SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 103130 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG CH ENRG FR KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL RS UK UNGA, IAEA, NPT SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAPAN Classified By: ISN/SSRN Susan Burk, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Ambassador Susan Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, met with key interlocutors on preparations for the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Japan from August 25-30 on the margins of the 21st UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Niigata. The support and enthusiasm for the President and his nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda was palpable throughout the trip. His message of U.S. "moral responsibility" for leading global nuclear disarmament efforts resonates deeply with the Japanese and has laid a solid base of goodwill to build upon. ¶2. (C) In addition, through bilaterals with key figures among the participants, Amb. Burk was able to survey support for U.S. approaches and find areas for future cooperation on a range of issues. Senior Japanese Government officials voiced their gratitude to the United States for its strong support for DG Amano,s election, and promised to work with the United States on our mutual objectives at the 2010 NPT RevCon and on the broader nuclear nonproliferation agenda. Egypt previewed a hard-line stance on Israel and the NPT, and a soft attitude towards Iran and compliance, while asserting a right to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. ¶3. (C) NPT RevCon President Ambassador Libran Cabactulan voiced a strong desire to work with the United States and was interested in knowing U.S. priorities and goals for the RevCon. He presented himself as an "honest broker," a role that we have promoted. He also stated his intention to survey key States Parties to develop common approaches and positive outcomes for the RevCon. The Philippines Government is forming an NPT policy advisory board for Cabactulan, with a key meeting scheduled for early October in New York. Meetings with Kazakhstan, Norway, Ireland, Indonesia, and Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku, the 2009 NPT PrepCom Chair, also elicited offers of support for the President,s nuclear nonproliferation priorities. Numerous interlocutors expressed intense curiosity about and relationship among the upcoming high-level U.S. initiatives, including the late-September UN Security Council summit and the April 2010 nuclear security summit. End Summary -------------- -- Day 1 (August 26): Bilaterals -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Amb. Knut Langeland (Norway MOFA) offered his support to the United States in ensuring a successful 2010 NPT RevCon and emphasized the ongoing work Norway was conducting with the UK on nuclear warhead dismantlement verifiability and transparency. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Takashi Nakane (Japan, Ambassador to IO in Vienna) expressed his thanks to the United States for their support for DG Amano, saying he worked behind the scenes in Vienna to make that happen. Nakane was thankful for Ambassador Burk,s statements emphasizing a balanced approach to the three pillars. Nakane noted that he will chair Main Committee 3 ) traditionally a quiet committee, but undoubtedly a contentious one in 2010 with topics such as nuclear supply assurances and withdrawal. He stated his skepticism of progress on supply assurances and international fuel banks, owing to G-77 resistance. He said there was some opportunity, however, given the lack of unanimity within the NAM on the issue as evidenced by national statements on the subject that diverged from the G-77 statement. Nakane opined that without demonstrable progress on the Middle East Resolution, Egypt will disrupt the GC in Vienna. He also said that the NAM will assert there was no evidence of Syrian non-compliance, mov e to condemn Israel for their attack, and say that the safeguards standard articulated in Article III is no more than the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. He advised close consultations with Egypt. ¶6. (C) Mr. Kanat Saudabayev (Secretary of State of Kazakhstan) held a brief bilateral/media opportunity with Amb. Burk, stating his support for global nuclear non-proliferation and President Obama,s disarmament and STATE 00103130 002 OF 006 SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP nuclear security initiatives, and seeking U.S. support for the UN establishment of August 29 as a day for the renunciation of WMD. He praised the role of Laura Holgate in furthering nuclear security efforts in Kazakhstan, and invited Amb. Burk to visit. Amb. Burk reviewed broad USG priorities for the 2010 NPT RevCon. -------------- -------------- Day 1 (August 26): Conference Highlights -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) Day 1 of the