TWO YEARS IN, BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO FIND VOICE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000225 SIPDIS EUR/CE ERIC GAUDIOSI, TOM YEAGER, AND LAURA LOCHMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV BU SUBJECT: TWO YEARS IN, BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO FIND VOICE IN EU REF: A. BRUSSELS 00496 ¶B. 08 SOFIA 00750 ¶C. 08 SOFIA 00775 ¶D. 08 SOFIA 00499 Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Two years after accession, Bulgaria still struggles to find its voice within the EU. Preoccupied with domestic political in-fighting, shamed by the withholding of EU funds, and sensitive to its status as a "quasi member state" subject to a rule-of-law-related special monitoring mechanism, Bulgaria is a "policy taker" rather than a "policy maker" in the 27-member block. When it dares speak up, it is usually on issues of marginal importance or on "neighborhood concerns" such as EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, Black Sea issues, and energy security. END SUMMARY. LACK OF FOCUS, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY -------------- ¶2. (C) The Bulgarian government's complicated coalition government and administrative spoils system hampers Sofia's ability to form concrete policy objectives within the EU. Local EU-focused NGOs say the convoluted administrative system which distributes minister and deputy minister posts among the ruling coalition parties by a weighted formula makes it difficult to form a consensus on any basic policy issue. The system also allows ample room for corruption, horse-trading, and non-transparent deals among the coalition partners. Administrative capacity is another reason that Bulgaria normally follows consensus in the EU. A learning curve of how to navigate EU institutions, rules, and culture exists for all new EU members. For Bulgaria the curve is especially steep given the country's small population and a sustained brain drain since the early 1990's. Although Bulgarian civil servants working in EU institutions are well trained and valued, NGO analysts assert that those who work in the Bulgarian mission to the EU in Brussels range from "somewhat weak" to "downright incompetent." The EC's permanent representation in Sofia also lacks high-flyers, and Sofia cannot tap into influential, hard-charging mentors. LACK OF CREDIBILITY -------------- ¶3. (C) Within the EU, Bulgaria lacks credibility. The Commission and the international press routinely criticize Sofia's lackluster attempts to curb high-level corruption, �0A;organized crime, and mismanagement of EU funds (reftels B, C, D). According to Ayssa Kavrakova, Program Director for European Policies at Sofia's Open Society Institute (OSI), many in Brussels consider Bulgaria a "failed state" because of its severe rule of law problems. Other EU analysts in Bulgaria point to an EU perception of Bulgaria as a "second class member state" and cite the Brussels'-imposed special rule-of-law-focused monitoring arrangement to which Bulgaria has been subject since accession in January 2007. While our contacts agree Bulgaria has brought this on itself, they also highlight the growing feeling among Bulgarians that the EU applies a double standard here. A recent poll showed that 60 percent of Bulgarians support Bulgaria's EU membership, but over 70 percent believe that Bulgaria's interests in the Union are not well protected. Ordinary Bulgarians now chafe at perceived EU high-handedness and unequal treatment. ¶4. (C) Bulgarian clumsiness within the EU further hinders its ability to be taken seriously. One NGO contact relayed his embarrassment when he realized "our leaders still have no clue how the EU works," citing PM Stanishev's March 31 letter to EC President Manuel Barroso asking the EC to send European officials and diplomats to monitor implementation of Bulgarian laws, work in Bulgaria's state administration, and manage Bulgaria's EU funds. Our contacts stated that with this letter the PM tacitly admitted his government could not meet its EU membership responsibilities. More importantly, the PM exposed Bulgaria to EU ridicule by asking for something the institution can not do -- interfere with the sovereignty of a member-state. Barosso publicly replied that Stanishev's requests were improper for an EU state, adding the bloc is feeling "assistance fatigue" with the Bulgarians and Sofia should show concrete and visible results on its SOFIA 00000225 002 OF 003 own. ¶5. (C) Bulgaria's image and credibility are further hit by the perception that Sofia is in Moscow's pocket. According to OSI's Kavrakova, the Bulgarian