TWO YEARS IN, BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO FIND VOICE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000225

SIPDIS

EUR/CE ERIC GAUDIOSI, TOM YEAGER, AND LAURA LOCHMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BU
SUBJECT: TWO YEARS IN, BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO FIND VOICE IN
EU

REF: A. BRUSSELS 00496

B. 08 SOFIA 00750

C. 08 SOFIA 00775

D. 08 SOFIA 00499

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Two years after accession, Bulgaria still
struggles to find its voice within the EU. Preoccupied with
domestic political in-fighting, shamed by the withholding of
EU funds, and sensitive to its status as a "quasi member
state" subject to a rule-of-law-related special monitoring
mechanism, Bulgaria is a "policy taker" rather than a "policy
maker" in the 27-member block. When it dares speak up, it
is usually on issues of marginal importance or on
"neighborhood concerns" such as EU enlargement in the Western
Balkans, Black Sea issues, and energy security. END SUMMARY.

LACK OF FOCUS, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
--------------


2. (C) The Bulgarian government's complicated coalition
government and administrative spoils system hampers Sofia's
ability to form concrete policy objectives within the EU.
Local EU-focused NGOs say the convoluted administrative
system which distributes minister and deputy minister posts
among the ruling coalition parties by a weighted formula
makes it difficult to form a consensus on any basic policy
issue. The system also allows ample room for corruption,
horse-trading, and non-transparent deals among the coalition
partners. Administrative capacity is another reason that
Bulgaria normally follows consensus in the EU. A learning
curve of how to navigate EU institutions, rules, and culture
exists for all new EU members. For Bulgaria the curve is
especially steep given the country's small population and a
sustained brain drain since the early 1990's. Although
Bulgarian civil servants working in EU institutions are well
trained and valued, NGO analysts assert that those who work
in the Bulgarian mission to the EU in Brussels range from
"somewhat weak" to "downright incompetent." The EC's
permanent representation in Sofia also lacks high-flyers, and
Sofia cannot tap into influential, hard-charging mentors.

LACK OF CREDIBILITY
--------------


3. (C) Within the EU, Bulgaria lacks credibility. The
Commission and the international press routinely criticize
Sofia's lackluster attempts to curb high-level corruption,
organized crime, and mismanagement of EU funds (reftels B, C,
D). According to Ayssa Kavrakova, Program Director for
European Policies at Sofia's Open Society Institute (OSI),
many in Brussels consider Bulgaria a "failed state" because
of its severe rule of law problems. Other EU analysts in
Bulgaria point to an EU perception of Bulgaria as a "second
class member state" and cite the Brussels'-imposed special
rule-of-law-focused monitoring arrangement to which Bulgaria
has been subject since accession in January 2007. While our
contacts agree Bulgaria has brought this on itself, they also
highlight the growing feeling among Bulgarians that the EU
applies a double standard here. A recent poll showed that 60
percent of Bulgarians support Bulgaria's EU membership, but
over 70 percent believe that Bulgaria's interests in the
Union are not well protected. Ordinary Bulgarians now chafe
at perceived EU high-handedness and unequal treatment.


4. (C) Bulgarian clumsiness within the EU further hinders
its ability to be taken seriously. One NGO contact relayed
his embarrassment when he realized "our leaders still have no
clue how the EU works," citing PM Stanishev's March 31 letter
to EC President Manuel Barroso asking the EC to send European
officials and diplomats to monitor implementation of
Bulgarian laws, work in Bulgaria's state administration, and
manage Bulgaria's EU funds. Our contacts stated that with
this letter the PM tacitly admitted his government could not
meet its EU membership responsibilities. More importantly,
the PM exposed Bulgaria to EU ridicule by asking for
something the institution can not do -- interfere with the
sovereignty of a member-state. Barosso publicly replied that
Stanishev's requests were improper for an EU state, adding
the bloc is feeling "assistance fatigue" with the Bulgarians
and Sofia should show concrete and visible results on its

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own.


