(C) WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S SEPTEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 103976 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019 TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV ECON EFIN ES HO SUBJECT: (C) WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH SPANISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS JUAN PABLO DE LAIGLESIA Classified By: WHA Thomas A. Shannon.Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. Classified by WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶2. (U) September 24, 2009; 10:00; New York, USA. ¶3. (U) Participants: U.S. WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon Jenna Ben-Yehuda (Notetaker) SPAIN Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Juan Pablo de Laiglesia Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Jorge Dezcallar Senior Advisor, David Navarro ¶4. (C) SUMMARY. In a discussion that took place days after Honduran President Manuel Zelaya returned to Honduras and sought protection in the Brazilian Embassy, the Latin American Working group devoted much of their meeting to the Honduran crisis. Colombia and Cuba were also discussed. Additionally, both sides stressed the importance of U.S.-Spanish cooperation in the Hemisphere and noted the value of expanded strategic partnerships. END SUMMARY. -------------- Comparing Notes on Honduras -------------- ¶5. (C) De Laiglesia shared the findings of the September 23 meetings the Spanish Mission to the UN had convened on Honduras. (Note: U.S. was unable to attend. End Note.) According to de Laiglesia, the group, which included a wide range of regional, EU, and OAS participants, agreed that the following three steps must be taken: 1) the countries should demonstrate visible support for Brazil; 2) Return ambassadors to Honduras within the next few days; 3) Organize a new OAS Mission, larger and more regionally inclusive than the initial Foreign Minister mission, that would have broader authority to negotiate a settlement between President Zelaya and the de facto regime. ¶6. (C) The Spanish were quick to point out that they in no way wanted to take any actions that would legitimize Micheletti,s de facto regime and to that end were circumspect about how to approach the upcoming November 29 elections, though they hoped there would be some way to offer assistance to the process. The Spanish agreed with A/S Shannon that the goal of these negotiations should be Honduras, return to what de Laiglesia termed &constitutional normalcy,8 something he hoped could be achieved through the San Jose process, although he acknowledged the prospects for such a settlement appeared increasingly dim. ¶7. (C) Both sides agreed it would be important to ensure Zelaya did not govern from within the Brazilian Embassy, because doing so would put the Brazilians in an especially difficult position. A/S Shannon indicated that the United States, for its part, had made very clear to the de factos and the military that we would not accept any transgression into the Brazilian Embassy and would consider such actions a serious breach of diplomatic protections accorded under international law. A/S Shannon shared that Honduran General Vasquez had assured the United States that the de facto regime would not order such an invasion unless they determined that the Brazilian Embassy had become a political platform for Zelaya * a move that would cause the de facto government to &reassess the situation.8 This led A/S Shannon to comment that he felt the military would be the institution that had the most to lose from this crisis, since the political personalities involved would ultimately be able to return to their livelihoods or seek residence outside of the country. ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon stressed the importance of keeping all diplomatic channels open during this crisis, so as not to isolate anyone. When asked by the Spanish about the size of the protests, A/S Shannon noted that while the pro-Zelaya protest have been relatively small, it was not in the Honduran tradition to turn out large numbers of protesters in the streets and that such an indicator was not necessarily an accurate measure of popular opinion. -------------- Venezuelan Involvement in Honduras -------------- ¶9. (C) The Spanish wondered to what extent Venezuelan President Chavez was orchestrating Zelaya,s actions behind the scenes, especially since the de factos believed that Chavez was the principal architect of Zelaya,s strategy. A/S Shannon did not believe that the Venezuelans were the principal protagonists, but suggested they were motivated by a desire to cripple remaining Honduran institutions, creating a political vacuum into which Zelaya could return and seize control. A/S Shannon observed that Venezuela was motivated by the desire to keep Honduras as a member of ALBA, since without Honduras, Nicaragua would be the lone member in Central America. -------------- The OAS-Honduras Angle -------------- ¶10. (C) De Laiglesia expressed concern that the crisis in Honduras had damaged the credibility of the OAS as the region,s preeminent negotiator and hoped an eventual resolution to the crisis would involve a way for the OAS to save face. A/S Shannon agreed the OAS had an important role to play. -------------- Colombia -------------- ¶11. (C) Turning to Colombia, de Laiglesia commented he felt the operating space for Spain had begun to diminish and that Colombia,s resurgent problems with its neighbors had complicated Spain,s efforts at bilateral cooperation, lest it be implicated in a broader, cross-border conflict. ¶12. (C) De Laiglesia noted the Spanish Vice Minister had planned to visit Colombia soon (no dates provided) and said his government had concerns about Uribe,s plans to seek a third term. He noted the Spanish would like to find a way to be more engaged with Colombia, but were not sure what would be the best way to proceed under the current circumstances, noting he was concerned the Colombians were too focused on assistance coming from the United States to the detriment of other potential partners. -------------- Cuba -------------- ¶13. (C) In response to numerous questions from the Spanish about recent U.S. engagement in Cuba, A/S Shannon explained the United States had been heavily engaged in direct mail talks, migrations accords, and that, more broadly, the United States was exploring areas of joint cooperation with the Cubans in which both sides had mutual interests (i.e. humanitarian assistance). He noted Acting DAS Bisa Williams, in Cuba at the time, was the most senior U.S. official to travel to the island in seven years. Williams, trip included a series of meetings with government officials, but she also met with dissidents and other civil society leaders * a significant achievement. A/S Shannon mentioned the United States was awaiting approval from the Cubans on a request for U.S. diplomats to be able to travel outside Havana. -------------- -------------- The Future of U.S.-Spanish Cooperation in the Hemisphere -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) The meeting concluded with a brief discussion on the merits of U.S.-Spanish cooperation in the hemisphere. Both sides agreed that meetings such as this one were useful and ought to happen with increased regularity. The Spanish welcomed U.S. ideas on how to engage in the region more effectively and to that end suggested another series of talks in the coming months. Both sides looked forward to the October U.S.-Spain Business Council meetings in Valencia, Spain as the most immediate opportunity in which to explore these joint interests. CLINTON