conference examined the prospects for disarmament within the context of the NPT and the denuclearization of North Korea. Speakers on the prospects for disarmament included Yoriko Kawaguchi and Gareth Evans from the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND),and Ambassador Burk. Emmanuel Besnier (French Embassy),Khaled AbdelHamid (CTBTO),and Amb. Akio Suda (Japan Del to the CD) discussed the prospects for the CTBT and the FMCT. Denuclearization of North Korea was addressed by current and former Japanese MOFA experts. Of note, the ICNND co-chairs spelled out the scope of the final recommendations they will deliver on the NPT and enhancing the global non-proliferation regime. Their recommendations will include short-term recommendations to 2012 (focused on minimizing the role of nuclear weapons), medium-term recommendations to 2025 (including broadening nuclear disarmament beyond U.S. and Russia, and beyond the P-5),and longer-term recommendations beyond then (to facilitate verifiability and transparency to facilitate world free of nuclear weapons). Specifically, they will seek to re-articulate the "13 practical steps" of the 2000 RevCon to ensure that we do not have to re-negotiate but instead build a new international nuclear consensus. During the North Korean panel, the South Korean delegate (Dong-ik Shin, ROK MOFA) called for Parties to agree to measures strengthening the withdrawal provisions of the NPT at the 2010 RevCon. ¶8. (U) During the question and answer session, there were questions on the emphasis the United States has placed on nuclear security, asking how to counter the claims that this is a concern only for rich nations. The Chinese attendee, Yingfeng Jiang (Chinese MOFA),asked if there was a contradiction in the Japanese call for disarmament and their need for extended deterrence, and whether the commission will call for the other NWS to offer NSAs to the NNWS, as China has done. Kawaguchi answered that the security conditions of the world need to improve for full disarmament to take place. Evans answered that changes in the nuclear doctrine of the NWS need to take place so that legally-binding NSAs can be offered to NNWS. Burk answered that all countries are threatened by nuclear terrorism, including NNWS from threats such as dirty bombs. In reply to a question on the prospects for CTBT ratification, Burk stated that no timetable has been set but that thorough efforts will be made to prepare the way for Sena te ratification. ¶9. (U) Following the discussion of the CTBT and FMCT, questions were asked on verifiability and scope of the FMCT. Ambassador Suda answered that the Trilateral Initiative and START implementation prove that verifiability of weapons material is possible. On existing stocks, Suda replied that the FMCT will cover whatever can be reached by consensus. Jiang volunteered that China has not offered a voluntary moratorium on fissile material production because such a declaration would be ill-defined, unverifiable, and could undercut momentum towards a verifiable FMCT. AbdelHamid said that P-5 ratification of CTBT could lead towards efforts on provisional application of the Treaty. Responding to questions on the prospects for a Northeast Asian NWFZ, all the panelists agreed that none of the conditions necessary for consideration of such a zone are present. -------------- Day 2 (August 27): Bilaterals -------------- ¶10. (C) Amb. Toshio Sano (DG of Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Science/MOFA Japan) discussed a range of issues, including a strong word of thanks for U.S. support for the DG election of Yukiya Amano, noting that Amano will visit UN HQ after his swearing-in in December, then Washington. He highlighted upcoming U.S.-Japanese dialog on the IAEA in October at the Director level (Samore). He said Japan is adamant that Israel, India, and Pakistan join the Treaty as NNWS, and expressed his distaste for the U.S.-India deal ) stating bluntly that the United States "twisted our STATE 00103130 003 OF 006 SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP (Japan,s) arm" to support the deal. On the RevCon, he said Japan,s criteria for success would be modest. He stated that he knew of the September 3-4 UK-hosted P-5 disarmament meeting, and said that P-5 solidarity poses risks for Japan. When pressed, he said that China would dilute to the "lowest common denominator" any P-5 position on disarmament, transparency, and verifiability. On the RevCon, he asserted that the criteria for me asuring success at the RevCon should remain modest. At minimum, the RevCon should contain a strong word on the fulfillment of Article VI, similar to the 13 steps, and address Syria, Iran, and DPRK non-compliance, the Middle East Resolution, and the issue of withdrawal. Sano reminded Burk that the ICNND final report will be finalized and issued in December, after their October 2009 meeting in Hiroshima. Sano also said that Japan has created a CTBT "road show" to help convince the remaining Article II countries to ratify the Treaty. He said only the U.S. and Japan care about Additional Protocol universalization and that Japan requires an AP to cooperate on nuclear power. ¶11. (C) Mr. Khaled Abdel Rahman Shamaa (Egypt MOFA) met informally with Amb. Burk, focusing on the 1995 RevCon Resolution on the Middle East. Shamaa asserted that Israel as a non-signatory to the NPT presented a greater problem than Iran as a non-compliant signatory. Burk countered that such a position seems like an endorsement of Iranian non-compliance. Shamaa acknowledged Burk,s assertion that the security situation in the Middle East had become more, not less, complicated, including the questions surrounding the Syrian nuclear program. On a separate topic, Shamaa stated that multilateral fuel assurance proposals were designed to deny NNWS their right to ENR technology, an approach rejected by the recent G-77 statement. Amb. Burk pointed out that through her consultations, she detected a lack of unanimity within the G-77 on this issue. ¶12. (C) Ambassador Libran Nuevas Cabactulan (Philippines, RevCon President) met with Amb. Burk several times throughout the week to discuss the RevCon. Through these discussions, he sought to better understand the U.S. key objectives, share his schedule, and discuss the procedural matters that still need to be decided. He highlighted the importance of the decision on establishing subsidiary bodies to the Main Committees, and the selection of the chairmen, vice-chairmen, and vice-presidents at the RevCon. He shared a draft proposal on subsidiary bodies, which only listed one on disarmament and negative security assurances, and one on the Middle East. No mention was made of a subsidiary body to address other issues including Article X, as had been the case at the 2007, 2008 and 2009 PrepComs. He outlined the major NPT RevCon preparatory events he will attend, including a South Korea-hosted conference in November, a Wilton Park conference in December 2009, a Philippines-sponsored conference in February 201 0, and the Annecy Conference in March 2010. In addition, he said the Philippines Government is setting up a high-level advisory committee to support him in the run-up to the RevCon. The committee is being organized by his MOFA and will be made up of the Philippines, ambassadors to Vienna, the Conference on Disarmament, and Japan. They will meet in New York from September 20 to October 20. -------------- -------------- Day 2 (August 27): Conference Highlights -------------- -------------- ¶13. (U) Day 2 saw sessions on strengthening the NPT, prospects for NWFZs, conventional arms control, and the roles of the news media and public in nuclear disarmament. Speakers on the RevCon included Witjaksono Adji (Thailand Mission to the UN),Amb. Seyed Abbas Aragchi (Iranian Ambassador to Japan),Amb. Takeshi Nakane (Japanese Representative to IOs in Vienna),Amb. Volodymyr Yel,chenko (Ukrainian Representative to IOs in Vienna),Chris Rampling (UK FCO),and Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (President-elect of the 2010 RevCon). Speakers on NWFZs were Khaled Abdel Rahman Shamaa (Egyptian MOFA) and Arman Baisuanov (Kazakhstan MOFA). Representatives of Laos, Switzerland, and Oxfam spoke on conventional weapons, and various NGOs and Japanese officials spoke on public and news media engagement on nuclear disarmament. The Thai statement was balanced, emphasizing the importance of all three pillars, and called for negative or positive security assurances from the NWS to the NNWS, as well as verifiability and tr ansparency in nuclear weapons dismantlement, de-alerting, and decreasing the roles of nuclear weapons in defense policy. He also stated that U.S. ratification of CTBT would lead immediately to ratification by several other Article II STATE 00103130 004 OF 006 ¶14. (U) Iran,s statement decried nuclear cooperation with non-Parties to the NPT and criticized the IAEA for asking NNWS to accept the AP while the NWS select which parts of their nuclear programs are subject to safeguards, and refuse to fulfill their Article VI obligations. He ended his statement stating clearly that the IAEA should not act as a "UN Watchdog," but should instead focus on promoting cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Ukraine supported discussion of NSAs, fulfilling promises on disarmament, implementing the Middle East Resolution, improving Article X implementation, strengthening compliance, and examining the Canadian proposals for changing the Review Process at the RevCon. The UK stated that they are examining Egypt and Russia,s proposals on formal steps to implementing the Middle East Resolution. He also said that the IAEA needed to find cost-savings measures within before they ask for more budgetary resources. On declaratory policy, he reminded everyone that the "doctrin e of nuclear deterrence has proven to be contagious." He replied to the