BULGARIA: PRESIDENT VETOES ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000186 SIPDIS EUR/CE FOR ERIC GAUDIOSI E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA: PRESIDENT VETOES ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS Classified By: CDA a.i. Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Parvanov vetoed amendments to the election law that raise the threshold vote for coalitions to enter the parliament (from 4 to 8 percent) and allow for majority vote election of "district deputies" (31 of the parliament,s 240 seats) rather than on a proportional basis. Parvanov said raising the coalition threshold limited citizens' political representation. But his veto of his own Socialist (BSP) party's legislation also reflects his continuing rivalry and gamesmanship with PM Stanishev over stacking BSP party lists. Parliament will likely override the veto next week; only a simple majority is required and the pro-amendment parties have those votes. The changes hurt the center-right UDF-DSB coalition -- already crippled by internal dissention -- and the new populist Forward movement. If UDF and DSB -- front-runner GERB's preferred coalition partners -- do not enter parliament, it would make a GERB-BSP coalition a realistic (if odd) possibility simply because of the sheer mathematics of forming a government. Opposition parties and NGOs blasted the last-minute amendments as unfair and threatened to appeal to the Constitutional Court. The cynical manipulation of the electoral law has further tarnished Bulgaria's reputation. END SUMMARY The Politics of Electoral Reform -------------- ¶2. (C) Parliament on April 14 passed amendments to the election law that undermined the integrity of the electoral process. One amendment, of dubious constitutional validity, creates 31 single member districts with a first past the post system. Its net effect is to undercut representation by GERB (the populist center-right party of Sofia mayor Borissov) whose strengths in Sofia and other urban areas would be diluted. President Parvanov had proposed single member districts as part of his running rivalry with PM Stanishev, enabling the President to have greater say in naming candidates for districts and ultimately giving him greater sway over the government formation process in the likely event of a split parliament. The ethnically Turkish MRF party tied its support for this measure to reciprocal BSP support to raise the threshold from four to eight percent for party coalitions to enter parliament. After some wrangling and back room deals, BSP and MRF deputies rammed the measure through parliament. The new eight percent threshold directly targets the newly established but incredibly brittle coalition of two traditional center-right parties, UDF and DSB, that had barely overcome deep-seated distrust of each other (now polling at a combined 7.3 percent). The Forward coalition of shady businessman Hristo Kovachki (polling at 3 plus percent) also takes a hit. The net winners are BSP and MRF, though ironically the ultra-nationalist and xenophobic Ataka could also benefit, when seats are redistributed from parties that do not make the threshold. ¶3. (C) Within a day after parliament's passage, Parvanov vetoed the bill. He stated that the last minute change to increase the threshold limited citizens' political representation and could distort voters' will, thus leading to artificial majorities in parliament and an unstable national assembly. But BSP and MRF easily have the votes to override the veto, and this is expected early the week of April 20 as soon as Parliament returns from its short Easter recess. In that case, Parvanov gets his 31 seat majority system, and can claim the high road in opposing the increased threshold. Vigorous Opposition... -------------- ¶4. (C) NGO's and independent observers quickly and fiercely condemned the amendments-- noting that they are an unscrupulous and arroant way to score easy BSP and MRF victories. Th Coalition for Free and Democratic Elections (whse electoral transparency and campaign finance platform the embassy supports) also noted that the amndments create an odd hybrid system of direct an proportional voting that does not conform to th constitution; establish 31 districts of unequalvoting size and thus de-value the votes in largerdistricts; and through the last minute change in te threshold unfairly target the traditional centr-right parties. A constitutional challenge wil likely not be adjudicated before an election dae is set, which increasingly looks to be July 5 o 12. ...and Some Practical Consequences and Complications -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Introduction of a partial majority system raises a number of technical issues, including unequal representation of districts with different sized populations in a unicameral legislature; legitimacy of a majority-elected candidate vs. a party list candidate; and how a replacement is chosen for a SOFIA 00000186 002 OF 002 vacated seat from a majority vote district. As a practical matter, the majority system benefits parties that offer candidates with significant name recognition. Here, BSP and MRF have advantages over GERB or smaller conservative parties. Those parties will need to agree to back a single candidate in each region -- difficult given their track record on cooperation. But the proposed change would confer one advantage for small parties. Popular individual leaders (with lots of money to spend) could win in a single district and enter parliament even if their parties fail to cross the threshold. Even more than BSP or MRF, Parvanov is set to be a net winner. A number of well-known left-leaning Socialists close to Parvanov are expected to be assigned to the majority tickets because they are already well known to the public. PM Stanishev, who makes up the party lists and who has promoted younger modernizers, now has a smaller pool of districts for his followers. As for the eight percent threshold, in theory coalitions can get around it by formally registering as a single party (with a 4 percent threshold) and running under that party's name. But they seem incapable of resolving their quarrels and personality disputes. If they fail to get into parliament, votes would be re-apportioned, predominantly helping BSP and MRF. Center-Right Its Own Worst Enemy -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Meanwhile, the UDF-DSB coalition is crumbling from within, even without any help from the BSP. Rivals of newly elected UDF Chairman Martin Dimitrov contested the legality of his election in court. It ruled this week, upholding that challenge, casting Dimitrov out and restoring former Chairman Plamen Yurukov again to his post. Yurukov has vowed publicly not to keep UDF in coalition with DSB's leader, former PM Ivan Kostov. And a number of UDF MPs -- detesting Kostov but anxious for political survival -- defected to the new populist Order, Law and Justice Party (widely seen as an upcoming force but also perceived as a witting or unwitting tool of BSP and MRF manipulation to gut the center right). Some high-minded center-right politicians talk about joining all factions together under one acceptable-to-all group. But this seems a non-starter -- too many factions insist on blackballing one or more of the others. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Parvanov's veto extends the drama for another week, but the fate of the old line center-right parties is set on a downward spiral. If they had something material and compelling to offer voters, or if they showed seriousness, or even if they simply had a stronger survival instinct, they would run well above an 8 percent threshold. The votes are there to be had. But personal differences (there don't appear to be any real ideological differences) hold such sway that even under threat of political extinction the center-rightists look incapable of coming together. A look at possible electoral mathematics suggests that only a few possible combinations can produce a governing coalition. Some analysts believe that GERB may be tempted to court Ataka, but Borissov knows that his European backers would balk and that his reputation would nosedive. He'll go after Ataka voters, but is leery of joining with Ataka itself. More likely is a co-habitation between GERB and BSP. GERB and BSP tacticians have circled around this option for some time, using elaborate feints and jabs (and smears) as they test defenses and voter attitudes. If the election law amendments survive as expected, the possibility of this marriage of convenience increases. But voters have yet to cast any ballots. The next ten weeks will see a bitter fought campaign that may yet surprise in outcome, but, sadly, seems undemocratically stacked because of election rules and mechanics. Karagiannis