BULGARIA: DESPITE MIXED SIGNALS, POLICY TOWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000511 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA: DESPITE MIXED SIGNALS, POLICY TOWARD MACEDONIA UNCHANGED Classified By: CDA John Ordway for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Skopje. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Bulgaria's policy toward Macedonia remains unchanged despite recent confusing signals sent by the appointment of a provocative Minster Without Portfolio in Charge of Diaspora Affairs and a controversial Bulgarian-Macedonian consular case. Convinced that all irritants in the bilateral relationship would be more easily solved with Skopje inside key European and Transatlantic institutions, Bulgaria remains supportive of EU and NATO membership for its southeastern neighbor. End summary. ¶3. (C) Although Bulgaria was the first country to support Macedonian independence in 1991, since then the Bulgarian-Macedonian relationship has resembled the road connecting the two countries: smooth and modern in some places, potholed in others. Complex historical, linguistic, cultural and ethnic factors both unite and divide the neighbors. A backlog of Bulgarian citizenship applications filed by Macedonians hoping to access the benefits of Bulgaria's EU membership leaves Sofia's policymakers as well as average citizens even more conflicted about the nature and meaning of Bulgarian (and Macedonian) citizenship. ¶4. (C) The appointment of Bozhidar Dimitrov as Minster for Diaspora Affairs by new Prime Minister Boyko Borissov has only complicated the situation. Dimitrov, a communist-era state security collaborator, is a nationalist historian who has spent much of his career sowing doubt about the existence of a Macedonian nationality. One of his 36 books is "The Ten Lies of Macedonianism" in which he argues that the communist regime artificially created the Macedonian state in 1944. He is also infamous for offering a one million euro reward to anyone who could produce a document proving the existence of a medieval Macedonian state. ¶5. (C) If Dimitrov's nomination was not provocative enough, his actions since taking office July 27 have more than raised eyebrows at home and abroad. Dimitrov's inflammatory remarks have further irritated a sensitive consular case involving a Macedonian-Bulgarian woman, Spaska Mitrova, who was jailed in Macedonia for denying her husband access to their child. The details of the Mitrova case have been exaggerated and sensationalized in the Bulgarian press, providing Dimitrov a stage to spread his version of events. Meanwhile, the rest of the Bulgarian government, including the Prime Minister, is trying to work constructively with Skopje on the case -- although PM advisors have told us they find Macedonian efforts "frustrating." ¶6. (C) Despite the confusing signals sent by Minister Dimitrov, Bulgarian policy toward Macedonia has not changed. Within the government, Dimitrov's antics are met with eye rolling rather than respect. His nomination was more accident than intentional swipe at Macedonia. Owed a "respectable" post for abandoning the Bulgarian Socialist Party a month before July elections to join Borissov's GERB ticket, Dimitrov sought to become chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Culture. His hopes were dashed when Parliament passed a law precluding former state security collaborators from becoming committee chairs. As compensation, PM Borissov created for Dimitrov a "Minister Without Portfolio" billet in charge of diaspora affairs. Dimitrov's presence in the government, while frustrating for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, allows the Prime Minister to placate the nationalist wing of the Bulgarian electorate, thereby heading off potentially more damaging provocation by the ultra-nationalist Ataka Party. PM advisers tell us that Borissov has reprimanded Dimitrov for many of his actions and has told him to do a better job of coordinating his statements with the MFA. Nonetheless, Dimitrov's world view and over-sized ego complicate coordination with the Foreign Ministry. ¶7. (C) Embassy Sofia Comment: Our Bulgarian contacts acknowledge irritants in the Bulgaria-Macedonia relationship, including the Mitrova case, the tens of thousands of Macedonians who have applied for Bulgarian passports in the wake of EU accession, Macedonia's unwillingness to agree to "joint celebration of shared historical events and figures" and what they term Skopje's "hyper-sensitivity" to perceived Bulgarian slights. The death of 15 Bulgarian tourists in a boating accident in Macedonia on September 5 has cast a further shadow on bilateral relations. However, Bulgarian policy makers strongly believe that most irritants in the relationship would be more easily solved (or would not exist SOFIA 00000511 002 OF 002 at all) if Macedonia were inside the EU and NATO. Therefore Bulgaria, while still calling for more strict observance of "good neighborly relations" on the part of Skopje, remains firmly behind Macedonian integration into the main European and Transatlantic institutions. However, the combination of weak public diplomacy on the issues and Dimitrov's frequent presence on the front pages of the newspapers make it difficult for this message to get much traction in Skopje. ¶8. (C) Embassy Skopje Comment: Our impression of the prevailing view in Macedonia is that Bulgaria at this point will not block Macedonia's Euroatlantic integration, but there is growing concern in Skopje that Bulgaria might move in that direction or seek to leverage that possibility for various purposes. ORDWAY