Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SOFIA89
2009-02-27 16:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA: NEXT STEPS ON AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR BU 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5808
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0053
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1017
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000089 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY DECL DATE ADDED AND CLASSIFIED
BY STATEMENT MOVED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: NEXT STEPS ON AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

SOFIA 00000089 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY AMB MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

REF: STATE 15623, STATE 15959, SOFIA 44, SOFIA 452,
SOFIA 724

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000089

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY DECL DATE ADDED AND CLASSIFIED
BY STATEMENT MOVED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: NEXT STEPS ON AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

SOFIA 00000089 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY AMB MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

REF: STATE 15623, STATE 15959, SOFIA 44, SOFIA 452,
SOFIA 724


1. (C) SUMMARY: Recognizing the strategic challenge
that Afghanistan presents - for the Alliance and for
the region Q the Bulgarian government is looking to
increase its commitments on troop levels and civilian
support. As one of the principal transit routes for
Afghan heroine, the Bulgarians are also hoping to
expand cooperation on counter-narcotics. As Defense
Minister Tsonev told Secretary Gates in their February
4 meeting, Bulgaria is planning to deploy additional
OMLTs and a medical team and is considering ways to
provide helicopters. Foreign Minister Kalfin will
use a pull aside with Secretary Clinton at the March 5
NATO Ministerial to discuss additional training for
Afghan civilians, especially in the areas of
agriculture and engineering. The Bulgarian General
Staff has also offered to discuss ways that joint
bases here might be used to address US and Alliance
needs, in the event that the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan
becomes unavailable. Facing general elections this
summer, the politics - and pricing - of additional
commitments will not be insignificant issues but they
should prove manageable. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Bulgarian leaders "get it" on Afghanistan,
understanding fully that it is the central challenge
facing NATO. Prior to receipt of reftels A and B, the
Ambassador had extensive discussions with the Prime
Minister, President, Defense Minister and Foreign
Minister on increasing Bulgarian engagement. While the
GOB has not made a final decision, they are looking
for ways to do more.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: FOCUSED IN KANDAHAR


3. (C) Bulgaria has 467 soldiers in Afghanistan (up
from 80 in 2006). Most are in Kandahar guarding the
perimeter of Kandahar Airfield, while the remainder are
embedded in international military, medical or PRT
contingents in Kabul, Herat and Pol-e Khomri. In
February 2009, Bulgaria will deploy to Kandahar its
first Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT),in
cooperation with the Tennessee National Guard.
Bulgaria has also donated weapons, ammunition and
equipment to the Afghan Army. We have engaged the
Bulgarians repeatedly on adding more OMLTs and a Role
Two medical facility. The government is inclined to
do so, but has not committed. The Bulgarians are also
serious about providing helicopters to ISAF, including
pilots and crews, but talks with NATO on necessary

refurbishments and upgrades have not yet produced results.

CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE: ROOM FOR GROWTH


4. (C) The Foreign Minister and President's Chief of
Staff expressed interest in expanding civilian cooperation
in Afghanistan as a complement to military participation,
but look to us for ideas. In 2008, Bulgaria signed an
agreement to train a dozen Afghani diplomats per year in
Sofia. We believe this type of program could be extended
to other fields and/or Bulgaria could support development
in Afghanistan through engineering, medical or agricultural
teams. In response to demarche (reftels A and B),Deputy
Foreign Minister covering Afghanistan indicated readiness
to provide civilian training either in Bulgaria or in
Afghanistan. Bulgaria previously provided 70 personnel
for Air Traffic Control at Kabul International Airport.


5. (C) Counter-narcotics programs are an area of great
interest to the Bulgarians, as the largest-ever heroine
seizure in Europe (approximately 450 kgs from
Afghanistan) was recorded in December 2008 at the Black
Sea port of Burgas. Bulgaria has limited expertise to
provide to Afghanistan in this regard, but it does have
a strong law-enforcement relationship with our regional
DEA office, which could be expanded to promote Bulgarian
cooperation with Turkey, Macedonia, and Serbia. (See
reftels D and E.)

EFFECTIVE IN THE FIELD, BUT NOT FULLY UTILIZED


6. (C) American and allied commanders have praised the
skill and professionalism of Bulgarian soldiers in

SOFIA 00000089 002.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY AMB MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia. Bulgarian soldiers
are capable, and in many instances, may be under-utilized
(e.g., Special Forces personnel assigned to perimeter
security missions, etc.) Bulgaria retains a pool of
deployable forces, many with prior experience in overseas
operations. As a rule, Bulgarian soldiers are eager to
participate in foreign deployments and the General Staff
always has more volunteers than slots to fill.


7. (C) While Bulgaria possesses capable forces, its
soldiers have very little experience leading operations,
and its political leadership remains leery of sending
troops into combat situations. The first Bulgarian OMLT
(in cooperation with Tennessee National Guard) will be
U.S.-led, but future rotations will be Bulgarian-led. The
plan is to ease the Bulgarians into a leadership role and
get them comfortable operating "outside the wire." Longer
term, our recommendation to Bulgaria is to consolidate its
troops (now spread across three regional commands) to a
single area and add additional troops to form a
battalion-sized force. The Bulgarian leadership is
interested in this idea, though they have asked for U.S.
training and equipment support.

RECOMMENDATIONS


8. (C) Lack of money and equipment are the greatest
impediments to further Bulgarian contributions.
But the withdrawal of Bulgaria's 153-soldier contingent
from Iraq in December 2008 has created an opportunity to
transfer resources to Afghanistan. We see the following as
within Bulgaria's capacity:

- Bulgaria deploys 2 or 3 additional OMLTs in late 2009.

- Bulgaria deploys a Role Two Military Medical team in
2009 as recommended in the CJSOR.

- Bulgaria either allows NATO to refurbish its MI-17 helos
at a reasonable cost, or offers to deploy its newer Cougar
helicopters.

- Bulgaria begins planning for a long-term consolidation
of its forces to reduce command and control problems and
allow Bulgarian contingents to take on more ambitious
roles.

- Bulgaria agrees to new civilian training programs in
agriculture, engineering or medicine; and extends
counter-narcotics cooperation to include its neighbors,
especially Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia.


9. (C) Comment: The Bulgarian government will be
reluctant to announce any new large commitments prior to
the elections this summer. But they are interested in
discussing future options with us now, so that training and
logistics can begin to move and a new formal package of
Afghanistan assistance executed by year's end. The
government will likely respond positively to a specific,
targeted request, but it is important they hear a
coordinated message from the U.S. and NATO.

MCELDOWNEY

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