MI-17 HELOS AVAILABLE BUT MOST REQUIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000266

SIPDIS

FOR SCA/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR SMIG PK BU
SUBJECT: MI-17 HELOS AVAILABLE BUT MOST REQUIRE

REFURBISHMENT

REF: SECSTATE 55654

Classified By: Ambassador McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Bulgarian Armed Forces currently
possess 12 MI-17 helicopters, only three of which are in
flying condition. The remaining nine require approximately
USD 10 million (per airframe) of repair and upgrades to be
fully mission capable. Since early 2008, Bulgaria has been
in discussions with NATO on a deal to refurbish (using funds
provided by other NATO members) two of its non-operational
MI-17s that would then be deployed to Afghanistan and piloted
by Bulgarian crews in support of ISAF operations. To our
knowledge, no formal decision has been made by NATO on this
offer. To date Bulgaria has not considered sale, lease or
donation of its helicopters, but we believe it would likely
agree to donation or sale of up to two of its non-operational
MI-17s to Pakistan. Bulgaria would most likely not be
willing to donate any of its three fully operational MI-17s,
but it would consider offers for sale or lease. END SUMMARY.

Status of the Aircraft


2. (C) In November 2008, a NATO team visited Sofia to
assess the state of Bulgaria's MI-17s. The team found that
at twenty-one years of age, Bulgaria's nine non-operational
helicopters would require substantial repairs and overhauls
to become fully mission ready. Terem, a state-owned
Bulgarian company, estimates the required investment would be
approximately USD 10 million per airframe. (Terem is not
known for competitive pricing, so it is possible another
company could do the work more cheaply.)


3. (C) According to a NATO report, the repair and upgrades
would take approximately 12 months and would extend the life
of each helicopter by seven years and 1,000 flying hours.
These preliminary quotations do not include cockpit or
fuselage ballistic protection or upgraded engines, which may
be required for operations in heavy combat or at
high-altitudes. (The full text of this NATO report will be
emailed to SCA/P.)

Transfer Options


4. (C) The Bulgarians have plans for 10 of their 12 MI-17s.
The three operational helicopters and three of the
non-operational helos will be kept by the Ministry of
Defense. Four non-operational helos will be re-outfitted for
rescue and relief operations and provided to the Ministry of
Emergency Situations. The remaining two non-operational
helos are available for sale or donation.


5. (C) The simplest option would be to ask Bulgaria to
donate these two non-operational MI-17s to Pakistan. The
Bulgarian Government would likely agree to this, though they
may seek some form of compensation, such as agreement to
refurbish or upgrade other helicopters. Such a deal might
also negate or complicate Bulgaria's offer to provide two
MI-17s to NATO for ISAF operations in Afghanistan, so the
relative needs of the two missions should be weighed. It is
possible the Bulgarians would consider donation of
non-operational helos to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, but
to date they have not offered more than two helicopters, and
that offer has been conditional on substantial and costly
upgrades. They might be persuaded to donate more (for
instance, two to Pakistan and two to Afghanistan),but this
would likely require some sort of incentive for the Bulgarian
side, such as a deal to purchase the aircraft or an agreement
to provide U.S. or NATO funds to refurbish Bulgaria's other
helicopters.


6. (C) Bulgaria possesses three fully operational MI-17s,
but as they have so few, they are reluctant to part with
them. They have made no offer of these aircraft, but we
believe Bulgaria would be willing to seriously consider a
sale or lease deal, if presented with an attractive proposal.



7. (C) COMMENT: With national elections just over four
weeks away, it will become increasingly difficult for the
Bulgarian government to make complicated or controversial

political decisions. If a clear and direct request is made
soon, (either for donation of non-operational helos or an
attractive offer for sale or lease of operational aircraft),
it might be possible for the Bulgarians to move forward in
the relatively tight time window before elections.
Otherwise, a final decision would have to wait until after a
new government is formed, likely in August.
McEldowney