Iranian statement, retorting that countries that call for disarmament progress as a condition of non-proliferation cooperation are attempting to shirk their legal obligations. The Chair (Norway) noted that there is a paper under consideration at NATO on NSAs ¶15. (U) Kazakhstan said they were willing to engage with the P-5 on their questions related to Articles 4 (transit) and 12 (Treaty of Tashkent) of CANWFZ, and announced a conference of the CANWFZ signatories in October to discuss implementation of the Treaty. The Kazakh rep said that Russia had agreed, in their ratification package, to include a renunciation of the rights granted under the Treaty of Tashkent to deploy nuclear weapons in the Zone, although the question on transit was still outstanding. He advocated that the other P-5 countries should open dialog with the C-5 as soon as possible. Amb. Cabactulan outlined his approach to the NPT RevCon, highlighting the success of the PrepCom Chairman,s final document in identifying matters of agreement and disagreement among Parties. He sketched his consultative process, saying he would listen to Parties over the next six months, seek consensus on those issues that can be agreed upon, and work on text to bring to the RevCon. He reminded parties that the 13 practical steps were no longer able to be implemented without change. He said some Parties, "willingness to compromise will require a meaningful injection of flexibility" from others to realize progress. He listed all the issues facing the Parties, and suggested practical action plans as an achievable final product of the RevCon. He praised the P-5 statement at the PrepCom for deflecting perceptions of a lack of substance decided there and highlighted that the UN Security Council Summit in September might yield substantial results. ¶16. (U) Egypt stated that the 1995 decision to extend indefinitely the NPT was tied directly to the 1995 Middle East Resolution. He said implementation had drifted until the 2009 PrepCom, but still no progress had been made. He acknowledged that the conditions in the Middle East had changed, but that further progress on the 1995 resolution would remain the litmus test for the efficacy of the NPT. He called for the final decisions of 1995 and 2000 to be reaffirmed ) that disarmament should progress gradually, but a lack of progress on the Middle East Resolution would legitimize proliferation in the region. He said that if countries seek to single out countries in the Middle East by name, they must include Israel, with consistency and even-handedness. He also called for all four countries outside the Treaty to abide by it unconditionally and that all facilities in the Middle East must be subjected to comprehensive safeguards as soon as possible. ¶17. (U) During the question and answer session, Iran,s remarks, especially the statement on the non-verification role of the IAEA, and accusation of double standards, drew fire from the audience who pointed to Iran,s noncompliance. Iran back-peddled that the IAEA might have a safeguards verification mission, but that technical cooperation is more important. He said they suspended implementation of the AP because they suspended all relevant nuclear activities in 2005, and that they would never give up their rights to enrichment. Darkly, he said the international community was "punishing Iran for a crime that we have not committed yet." Cabactulan, answering a question about the participation of the four nonparties in the RevCon, said that this was up to the States Parties, which had not figured out how to engage STATE 00103130 005 OF 006 SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP them. He said in the Chairman,s draft statement from the PrepCom called upon all remaining States to sign the Treaty as NNWS and all Parties to the Treaty to engage with them towards this goal . He said 2010 must look forward, and hoped the three Main Committee chairmen would work with him to strike the right balance between evaluating the operation of the Treaty and looking forward to positive steps that could be taken to improve the Treaty. Adji said that he hoped the President,s Prague speech signaled a new U.S. policy on NSAs and NWFZs. Ukraine echoed this sentiment and said that while Ukraine did not expect the question of NSAs for NNWS to be solved at the RevCon, serious work needs to be done. He also said the current NPT review process made the life of the Main Committee chairs miserable and that Parties should seriously consider the Canadian proposals, in a subsidiary body at the RevCon. -------------- -------------- Day 3 (August 28): Conference Highlights -------------- -------------- ¶18. (U) Day 3 included the summary of the conference and travel to Tokyo. Significant additional comments included China,s imprecation that countries stop putting too much emphasis on their role in the DPRK crisis, noting that DPRK actions are in response to the policies of South Korea, Japan and the United States and in particular their desire for bilateral relations with the United States. In her concluding remarks, Hannelore Hoppe of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs said that we are in a unique and watershed moment in history, and that all States must seize this opportunity to pursue disarmament. She said she hoped this conference served as a venue for quiet diplomacy that could contribute to success at the 2010 RevCon. -------------- -------------- Day 4 (August 29): Inaugural Meeting of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo -------------- -------------- ¶19. (U) After a morning meeting with US Embassy/Japan, Amb. Burk addressed the inaugural Annual Meeting of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies, held at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. The meeting included two sessions in Japanese, on Disarmament and Verification and Disarmament Studies, and one session in English, on "How to Create Momentum for the Success of 2010 NPT Review Conference. Her co-panelists included Ambassador Cabactulan, Ambassador Suda, and Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki of the University of Tokyo and Pugwash. Cabactulan revisited his comments from Niigata, spelling out how he intends to reach a successful RevCon outcome. Suda discussed the Japanese perspective on the NPT, emphasizing that it is the only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons. He said that the NPT is important to Japan because it is the basis for solving the DPRK crisis, safeguards, and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear power. The problems facing the Treaty include undeclared weapons activities, w ithdrawal from the Treaty by the DPRK, perceived imbalances in implementation, and weakness in Article VI implementation. He said the way forward includes universalization of the AP, a reaffirmation of the balanced approach to the three pillars, dealing with countries that withdraw while violating the Treaty, implementing the Middle East Resolution, establishing consensus on fuel guarantees without surrendering the right to peaceful nuclear technology, and demonstrating progress on NSAs/NWFZs. ¶20. (U) Suzuki pointed out that two key steps in the fuel cycle - both enrichment and reprocessing - are the most important steps towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons. He said that HEU was mainly in the hands of the U.S. and Russia, but only small amounts could make a bomb, whereas separated plutonium is prevalent in the civil nuclear sector, but the predicted demand for plutonium fuel has not materialized. Dealing with this nonproliferation problem has led to various proposals to control the fuel cycle, offered by the UK, Russia, Japan, NTI, and the IAEA. The United States, he noted, tried GNEP to trade fuel for caps on the spread of fuel cycle technology. The problem with all the proposals is that they originate from the haves, not the have-nots, and this dynamic raises suspicion among the have-nots. None of the proposals address spent fuel. Any solution would have to be multi-lateral, transparent, and economically viable. At the same time, the massive global excess in HEU and Pu must be reduc ed by halting all reprocessing world-wide, exhausting all global stocks. Enrichment and reprocessing should only be STATE 00103130 006 OF 006 SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP allowed in countries that have a comprehensive burn plans to consume all fuel produced by such capabilities, to prevent stockpiling and the unnecessary spread of ENR technology. This happens to some extent with enrichment, but reprocessing occurs globally irrespective of demand for plutonium. Industry, he concluded, must have a code of global non-proliferation norms that they follow scrupulously. ¶21. (U) In the Q and A session, Suzuki criticized the Russian/Angarsk fuel bank proposal because of its lack of standards on who it sells to, and a lack of take-back provisions. Cabactulan pointed out that the problem of Iran poses the biggest security threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states ) not Israel. He continued the criticism of the Iranian statement from the Niigata conference, saying that all sides, not just the NWS, have to fulfill their NPT obligations. He said he understood that the United States must maintain a safe and reliable stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, but called on the NWS to establish a stockpile baseline, create a reliable and consistent report on progress towards disarmament, and perform disarmament in a verifiable and transparent manner. He said that once those conditions were fulfilled, dismantlement in this manner should be expanded to the non-NPT NWS. He closed by reminding attendees to focus their energies on the real pressure points ) for example, Pre sident Obama wants the CTBT ratified, but it is the U.S. Senators that hold that power. CLINTON