MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) -- U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 103767


PARIS FOR POL
BRASILIA FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2035
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA PARM PREL FR

SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) -- U.S.
PROPOSALS FOR THE NOVEMBER 2009 RIO PLENARY (C)

REF: STATE 090236 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reason: 1.4 (B),(D),(H).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.


2. (C) BACKGROUND/ACTION REQUEST: Request Embassy Paris
provide the four separate interagency-cleared proposals in
paragraphs 3-6 below to the French Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all
Partners. Also request Embassy Brasilia provide proposals
to the Brazilian MTCR Plenary Chair and/or other appropriate
host government officials. Info addressees in MTCR countries
also are encouraged to provide copies to host government
officials. In delivering the proposals, posts should
indicate that we would welcome MTCR Partner feedback, as well
as Partners' own contributions on these or other issues.
Posts also should note that the United States looks forward
to an in-depth discussion of priority missile
nonproliferation issues at the November 9-13, 2009 MTCR
Plenary in Rio de Janeiro.


3. (C) U.S. PROPOSAL ON IE-TEM WORKING GROUP TO FOLLOW UP
ON PAPERS/PROPOSALS ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES:

(C/REL MTCR)

The MTCR's Information Exchange (IE) meetings are an
important component of the Regime, contributing to a
successful Plenary as well as Partner cooperation on export
licensing and enforcement issues throughout the year. In
recent years, the IE has increasingly discussed new and
emerging or "risk" technologies of interest to proliferators
and programs of concern. The United States believes this
area of the IE should continue to be emphasized and expanded
because of its direct relevance to Partner export control
efforts. Therefore, the United States believes the Partners
should establish an ad hoc working group - consisting of both
IE and Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) participants - to
review the IE papers submitted in previous years to ensure
that the information on proliferant procurement and risk
technologies discussed at the annual IE meetings is
incorporated into the Regime's export controls. This working
group would report to the Plenary on opportunities to improve
MTCR export controls to better a
ddress these technologies, potentially setting the stage for
further action in the TEM, and could help the Partners
prioritize emerging areas that require near- or longer-term
attention. Establishing such an IE-TEM working group also
would improve the MTCR's broader missile nonproliferation
efforts and help to ensure that the Regime remains relevant
to real world developments.

Experts from all interested Partner countries would be
invited to participate in the IE-TEM working group. In order
not to interfere with the normal work of the MTCR or with the
ongoing work of either the IE or the TEM, this IE-TEM working
group could be scheduled to meet on the margins of the
intersessional TEM. Participants then could follow-up
intersessionally via e-mail, just as the TEM now does. So as
not to unnecessarily overburden the TEM co-chairs, the IE
permanent co-chair could lead this IE-TEM working group.

The United States recommends holding the IE-TEM working group
meeting on a one-time trial basis, and then evaluating the
results. If successful, the Partners could agree to hold
future meetings of this group.

Proposed consensus language:

"The Partners agree to establish an ad hoc working group -
consisting of both IE and Technical Experts Meeting (TEM)
participants - to review the IE papers submitted in previous
years to ensure that the information on proliferant
procurement and risk technologies discussed at the annual IE
meetings is incorporated into the Regime's export controls.
The working group will report to the Plenary on opportunities
to improve MTCR export controls to better address these
technologies, highlighting areas for near- and longer-term
attention. Experts from all interested Partner countries are
invited to participate in the IE-TEM working group, which
will meet on the margins of the intersessional TEM and be
chaired by the IE permanent co-chair."


4. (C) U.S. PROPOSAL ON ROUND TABLE (RT) FOR OUTREACH TO
NON-MEMBERS:

(C/REL MTCR)

At the 2007 Athens MTCR Plenary, the MTCR Partners
acknowledged the growing risk of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
Additionally, as noted in the Athens press release, they
welcomed the growing awareness of the need for export
controls and the expressed interest by many states in
cooperating with the MTCR. Partners also confirmed their
intention individually and through the outreach activities of
the Chair to consult and cooperate with non-members to
promote effective export controls over missiles and missile
technology.

Building on these efforts, the MTCR subsequently agreed at
the 2008 Canberra Plenary to hold a Technical Outreach
Meeting (TOM) in Paris immediately following the 2009
Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting. The purpose of
this meeting, which was held on April 30, 2009, was to brief
non-Partner participants on the changes to the MTCR Annex
adopted at the Athens and Canberra Plenaries, including by
explaining why the changes were made, what they entail from a
technical perspective, and the potential impact on licensing
reviews. The initial feedback from the 15 participating
non-Partner countries was positive, with several noting that
they appreciated the opportunity to interact with the MTCR.

In light of the positive reaction to the TOM, and the
importance of ongoing dialogue with non-Partners on missile
nonproliferation matters, the United States believes it would
be extremely useful for the MTCR to hold a Round Table (RT)
as another outreach event for non-Partners at the conclusion
of the 2010 RPOC in Paris.

The purpose of the RT would be to remind non-Partners of the
principles and objectives of the Regime, enhance
transparency, address questions, and share experiences
concerning implementation and enforcement of missile-related
export controls. However, unlike the TOM, this meeting would
not focus on the details of changes to the MTCR Annex. It
also would not be a forum for non-members to present their
case for membership or to express political views on missile
issues.

One topic that might be particularly timely for the RT -
especially given positive Partner reaction to the June 2009
Berlin Seminar - would be risk assessment in licensing.
Partners could make presentations on their national licensing
review processes, share case studies, and answer questions
from non-Partners. The United States recently gave such a
briefing to Taiwan, for example, and it was very
well-received.

