SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S.

S E C R E T STATE 107748 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019 TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS SUBJECT: SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, BEGINNING OCTOBER 19, 2009 REF: A. STATE 099070 AND 099072 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003) ¶B. GENEVA 00869-00872 (SFO-GVA-V-031) ¶C. GENEVA 0744 (SFO-GVA-IV-013) ¶D. STATE 94665 (SFO-GVA-IV-005) ¶E. STATE 97474 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-001) Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller will head the U.S. delegation to the sixth round of START Follow-on treaty negotiations with Russia in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning on October 19, 2009. Following is guidance for the beginning of this round. Delegation should request further guidance when needed. -------------- COUNTING OF "PHANTOM" DELIVERY VEHICLES -------------- ¶2. (S) With respect to empty Minuteman III and Peacekeeper ICBM silos that are not in service and no longer capable of operationally launching an ICBM absent significant refurbishments, Delegation is authorized to offer that these silos will be eliminated within seven years after entry into force using simplified procedures to be specified in the START follow-on Treaty. Because the Minuteman III ICBM will be an existing type under the treaty, the Minuteman III silos will remain accountable until eliminated. Because, under the U.S. proposal, the Peacekeeper ICBM would not be an "existing type," the Peacekeeper silos would not be accountable under the treaty, even prior to their elimination. ¶3. (S) To ensure that the launchers on the four converted U.S. Ohio-class SSGNs do not count against the SFO treaty limits, Delegation should maintain the position that the C-4/Trident I will not be an "existing type" of SLBM under the SFO treaty. Delegation is authorized to offer to conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted SSGN to demonstrate how it has been modified so that it is unable to launch a C-4/Trident I SLBM. ¶4. (S) As a means to settle and record agreement on the B-1B bomber issue, Delegation is authorized to propose the following approach: -- The United States will complete the conversion of the remaining B-1Bs to a conventional-only configuration, using the procedures that have been used previously to convert B-1Bs. Each B-1B bomber will continue to count against the treaty limits until it is converted. In addition, 1 B1-B will be converted to static display, using START procedures. -- The United States will convert or use simplified procedures to eliminate any B-1Bs currently stored at Davis-Monthan AFB that will not be converted to a non-nuclear capability. Each of these 16 B-1B bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB will continue to count against the treaty limits until it is so converted or eliminated. -- The United States will agree to a prohibition on the storage of nuclear warheads at B-1B bases and on re-conversion of B-1Bs to a nuclear configuration. -- The United States will agree to confidence-building measures at air bases for heavy bombers converted to a conventional-only role. The purpose of these measures would be to confirm that the bombers have not been re-converted to a nuclear configuration. This could be confirmed by conducting a spot check of a randomly chosen bomber once each year at a B-1B base chosen by the Russian Federation. ¶5. (S) Regarding the B-52G heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB, Delegation should maintain the position that the B52-G will not be listed as an existing type in the SFO treaty and is excluded from accountability. However, Delegation is authorized to agree to eliminate them using simplified SFO elimination procedures. -------------- - COUNTING AND INSPECTING HEAVY BOMBER ARMAMENTS -------------- - ¶6. (S) With respect to the question of counting and inspecting nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, Washington confirms the U.S. position that nuclear gravity bombs and long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs (LRNA) located either on a deployed heavy bomber or in a designated nuclear armaments weapons storage area associated with air bases where heavy bombers are deployed, should be counted and applied toward the aggregate limit on warheads associated with strategic delivery vehicles. Regarding the inspection of Russian nuclear armaments, delegation should seek agreement that U.S. inspectors would be permitted to inspect the LRNA weapons storage areas associated with Russian heavy bomber air bases to count the number of LRNA that are stored there. Note: Washington understands that the Russian practice is to store the LRNA warheads in a separate nuclear weapons storage area removed from the base, and therefore inspectors would adopt a "considered to contain" rule when counting LRNA at Russian and U.S. heavy bomber bases. End note. -------------- MOU ISSUES -------------- ¶7. (S) Regarding warhead data in the MOU, Delegation should take the position that both Parties should report the number of warheads for each ICBM and SLBM launcher once each six months in a classified MOU data update notification, but should not provide a notification of every change in that warhead data, as is required for all other MOU data. Washington notes that this position requires a tracking fix in the Notification Protocol to make an exception for warhead data from the general obligation to provide notification, no later than 5 days after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Washington also notes that this position is consistent with the Russian proposal on notifications, which includes the required tracking fix. ¶8. (S) Regarding the inclusion of throw-weight in the technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs, Washington confirms the U.S. position that for each type of ICBM and SLBM there should be listed "the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests" since START entry into force. ¶9. (S) Regarding whether to list in the MOU the maximum number of real and simulated warheads demonstrated during any flight test for each type of ICBM or SLBM, and the maximum number of nuclear armaments associated with each type of deployed heavy bomber, Washington has determined that there is no treaty basis for requiring that this data be provided in the MOU. Therefore, the Delegation should not seek to include these categories of data in the MOU. ¶10. (S) Regarding the Russian proposal to combine space launch facilities