5. (C) Bulgaria's image and credibility are further hit by
the perception that Sofia is in Moscow's pocket. According
to OSI's Kavrakova, the Bulgarian government -- worried about
the country's reputation -- heavily lobbied the European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) to change Bulgaria's
original classification from a "Russian Trojan Horse" in its
2007 report, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations" to a
"Friendly Pragmatist." Dependent on Russia for nearly all of
its nuclear, gas and oil needs, connected to Moscow by a
series of murky energy deals, and linked to Russia by close
historical, cultural, and diplomatic ties, Sofia feeds
perceptions that it still is Moscow's proxy and client.


AND A LOSS OF EU FUNDS
--------------


6. (C) The loss of 480 million euros in preaccession funds
in July 2008 was a severe blow to Bulgaria's credibility.
Local EU experts agree that the ability to withhold funds is
Brussels, only stick when it comes to Bulgarian rule-of-law
reform. In fact, our contacts say that with its hands on the
purse strings, the EC plays "the role of opposition" to the
current government, forcing it to assume more responsibility
for its actions. Although the EC still uses the Cooperation
and Verification Mechanism (commonly referred to as the
monitoring report) to observe reforms in justice and home
affairs, most local experts agree that -- EU funds aside --
Brussels no longer possesses the leverage it once had over
Sofia, a source of frustration within the EC bureaucracy.


LIMITED INSTANCES OF ACTIVISM
--------------


7. (C) While Bulgaria normally follows EU consensus, at
times it is willing to speak up. In October 2007, the
Bulgarians went to the mat over the spelling of the word
"euro" claiming they had the right to use the Bulgarian
version of the word, "evro." After Sofia threatened to
withhold signature of Montenegro's Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) over the issue, Brussels gave in,
allowing Sofia to tout a "great" EU policy success. More
serious issues also grab Bulgaria's attention. Priding
itself as a stable and predictable NATO and EU partner, Sofia
often has sound perspectives on regional issues. Our
contacts say that EU enlargement, particularly in the Western
Balkans and Black Sea littoral, could offer Bulgaria a
vehicle to influence EU policy. Bulgaria can and does use
its regional reputation for "good neighborly relations" to
champion EU accession for Croatia, Albania, Macedonia,
Serbia, and Turkey. Sofia offers practical assistance to its
Balkan neighbors on EU and NATO membership preparation.
Despite minor irritants and friction with Macedonia,
bilateral relations are basically positive, and it sill
supports Macedonian NATO membership. Bulgaria's support for
Kosovo's independence -- announcing its support together with
Croatia and Hungary -- showed Sofia is capable of forming an
alliance with others to influence regional and even EU
policy. Bulgaria's involvement with Greece, Romania, and
Germany in the EU's Black Sea Synergy Initiative is another
area where Sofia is cutting its teeth on EU policy making.
In late fall 2008, the GOB named its energetic and respected
former Ambassador to the United States Elena Poptodorova as
Bulgaria's Black Sea Ambassador-at-large, the only "Black Sea
Ambassador" in the region.


8. (C) The EU's lack of a common energy security policy is
another place where Bulgaria is attempting to influence
EU policy. President Parvanov sponsored an April 24-25
Energy Summit, titled "Natural Gas for Europe: Security and
Partnership" to improve Europe's outreach and relationship
with Central Asian and Caspian producers, and to put Sofia on
the regional energy map. Despite skepticism that Bulgaria
was too much in Russia's pocket to hold a meaningful meeting,
Sofia managed to keep the event's focus on transparency and
reliability rather than on Russia's South Stream project.


9. (C) COMMENT: Bulgaria's ability to influence the EU's
agenda will continue to be crippled by domestic problems,
lack of administrative capacity and the black eye created by

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persistent rule of law concerns. Brussels' only real
leverage -- the withholding of more funds -- is double-edged.
The loss of funds may bring incremental progress, but it
will also prevent Bulgaria from using the funds for their
intended purpose: to turn the country into a modern,
developed, fully functioning EU member state that has the
ability to shape EU policy. Once Bulgaria emerges from its
July parliamentary elections, the new government will be
challenged to tackle domestic issues. A thin bench will be
stretched, and taking care of EU business will remain a
priority and a problem. END COMMENT.
McEldowney