Holding the RT immediately following the RPOC also would be a
way to increase MTCR Partner participation in Regime outreach
activities and an opportunity for Partners to reach a broader
audience. This meeting would be open to representatives from
all MTCR countries, as well as the MTCR Chair and POC, and
would be a way to complement outreach activities undertaken
by the MTCR and by the MTCR Partners on a national and
regional basis. In an era of fiscal restraint, it also
would be a way for Partners to maximize limited travel
resources. Accordingly, it would be most useful if
non-Partner invitees included countries with pending MTCR
membership applications and countries that were identified as
outreach priorities for the Regime at the previous two
Plenaries.

The United States recommends holding the RT on a one-time
trial basis, and then evaluating the results at the 2010
Plenary.
If successful, the Partners might decide to alternate the RT
with the TOM - 2009/TOM, 2010/RT, 2011/TOM, 2012/RT, etc.
This would create a forum for an established and regular
dialogue with non-Partners.

Proposed consensus language:

"The Partners agree to hold a Round Table (RT) meeting
immediately following the conclusion of the 2010 MTCR
Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) in Paris for
representatives of non-Partner countries that have membership
applications pending with the Regime and/or that have been
agreed as possible destinations for MTCR outreach visits at
the 2008 Canberra Plenary and the 2009 Rio Plenary. The
purpose of the RT would be to advise non-Partners of the
principles and objectives of the Regime, enhance
transparency, address questions, and share experiences
concerning implementation and enforcement of missile-related
export controls. One possible topic for discussion at the RT
might be risk assessment in licensing."


5. (C) U.S. PROPOSAL ON ENTITIES OF CONCERN:

(C/REL MTCR)

At the 2005 MTCR RPOC Meeting, the French MTCR POC
distributed to all Partners a list of entities of concern.
The 250 entities included on the list were drawn from Partner
denials, Information Exchange papers, and other documents
circulated by Partners between 2000-2004. This list is not a
"black list" but a tool to facilitate Partners' national
licensing, enforcement, and interdiction efforts. The United
States has used this list on multiple occasions since 2005,
and believes an updated version - incorporating the names of
entities in Partner denials, IE papers, and other documents
circulated by the Partners between 2005-2009 -- would be
useful for Partners. Recognizing that the POC already has a
wide variety of responsibilities, we think it would be
helpful if the IE Co-Chairs undertook to compile this list.
We also think it would be helpful to have this list available
to all Partners on ePOC. We therefore recommend that the Rio
Plenary agree that the IE Co-Chairs update the list for
distribution to
Partners at the 2010 RPOC meeting.

Proposed consensus language:

"Partners agree on the utility of updating the list entities
of concern -- drawn from Partner denials, Information
Exchange papers, and other documents circulated by Partners
between 2000-2004 -- that was circulated to Partners in 2005.
Partners further agree that this list is not a "black list"
but a tool to facilitate Partners' national licensing,
enforcement, and interdiction efforts, and that having this
information available on ePOC will provide a useful tool to
inform Partners' export control implementation. The IE
Co-Chairs were asked to update the 2005 list, with a view to
distributing it to all Partners at the 2010 RPOC meeting, if
possible."


6. (C) U.S. PROPOSAL ON OUTREACH TO CHINA:

As noted in the press release for the 2008 MTCR Plenary in
Canberra, MTCR Partners have "recognized that more must be
done to discourage WMD means-of-delivery programmes and
activities of proliferation concern." Additionally,
"special emphasis was placed on particular challenges posed
by missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and
the Middle East." In this context, and in light of
developments in the missile area since Canberra - numerous
DPRK and Iranian missile launches, the promulgation of UNSCR
1874, etc. -- and in view of the fact that missile programs
of concern remain dependent on foreign assistance (and thus
remain susceptible to export controls),the United States
believes regional missile nonproliferation merits particular
focus by the Partners at the 2009 Plenary in Rio, including
during discussions on outreach to non-members.

In this context, we believe it is important for the MTCR to
urge China to take a more active role in promoting
international missile nonproliferation. In particular, we
think that during any MTCR-related outreach, including the
Chair's visit, Partners should urge China: 1) not to market
MTCR Category II short range ballistic missiles to countries
of proliferation concern; 2) to use all available measures to
prevent and/or stop Chinese entities from serving as sources
of supply for programs of concern, including the Iranian and
North Korean missile programs; and 3) to use its bilateral
contacts with Iran and North Korea to promote missile
restraint.

We believe such an approach would be appropriate in light of
ongoing concerns - as expressed in various IE papers and
Plenary and RPOC discussions - about Chinese entities
supplying goods and technologies to the Iranian and North
Korean missile programs, and in view of China's participation
in the Six Party Talks, its obligation to abide by all
missile-relevant UNSCRs concerning Iran and North Korea, and
its oft-stated interest in furthering international missile
nonproliferation efforts, including by cooperating with the
MTCR.

Proposed consensus language:

"Partners agree to encourage China - during the course of the
MTCR Chair's outreach and during Partners' bilateral
contracts - to take a more active role in promoting
international missile nonproliferation. Inter alia, this
effort would include urging China to use all available
measures to prevent and/or stop Chinese entities from serving
as sources of supply for programs of concern and to use its
bilateral contacts with Iran and North Korea to promote
missile restraint. Additionally, Partners would urge China
not to market MTCR Category II short range ballistic missiles
to countries of proliferation concern."


7. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Please contact ISN/MTR Director
Pam Durham with any questions or follow-up related to this
issue (202-647-4931; durhampk@state.sgov.gov).


8. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other
MTCR-related issues for ISN/MTR.
CLINTON


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