and test ranges into one category in the MOU, Washington confirms U.S. opposition to this proposal on the grounds that the United States wants to maintain the right to conduct inspections at test ranges, but does not want to confer inspection rights at space launch facilities. -------------- ADDITIONAL CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION ISSUES -------------- ¶11. (S) Delegation is authorized to revise the Ref A U.S. proposal on conversion or elimination procedures as follows: a. Delegation is authorized to use the term "conversion" in the U.S. proposal to refer to procedures that render an SLBM launcher incapable of launching an SLBM or heavy bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments, but allow its use for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. Delegation is authorized to agree that converted items will remain subject to the treaty's verification regime, if Russia agrees that they will not be counted under any of the treaty's central limits. b. Delegation is authorized to insert, as appropriate throughout the document, the option of other procedures, determined by the Party carrying out the conversion or elimination, that the other Party can confirm, and which shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC. c. Delegation is authorized to change the term " demonstration" to "exhibition." Delegation should clarify that exhibitions will be scheduled by the possessing Party. For inspections to confirm the completion of elimination and conversion procedures, delegation should standardize the U.S. proposal to a 20-day inspection window in all cases. Delegation also should develop and propose to Washington any new notifications required for these exhibitions and inspections related to elimination and conversion. d. While recognizing the interest of both sides in moving procedural details to a third tier (ref B),Delegation should not propose moving any sections of the elimination and conversion provisions to a third-tier document. Provisions relating to removal from treaty accountability are central to the treaty, and should not be relegated to a document that is intended for procedural details. However, Delegation is authorized to trim unnecessary language from the existing procedural details to reduce the length of the Protocol. e. Delegation should not agree to include specific mandatory elimination procedures, but should maintain the lists of procedures, any of which may be selected, as originally proposed in ref A. -------------- JOINT STATEMENT ON BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE TO BE ISSUED AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY -------------- ¶12. (S) Background: During START Follow-On (SFO) Geneva IV, the Russian Delegation handed over a Russian-proposed text for a Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty (Ref C). Delegation Head Anatoliy Antonov solicited the views of the U.S. on the proposed text, as well as on questions including at what level such a Joint Statement should be signed, and whether and how such a statement should be coordinated with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Ref D). Ref E authorized the SFO Delegation to indicate that the United States supports the idea of issuing a joint statement either bilaterally or by the five START Parties in connection with the START Treaty's expiration, and that it would be important to consult the other START parties regarding both the content and the timing of the statement. ¶13. (S) Guidance. Washington has reviewed the Russian-proposed text and has developed a counterproposal. Delegation is authorized to table this U.S.-proposed text (provided in para 18 below). Further changes may be negotiated ad ref to Washington for final approval. Any work on the text should take into account the priority of the delegation work, which is to finish the new treaty before December 5, 2009. ¶14. (S) Washington believes that the preferable approach would be for the United States and Russia to simultaneously inform Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine of our intention to issue a joint statement in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty. The draft text, once agreed between the United States and Russia, should be shared with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, but Washington has no intention of, and does not support, negotiating the text with the other three parties. The United States and Russia could each present the information and text to the three parties through diplomatic channels on a coordinated date. ¶15. (S) Washington is still considering the issue of the level at which the Joint Statement should be issued. ¶16. (S) Because the United Kingdom was a cosignatory of the Budapest Memoranda on Security Assurances, Washington plans to inform the United Kingdom of our work with Russia on the statement to allow the United Kingdom time to consider whether it wishes to issue any statement of its own. ¶17. (S) In addition to any work on the Joint Statement, Delegation may present the views contained in paras 14-16 above to the Russian delegation, solicit their reaction, and report it back to Washington for further consideration. ¶18. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Joint Statement: JOINT STATEMENT by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms The Russian Federation and the United States of America recognize the significant contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to successful implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty),and to the reduction in strategic offensive arms required by the Treaty. The value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced by the commitments of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from their territories and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states. Their actions have enhanced the NPT regime, had a beneficial impact on international security and strategic stability, and created favorable conditions for further steps to reduce nuclear arsenals. The United States of America and the Russian Federation deeply appreciate the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this connection, the United States of America and the Russian Federation would like to confirm that their assurances recorded in the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994, remain in place after December 4, 2009. End text. -------------- Previous Guidance -------------- ¶19. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous guidance remains in effect. End guidance. CLINTON