BULGARIA: PRESIDENT VETOES ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000186

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR ERIC GAUDIOSI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: PRESIDENT VETOES ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS

Classified By: CDA a.i. Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Parvanov vetoed amendments to
the election law that raise the threshold vote for coalitions
to enter the parliament (from 4 to 8 percent) and allow for
majority vote election of "district deputies" (31 of the
parliament,s 240 seats) rather than on a proportional basis.
Parvanov said raising the coalition threshold limited
citizens' political representation. But his veto of his own
Socialist (BSP) party's legislation also reflects his
continuing rivalry and gamesmanship with PM Stanishev over
stacking BSP party lists. Parliament will likely override
the veto next week; only a simple majority is required and
the pro-amendment parties have those votes. The changes hurt
the center-right UDF-DSB coalition -- already crippled by
internal dissention -- and the new populist Forward movement.
If UDF and DSB -- front-runner GERB's preferred coalition
partners -- do not enter parliament, it would make a GERB-BSP
coalition a realistic (if odd) possibility simply because of
the sheer mathematics of forming a government. Opposition
parties and NGOs blasted the last-minute amendments as unfair
and threatened to appeal to the Constitutional Court. The
cynical manipulation of the electoral law has further
tarnished Bulgaria's reputation. END SUMMARY

The Politics of Electoral Reform
--------------

2. (C) Parliament on April 14 passed amendments to the
election law that undermined the integrity of the electoral
process. One amendment, of dubious constitutional validity,
creates 31 single member districts with a first past the post
system. Its net effect is to undercut representation by GERB
(the populist center-right party of Sofia mayor Borissov)
whose strengths in Sofia and other urban areas would be
diluted. President Parvanov had proposed single member
districts as part of his running rivalry with PM Stanishev,
enabling the President to have greater say in naming
candidates for districts and ultimately giving him greater
sway over the government formation process in the likely
event of a split parliament. The ethnically Turkish MRF
party tied its support for this measure to reciprocal BSP
support to raise the threshold from four to eight percent for
party coalitions to enter parliament. After some wrangling
and back room deals, BSP and MRF deputies rammed the measure
through parliament. The new eight percent threshold directly
targets the newly established but incredibly brittle
coalition of two traditional center-right parties, UDF and
DSB, that had barely overcome deep-seated distrust of each
other (now polling at a combined 7.3 percent). The Forward
coalition of shady businessman Hristo Kovachki (polling at 3
plus percent) also takes a hit. The net winners are BSP and
MRF, though ironically the ultra-nationalist and xenophobic
Ataka could also benefit, when seats are redistributed from
parties that do not make the threshold.


3. (C) Within a day after parliament's passage, Parvanov
vetoed the bill. He stated that the last minute change to
increase the threshold limited citizens' political
representation and could distort voters' will, thus leading
to artificial majorities in parliament and an unstable
national assembly.
But BSP and MRF easily have the votes to override the veto,
and this is expected early the week of April 20 as soon as
Parliament returns from its short Easter recess. In that
case, Parvanov gets his 31 seat majority system, and can
claim the high road in opposing the increased threshold.

Vigorous Opposition...
--------------

4. (C) NGO's and independent observers quickly and fiercely
condemned the amendments-- noting that they are an
unscrupulous and arroant way to score easy BSP and MRF
victories. Th Coalition for Free and Democratic Elections
(whse electoral transparency and campaign finance platform
the embassy supports) also noted that the amndments create
an odd hybrid system of direct an proportional voting that
does not conform to th constitution; establish 31 districts
of unequalvoting size and thus de-value the votes in largerdistricts; and through the last minute change in te
threshold unfairly target the traditional centr-right
parties. A constitutional challenge wil likely not be
adjudicated before an election dae is set, which
increasingly looks to be July 5 o 12.

...and Some Practical Consequences and Complications
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Introduction of a partial majority system raises a
number of technical issues, including unequal representation
of districts with different sized populations in a unicameral
legislature; legitimacy of a majority-elected candidate vs. a
party list candidate; and how a replacement is chosen for a

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vacated seat from a majority vote district. As a practical
matter, the majority system benefits parties that offer
candidates with significant name recognition. Here, BSP and
MRF have advantages over GERB or smaller conservative
parties. Those parties will need to agree to back a single
candidate in each region -- difficult given their track
record on cooperation. But the proposed change would confer
one advantage for small parties. Popular individual leaders
(with lots of money to spend) could win in a single district
and enter parliament even if their parties fail to cross the
threshold. Even more than BSP or MRF, Parvanov is set to be
a net winner. A number of well-known left-leaning Socialists
close to Parvanov are expected to be assigned to the majority
tickets because they are already well known to the public.
PM Stanishev, who makes up the party lists and who has
promoted younger modernizers, now has a smaller pool of
districts for his followers. As for the eight percent
threshold, in theory coalitions can get around it by formally
registering as a single party (with a 4 percent threshold)
and running under that party's name. But they seem incapable
of resolving their quarrels and personality disputes. If
they fail to get into parliament, votes would be
re-apportioned, predominantly helping BSP and MRF.

Center-Right Its Own Worst Enemy
--------------

6. (SBU) Meanwhile, the UDF-DSB coalition is crumbling from
within, even without any help from the BSP. Rivals of newly
elected UDF Chairman Martin Dimitrov contested the legality
of his election in court. It ruled this week, upholding that
challenge, casting Dimitrov out and restoring former Chairman
Plamen Yurukov again to his post. Yurukov has vowed publicly
not to keep UDF in coalition with DSB's leader, former PM
Ivan Kostov. And a number of UDF MPs -- detesting Kostov but
anxious for political survival -- defected to the new
populist Order, Law and Justice Party (widely seen as an
upcoming force but also perceived as a witting or unwitting
tool of BSP and MRF manipulation to gut the center right).
Some high-minded center-right politicians talk about joining
all factions together under one acceptable-to-all group. But
this seems a non-starter -- too many factions insist on
blackballing one or more of the others.


7. (C) COMMENT: Parvanov's veto extends the drama for
another week, but the fate of the old line center-right
parties is set on a downward spiral. If they had something
material and compelling to offer voters, or if they showed
seriousness, or even if they simply had a stronger survival
instinct, they would run well above an 8 percent threshold.
The votes are there to be had. But personal differences
(there don't appear to be any real ideological differences)
hold such sway that even under threat of political extinction
the center-rightists look incapable of coming together. A
look at possible electoral mathematics suggests that only a
few possible combinations can produce a governing coalition.
Some analysts believe that GERB may be tempted to court
Ataka, but Borissov knows that his European backers would
balk and that his reputation would nosedive. He'll go after
Ataka voters, but is leery of joining with Ataka itself.
More likely is a co-habitation between GERB and BSP. GERB
and BSP tacticians have circled around this option for some
time, using elaborate feints and jabs (and smears) as they
test defenses and voter attitudes. If the election law
amendments survive as expected, the possibility of this
marriage of convenience increases. But voters have yet to
cast any ballots. The next ten weeks will see a bitter
fought campaign that may yet surprise in outcome, but, sadly,
seems undemocratically stacked because of election rules and
mechanics.
Karagiannis