BULGARIA 2008: PERSPECTIVE ON A TOUGH YEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000020 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA 2008: PERSPECTIVE ON A TOUGH YEAR Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: Bulgaria begins 2009 with a bad hangover. Pervasive disgust over the problems of recent months and the even grimmer prospects of the coming year has led many here to sink into an already deep hole of apathy and cynicism. Tangible improvements in family income and overall economic performance are discounted as political scandals and international criticism have dominated public debate. Many predict that the election of a new government this summer will only exacerbate the situation, as an unsteady and visionless coalition is likely to result. ¶2. (C) To be sure, 2008 was a hard year featuring scandals, suicides, and a humiliating rupture with the EU over unchecked corruption. At the same time, the country registered solid economic progress, emerging stronger than many neighbors in the face of the global downturn, and maintained a steady foreign policy including close engagement with the United States and its EU partners along with military deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo. Among the established states of central Europe (setting aside the former Yugoslav space),Bulgaria had one of the slowest and most uneven post-communist transitions. Real reforms were only implemented after the economic collapse of 1996-97 and then only in fits and starts. The Socialist-led government of Prime Minister Stanishev came to power in 2005 and delivered the once unimaginable -- EU membership, an agreement for joint basing with the U.S., and a ten percent flat tax on corporate and personal income that revitalized the economy. But Stanishev's failure to get a handle on corruption -- within his own party, the government, and throughout society -- is what most Bulgarians now highlight. ¶3. (C) Without minimizing the immediate problems, putting the contemporary circumstances in the context of Bulgaria's long-term transition yields a more nuanced conclusion. Once the joke of the Warsaw Pact, this country has made tremendous progress and, its lingering romanticism toward Russia notwithstanding, is now locked on a strategic course westward. Bulgaria has proven itself a reliable NATO ally and an important partner for us. Rooting out corruption, especially within the government and political parties, will be neither easy nor quick. But, with political will, EU insistence, and U.S. support, it can happen. The key now is for us to provide the strategic direction and standards of integrity that Bulgarians crave. Our influence here goes a very long way and the benefits of helping Bulgaria become a more modern democracy and a more capable ally are significant. END SUMMARY. ¶4. (C) After Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007, Prime Minister Stanishev cautioned that truly hard work was yet to come: implementation of EU norms would severely test both governance and civil society. While Bulgaria skated through 2007, its systemic rule of law shortcomings broke wide open in 2008, earning it the dubious distinction of the EU's most corrupt country. We take a look below at key events, offering perspective that Bulgaria can still turn the corner. A Bad Year for the Interior Ministry -------------- ¶5. (C) A messy Ministry of Interior (MOI) scandal launched the government's troubles. Centered on issuance of a Bulgarian passport to a notorious Serb drug lord, the reverberations led to a larger scandal involving Minister Petkov, who met known OC figures in a "secret" meeting. Petkov eventually resigned in disgrace (though he retained his powerful party and Parliamentary positions and eventually was acquitted in November). ¶6. (C) To replace Petkov, the PM appointed a new Interior Minister (Mikov),who cleaned house of Deputy Ministers and the Secretary General. Though widely credited as honest, Mikov's effectivness is widely questioned as he has struggled to overhaul the 63,000 person ministry, notorious for low morale, organizational dysfunction, and political complications. DANS Slips, Slides and Stumbles -------------- ¶7. (C) To clamp down on corruption and organized crime's cozy relationship with government officials, Bulgarian authorities in early summer turned to the newly-created State Agency for National Security (DANS). Established in January 2008, DANS was by design more an intelligence/security agency than a law enforcement body. Ill-equipped for its crime fighting role, it had its own leadership and management SOFIA 00000020 002 OF 003 challenges -- not least combining four competing intel services and resolving critical personnel decisions. By mid-summer, brewing squabbles burst into open feuds. ¶8. (C) A civil war broke out inside DANS as directorate heads battled their Chief. DANS