government -- worried about the country's reputation -- heavily lobbied the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) to change Bulgaria's original classification from a "Russian Trojan Horse" in its 2007 report, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations" to a "Friendly Pragmatist." Dependent on Russia for nearly all of its nuclear, gas and oil needs, connected to Moscow by a series of murky energy deals, and linked to Russia by close historical, cultural, and diplomatic ties, Sofia feeds perceptions that it still is Moscow's proxy and client. AND A LOSS OF EU FUNDS -------------- ¶6. (C) The loss of 480 million euros in preaccession funds in July 2008 was a severe blow to Bulgaria's credibility. Local EU experts agree that the ability to withhold funds is Brussels, only stick when it comes to Bulgarian rule-of-law reform. In fact, our contacts say that with its hands on the purse strings, the EC plays "the role of opposition" to the current government, forcing it to assume more responsibility for its actions. Although the EC still uses the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (commonly referred to as the monitoring report) to observe reforms in justice and home affairs, most local experts agree that -- EU funds aside -- Brussels no longer possesses the leverage it once had over Sofia, a source of frustration within the EC bureaucracy. LIMITED INSTANCES OF ACTIVISM -------------- ¶7. (C) While Bulgaria normally follows EU consensus, at times it is willing to speak up. In October 2007, the Bulgarians went to the mat over the spelling of the word "euro" claiming they had the right to use the Bulgarian version of the word, "evro." After Sofia threatened to withhold signature of Montenegro's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) over the issue, Brussels gave in, allowing Sofia to tout a "great" EU policy success. More serious issues also grab Bulgaria's attention. Priding itself as a stable and predictable NATO and EU partner, Sofia often has sound perspectives on regional issues. Our contacts say that EU enlargement, particularly in the Western Balkans and Black Sea littoral, could offer Bulgaria a vehicle to influence EU policy. Bulgaria can and does use its regional reputation for "good neighborly relations" to champion EU accession for Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey. Sofia offers practical assistance to its Balkan neighbors on EU and NATO membership preparation. Despite minor irritants and friction with Macedonia, bilateral relations are basically positive, and it sill supports Macedonian NATO membership. Bulgaria's support for Kosovo's independence -- announcing its support together with Croatia and Hungary -- showed Sofia is capable of forming an alliance with others to influence regional and even EU policy. Bulgaria's involvement with Greece, Romania, and Germany in the EU's Black Sea Synergy Initiative is another area where Sofia is cutting its teeth on EU policy making. In late fall 2008, the GOB named its energetic and respected former Ambassador to the United States Elena Poptodorova as Bulgaria's Black Sea Ambassador-at-large, the only "Black Sea Ambassador" in the region. ¶8. (C) The EU's lack of a common energy security policy is another place where Bulgaria is attempting to influence EU policy. President Parvanov sponsored an April 24-25 Energy Summit, titled "Natural Gas for Europe: Security and Partnership" to improve Europe's outreach and relationship with Central Asian and Caspian producers, and to put Sofia on the regional energy map. Despite skepticism that Bulgaria was too much in Russia's pocket to hold a meaningful meeting, Sofia managed to keep the event's focus on transparency and reliability rather than on Russia's South Stream project. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Bulgaria's ability to influence the EU's agenda will continue to be crippled by domestic problems, lack of administrative capacity and the black eye created by SOFIA 00000225 003 OF 003 persistent rule of law concerns. Brussels' only real leverage -- the withholding of more funds -- is double-edged. The loss of funds may bring incremental progress, but it will also prevent Bulgaria from using the funds for their intended purpose: to turn the country into a modern, developed, fully functioning EU member state that has the ability to shape EU policy. Once Bulgaria emerges from its July parliamentary elections, the new government will be challenged to tackle domestic issues. A thin bench will be stretched, and taking care of EU business will remain a priority and a problem. END COMMENT. McEldowney