SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING CONVENED BY OAS SG INSULZA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100957

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BR HO OAS CR
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING CONVENED BY OAS SG INSULZA
ON HONDURAS

Classified By: WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)



1. Classified by WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b,
d)


2. (U) September 22, 2009; 16:00; New York, USA.


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon
USUN Special Advisor Ron Godard
Barbara Rocha (Notetaker)

Other
OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza
Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim
Brazilian Ambassador Antonio Patriota
Representatives from Costa Rica, Mexico and other countries
in the region


4. (C) SUMMARY. OAS Secretary General Insulza convened a
meeting at the Brazilian Mission to the UN to discuss the
situation in Honduras. Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim
summarized the previous day,s events around President
Zelaya,s return to Honduras and refuge at the Brazilian
embassy. He expressed concern about a potential invasion of
the Brazilian embassy and asked for international support to
deter this immediate threat to peace. Amorim said Zelaya,s
return to Honduras was a new, important development that
could &unblock8 the situation. Insulza called for an
immediate international mission. END SUMMARY.

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Zelaya,s Return
--------------


5. (C) Brazilian FM Amorim offered a recap of the previous
day,s events, which he said the press had inaccurately
portrayed. He said that between noon and 1:00 p.m., the
Brazilian charge d,affaires in Tegucigalpa called and said
that the Central American Parliament president had asked if
the Embassy would receive Mrs. Zelaya. The charge was
instructed by Brasilia to receive her. Shortly thereafter,
the charge called again with the same question for Manuel
Zelaya, and was instructed to receive him as well.


6. (C) Amorim said Zelaya called him to say that he is
committed to a peaceful approach and ask for permission to
use the Brazilian embassy as a base for dialogue, which
Amorim granted. Amorim relayed his call with Secretary
Clinton, who insisted on the importance of Zelaya maintaining
a peaceful approach. Amorim also relayed President Lula,s
plea to Zelaya for calm and no provocations. Amorim said he
had reviewed Zelaya,s statements in the press and the only
phrase that could be seen as provocative was &patria,
restitucion, o muerte.8

--------------
Concerns about the Vienna Convention
--------------


7. (C) The Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa received a note
from the de facto government charging that Brazil would be
&directly responsible8 for any violence that ensued as a
result of provocation coming from the embassy. Brazil did
not respond because it does not recognize the Micheletti
government but is concerned about the tone of the note.
Copies were distributed.


8. (C) Amorim reported a rumor that the Honduran Supreme
Court would hold a special session that evening to suspend
the Vienna Convention, allowing the de factos to arrest
Zelaya at the Brazilian embassy. He thanked the United
States for our statement calling on the de facto government
to uphold the Vienna Convention. While recognizing that the
OAS remains the forum for political discussions on Honduras,
Amorim said Brazil would call for a Security Council session
to address this immediate threat to peace. He requested U.S.
support as president of the Security Council.

--------------
Current Conditions, Next Steps

STATE 00100957 002 OF 002


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9. (C) A/S Shannon reported that Ambassador Llorens had
already sent a message to Secretary Clinton describing the
situation as worrisome. He said the Ambassador was engaging
with de facto leaders to allow for food, water and
electricity. A/S Shannon reported on his meeting with FM
Patricia Rodas earlier that afternoon, during which he spoke
to Zelaya by phone and confirmed that food and water had
begun to arrive at the embassy.


10. (C) OAS SYG Insulza stressed the need for an
international mission immediately. A/S Shannon expressed
support for a mission to facilitate dialogue and send a
strong signal to the de facto government to comply with its
international obligations to respect the inviolability of
diplomatic premises and personnel.


11. (C) The Costa Rican official noted that de facto
officials complain the San Jose Accord does not have enough
&teeth8 to restrain Zelaya upon his return to power. He
suggested defining the verification commission and transition
to power in detail would help advance a peaceful resolution.
He also noted that Zelaya,s ongoing comments about the
constituent assembly and extending his term to make up for
lost days were unhelpful.


12. (C) Amorim asserted that this crisis must be resolved
quickly and peacefully, and while the issues raised by the
Costa Rican official should be taken into account, they
should not stall the process. Amorim said Zelaya,s return
to Honduras was a new, important development that could
&unblock8 the situation. All agreed to remain in close
communication while monitoring the situation closely.
CLINTON