documents were leaked to scurrilous websites; a journalist who had published leaks was brutally beaten; and MPs accused DANS of improperly obtaining their phone call records as part of the leak investigation. Three DANS directorate chiefs were either fired or submitted resignations, the internal affairs chief resigned, and parliamentary inquiries were launched along partisan lines. DANS has since slowed its free fall, but infighting has sapped trust and institutional capacity. A Suicide Rocks Political Parties -------------- ¶9. (C) In October, Bulgaria's parties were jolted by the suicide of the chief of staff to Ahmet Dogan, leader of the ethnic-Turkish MRF party, a governing coalition partner. The suicide took place inside Dogan's house, with abundant campaign finance documents at the scene. Fevered speculation dominated all analysis. After a stunned Dogan withheld all comment for a week, he went on the attack, denigrating his former colleague and touting MRF's role in ethnic peace and stability. In a clearly coordinated tack, both the President and PM echoed a similar line of ethnic stability. That, in turn, fueled additional speculation of secret deals within the governing coalition to close ranks and prevent exposure of additional scandals. The EU Loses Patience, Packs Punch -------------- ¶10. (C) Concerned over Bulgaria's inability to absorb and transparently use EU funds, Brussels in July issued a scathing report. Citing embezzlement, insufficient oversight, and a culture where no one seemed to be held accountable, the EU froze approximately $700 million in assistance funding. This prompted Bulgaria to establish a new Deputy Prime Minister-ship charged with cleaning house in multiple agencies and ministries -- a Herculean task. Deputy PM Plugchieva initiated a flurry of reform, ministerial re-organization, tighter fiscal and audit oversight, and production of an 80 point action plan to achieve demonstrable results. Progress was uneven. Bulgarian authorities started legal proceedings against some powerfully connected figures involved in siphoning off road infrastructure funds, but the charges are at the lower end of the scale. Other officials have resigned or been dismissed, but few have been charged. In November, the EU permanently withheld 220 million Euros in Phare funds, with hundreds of million more Euros still in their gun-sights. Another EU technical report is due in February, with a full report due in June/July, just as Bulgaria heads to parliamentary elections. Some Darkness, Some Light -------------- ¶11. (C) Bulgaria ranks at the bottom of EU tables on rule of law. Among EU states, Bulgarians have the lowest confidence in public institutions, with mistrust of police, prosecutors, and judiciary all in the seventy-plus percentile range, a damning indictment. But even in this bleak landscape, there is incremental progress: Plugchieva's hard-hitting scrutiny of EU funds; new laws on public procurement, conflict of interest, and party financing; some indictments and (sluggish) trials of those accused of siphoning EU funds; sanctioning 68 MOI employees, firing 37 others and 44 taken to court; and dismissals of nine prosecutors. By far the weakest point in Bulgaria is the judiciary, and it will be the hardest institutionally to correct given constitutional provisions protecting judges. While legislation and regulation can always be strengthened, what Bulgaria has on the books is pretty much in line with EU norms. But that's not enough -- what is needed is concerted, fierce action by political authorities and meaningful convictions by the judiciary. Civic society NGOs and a number of think tanks and media outlets are speaking out more vocally against corruption and organized crime, a very welcome development. Strategic Stakes -------------- ¶12. (C) Bulgarians recognize they are in a hole and need to climb out by cleaning out. Bulgaria is still a country in transition; the right push can give it momentum in the right SOFIA 00000020 003 OF 003 direction. Reform-minded Bulgarians need and want that supportive push. And it matters. Despite all its problems, Bulgaria has come through when called on: supporting MAP for Ukraine and Georgia; stretching out a helpful humanitarian hand to Georgia; recognizing Kosovo; sustaining commitments in Iraq; quadrupling forces in Afghanistan; concluding a Defense Cooperation Agreement with us and hosting large joint exercises; taking our recommendations on military modernization and procurement decisions; welcoming U.S. advice on energy diversification. The U.S. offers strategic direction and standards of integrity that Bulgarians crave. And because Bulgarians value our respect and authority, our influence goes far. The corruption and OC game is far from over here. A Bulgaria that gets through its homegrown problems with our help will be a more vigorous and active ally. McEldowney