(S) NEXT STEPS ON TURKEY'S SEIZURE OF IRANIAN

S E C R E T STATE 107705 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2034 TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU SUBJECT: (S) NEXT STEPS ON TURKEY'S SEIZURE OF IRANIAN SHIPMENT OF CONCERN REF: A. STATE 102580 ¶B. ANKARA 1434 ¶C. ANKARA 1438 ¶D. ANKARA 1448 Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Director Matthew Hardiman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara. Please see paragraph 3. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) On October 4, in response to U.S.-provided information, Turkey halted a convoy of three flatbed trucks enroute from Iran to a Lebanon-based company via Syria. The trucks were suspected of carrying a furnace, a large hydraulic press, and a punch press -- all of which we believe are intended for Hizballah and used to produce advanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Washington understands that Turkey will continue to detain this shipment while it conducts its investigation. We now need to discuss with Turkey the legal bases available for seizing and disposing of the items. -------------- ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶3. (S) Post is requested to draw from the talking points in para 4 to approach GOT officials to pursue the following objectives: -- Thank Turkish officials for their actions to detain and investigate the shipment of a hydraulic press and furnace from Iran to the Levant; -- Emphasize the importance of ensuring that this equipment is neither returned to Iran nor released for onward shipment; -- Urge the GOT to use available legal authorities, including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related to implementing UNSCRs 1701 and 1747, to prevent this shipment from going back to Iran or on to the Levant; -- Emphasize that while UNSCR 1747 might not explicitly require Turkey to take steps to seize this shipment, we urge Turkey, in the spirit of the resolution and our shared interest in combating terrorism, to use all available means to permanently seize this shipment. -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶4. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points: -- The U.S. wishes to applaud Turkey's swift and decisive action to find and detain a convoy of three flatbed trucks, on which one was carrying a hydraulic press, a device called a punch press, and a furnace destined for Beirut. 
 -- As we previously discussed, we believe that these items are likely intended for the production of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). To produce these weapons, copper sheets are loaded onto a punch press to yield copper discs. These discs are annealed in a furnace to soften the copper. The discs are then loaded into a large hydraulic press and formed into the final shape. The wax injection press would likely be used to load the completed warheads with molten TNT, a process that yields superior results in some cases when compared to using plastic explosives. Given the strong relationship between Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah, Iran's history of provision of lethal aid to Lebanese Hizballah, and the fact that the final destination of this cargo is Beirut, we feel strongly that Iran is trying to transfer an EFP production capability to Lebanese Hizballah. -- We also would like to emphasize that insurgents and terrorist organizations are using EFPs against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, to significant effect. Should Lebanese Hizballah acquire the capability to produce significant quantities of EFPs, the impact on the region could be significant and devastating. -- In this context, we wish to discuss with you the relevance of UNSCRs 1747 and 1701 in preventing this transfer. -- UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. -- As the dual-use items in question are essential to building an EFP factory, it is our assessment that Turkey could conclude that they could come within the scope of UNSCR 1747 paragraph 5. -- While UNSCR 1747 and other Iran-related resolutions do not explicitly require member states to seize or otherwise prevent shipments of prohibited items transiting their land territory, we urge you to take such steps, as they would be consistent with the spirit and intent of the resolutions. -- In addition to UNSCR 1747, we also believe that UNSCR 1701 is also relevant. -- In UNSCR 1701, the Security Council decided that States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon, except those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL, of arms and related material of all types, including military vehicles and equipment. -- As UNSCR 1701 explicitly calls for states to prevent arms and related materiel from being transferred "from their territories" to any individual or entity in Lebanon, it could therefore cover this shipment. -- As noted in our discussions and above, we feel strongly that Iran is trying to transfer an EFP production capability to Lebanese Hizballah and that this shipment is not bound for the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. -- Finally, we urge you to also consider whether any of your other counterterrorism or export control laws or authorities provide a basis to seize this cargo and prevent it from leaving Turkey. -- While we understand that your investigation is ongoing, we would emphasize the importance of not allowing this shipment to return to Iran or be permitted to continue to Beirut. -- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation, support, and willingness to enact prompt and thorough efforts to promote interdictions designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive material to and from Iran. END POINTS -------------- REPORTING REQUIREMENT -------------- ¶5. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its efforts as soon as possible. -------------- POINTS OF CONTACT -------------- ¶6. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA, and Michael Jakub, S/CT. CLINTON