion examines only devices or equipment,
not techniques such as target saturation, lofted trajectory,
depressed trajectory, use of fractional orbit, or the use of
electro-magnetic pulses (EMP).

Chaff: Chaff is an old technique used often with aircraft or
ships to defeat homing missiles. When used in missiles it may
be deployed over a large area of space, creating a large,
radar-reflecting area that will obscure incoming warheads from
defensive radar. A simpler way to generate a chaff field is
the incidental or deliberate fragmentation of the final-stage
rocket booster. This cloud of fragments can confuse an
enemy,s radar by creating a radar cross-section much larger
than the actual warhead or RV and providing no defined target
for the anti-missile system to home-in on.

Jamming/Spoofing Devices: Jamming a radar system is a
technique that has long been used in aircraft. It can be used
with an RV or post-boost vehicle (PBV) to confuse radar
systems to prevent the radar from finding or tracking the
warhead or RV. A variation of normal jamming can be used to
spoof a radar system by generating false returns, thus
allowing the real warhead or RV to reach its target. In
either case the radar system fails to track the warhead/RV and
thus cannot provide information on the attack, to include
warning.

Decoys: Decoys are used to confuse radar or electro-optical
systems to the actual number and location of the real
warhead(s). The decoy can be made from several different
materials, such as mylar balloons that can inflated in space.
These mylar balloons are designed to have the same radar
characteristics as the warhead or RV. Because the warhead and
the decoy balloons may be at different temperatures, a more
sophisticated system is to surround the warhead and the decoys
with heated shrouds that put them all at the same temperature.
This defeats attempts to discriminate between decoys and
warheads on the basis of temperature.

Stealth technology: Stealth technology also could be an
effective means to aid a warhead or RV in reaching its target.
Stealth technology is already controlled in the MTCR Annex
under Item 17.

Although countermeasure equipment that separates from the
RV/PBV (e.g. decoys, jammers or chaff dispensers) are included
in the MTCR,s definition of "payload" for ballistic missiles,
there are no MTCR Annex controls on penetration aids other
than stealth technology.

Conclusion

There are a number of technologies that are not part of the
MTCR Annex but could make an important contribution to a
country,s missile program. Partners need to be mindful of
this when evaluating the potential export license requests and
to consider applying catch-all controls to prevent the export
of these items to programs of concern.


END TEXT OF PAPER.


4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR
issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON