FORMAL REQUEST FOR A BRIEFING FROM THE GOU ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 102973 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2034 TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL MTCRE MNUC UP SA SUBJECT: FORMAL REQUEST FOR A BRIEFING FROM THE GOU ON PROPOSED UKRAINE-SAUDI SPACE LAUNCH COOPERATION (C) Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Kyiv please see para 5. ¶2. (C) In April 2009, Ukraine circulated to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners notification of the GOU's intention to transfer MTCR Category I and Category II items to Saudi Arabia. The notification states that the transfers will be carried out consistent with Ukraine's MTCR commitments and in the context of an MOU between the Ukrainian National Space Agency and the Saudi Science and Technology Center. It also states that Ukraine plans to transfer to Saudi Arabia "conceptual projects on the assessment of feasibility of space and aerospace missile complexes for injection into near-Earth orbit micro- and mini satellites of civil use only from the territory of the Kingdom." However, it does not provide any detailed information on what types of equipment and technology will be transferred from Ukraine to Saudi Arabia under the agreement. ¶3. (C) The U.S. raised concerns about the proposed transfer with the Ukrainian MTCR delegation on the margins of the April 2009 MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting in Paris. On instruction from Kyiv, the Ukraine representative responded that the GOU had anticipated that the U.S. would have questions and was prepared to provide a full briefing if the U.S. requested one. Beyond that, the Ukraine representative had little to say except that nothing had yet been transferred to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. responded that this was a very serious matter and asked the Ukraine representative to convey to Kyiv that the U.S. would like to receive a briefing on the proposed Category I cooperation with Saudi Arabia. In a separate conversation, the UK made a similar request to Ukraine and received an identical response. Subsequently, the U.S. raised the issue with the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, which also agreed to convey to Kyiv our concerns about the potential transfer and request for a briefing. ¶4. (C) Despite the two requests for a briefing from Ukraine officials on this proposed cooperation, when we raised the matter during the September 23-24 nonproliferation talks in Kyiv, GOU officials indicated that because the U.S. had not "formally" requested a briefing, Ukraine was not prepared to discuss the issue. In response, Acting A/S Vann Van Diepen verbally requested a "formal" briefing and reiterated the strong U.S. concerns about this activity. We understand Embassy Kyiv submitted a formal request via diplomatic note on September 28. We want to request that post use all appropriate opportunities to emphasize the importance of this issue and press for a response to our formal request. In conjunction with this request, we want to urge Ukraine to provide detailed information on the proposed Ukraine-Saudi cooperation, including information on the types of equipment and technology that will be transferred from Ukraine to Saudi Arabia under the agreement. ¶5. (U) Action Request: Request Embassy Kyiv approach appropriate Ukrainian government officials to deliver talking points in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. Post is also requested to ensure that the U.S. request is "formally" conveyed to Ukraine via whatever means deemed appropriate and press for a response. ¶6. (CONFIDENTIAL//REL UKRAINE) BEGIN POINTS: -- As discussed on the margins of the April 2009 MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact meeting in Paris, and again during the September 23-24 nonproliferation talks in Kyiv, the United States formally requests from Ukraine detailed information on its proposed transfer of MTCR controlled equipment and technology to Saudi Arabia. -- In particular, we would like to receive a detailed description of the nature and purpose of the proposed transfer, and of all MTCR-controlled equipment and technology proposed to be transferred, and the role of each such item in the proposed project in Saudi Arabia. -- We look forward to having detailed consultations on this issue on the margins of the 2009 MTCR Rio Plenary in November. In that connection, it will be important for the United States to receive the requested information sufficiently far in advance to permit study, and for Ukrainian experts able to answer U.S. technical questions to attend the Rio consultations. ¶7. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up related to this case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/UMB and EUR/PRA. CLINTON