Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SOFIA169
2009-04-06 17:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:
FM KALFIN PREVIEWS HIS APRIL 8 WASHINGTON VISIT
how-toO 061708Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5906 INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000169
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND EEB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG BU
SUBJECT: FM KALFIN PREVIEWS HIS APRIL 8 WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000169
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND EEB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG BU
SUBJECT: FM KALFIN PREVIEWS HIS APRIL 8 WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. FM Kalfin previewed his Washington visit with the Charge for 90 minutes on April 6. He asked for a strong public statement by the Secretary commending the substantially strengthened bilateral partnership over the past five years, underscoring that it will establish the foundation for the next Bulgarian government. He noted Bulgaria's contributions to international peace and security and the much improved trade and investment relationship. Bulgaria wants to start fast and strong with the Obama Administration. The Minister asked for a separate meeting with energy envoy Morningstar. He briefed on his April 2 trip to Turkmenistan on energy. End Summary.
2. (C) Afghanistan: At the NATO Summit, Bulgaria announced an additional OMLT that would be in place by September (NB this was already in the works) and a Role 2 medical team; it is looking for additional OMLTs for 2010 but requests U.S. training assistance. It favors consolidation for its forces at either Kabul or Khandahar and welcomes U.S. advice and assistance to making that happen, especially in defining the roles and missions. Responding to the Charge, he admitted that consolidation and increased training/equipment could lead to lifting caveats, but cautioned not to underestimate Sofia's political concerns. Bulgaria is looking hard at Afghan election support, possibly to include 100-110 troops that would deploy with the Italians in Herat. The government is committed to providing additional civilian assistance -- absolutely essential for Afghanistan -- but Bulgaria has limited capacity and funding. Few civilian experts have the experience or will to go to Afghanistan. The Charge encouraged Bulgaria to go the extra mile in providing troops and assistance; we had made quite modest requests and will look to step up coordination with the Bulgarian military but it needs clear political instructions to lean forward on planning.
3. (C) Energy Summit: Kalfin noted Bulgaria is in a careful balancing act on its April 24-25 Summit. The EU Commission adopted the hardest line against enumerating projects and pipelines at the April 2 working meeting; while the Summit would not endorse South Stream or include it in the Southern Gas Corridor, the Commission and Russia are sliding towards a contentious face-off.
4. (C) He briefed extensively on his recent visit to Turkmenistan. The Turkmen Deputy PM will attend the Summit as his President will stay home to host a UN-sponsored conference, shooting for attendance by 83 countries and over 140 companies plus UN and OSCE representatives. In contrast to his last visit 18 months ago, Kalfin found the Turkmen President more self-confident, but far less open to the EU and Azerbaijan, far more open to Russia and Iran, and quite sour on possible delimitation of the Caspian after the Azeris had not replied positively to his proposal. Based on new surveys and exploration, Turkmenistan believes it may have huge new reserves, potentially in the "trillions" of bcm; it's looking at building an 800-1000 km pipeline, but once it hits the border, it's up to the buyers to build pipelines and get it to markets. According to the Turkmens, Russia has committed to sell 50 billion bcm/year more gas than it now produces for export, meaning that it will buy from Turkmenistan or deveop new costly fields. Acknowledging South Stream's problems, Kalfin drily noted that if the Turkmen play these cards, Nabucco would face an infrastructure problem even if it bought sufficient Turkmen gas. He added that the Azeris are nervous over possible Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and re-looking at the Russia card.
5. (C) The Charge stressed that's why the Summit must focus on principles and policies. We have noted that PM Stanishev will travel to Moscow almost immediately after the Sofia Summit. Bulgaria has lots of deals in the works with Russia, but multiple signings do not result in viable projects -- financing and solid market economics do. Kalfin closed by noting that Iran has probed to get invited to the Sofia Summit, which will not happen.
6. (C) Western Balkans, Macedonia: Kalfin expressed concern that nationalist trends seem to be strengthening in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia; we should not take our eyes off those countries. On the Macedonia-Greece name dispute he was more pessimistic than last year, as Skopje has added new issues of identity to the dispute. He doubted that increased pressure on Athens would work, suggesting that Skopje isolate the name issue, leaving other questions for later.
7. (C) VWP: Kalfin will raise Visa Waiver, though he knows Bulgaria does not qualify: no biometric passport, refusal rate hovering at 18 percent, no data sharing agreements in place. But he would like us to highlight that our intent is still not to differentiate between European friends and hold out future VWP entry.
8. (C) UNESCO Seat: Ambassador Bokova is Bulgaria's candidate for UNESCO; she will participate in the Secretary's meeting. The Charge noted U.S. policy that we do not reveal our support or vote for UN elections.
9. (C) Comment: Kalfin was relaxed and confident, looking to highlight bilateral relations and boost the government as it hits the summer election cycle. As anticipated, Bulgaria made modest commitments on Afghanistan, but it will stick with us. On energy, it is struggling to hit all the right notes. It does not want to poke Moscow in the eye; nor can it afford any daylight with us. We should caution that we will look carefully and hard at Stanishev's Moscow visit where both natural gas and financing for the Russia-Bulgaria Belene nuclear project (very much in question) will be at center stage. As the government winds down, Bulgaria's credibility on energy is still unsettled; its international peace and security credentials are strong; and its determination to enhance our bilateral relations is very firm. We can set the policy compass points for Bulgaria through Kalfin's visit.
Karagiannis
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND EEB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG BU
SUBJECT: FM KALFIN PREVIEWS HIS APRIL 8 WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. FM Kalfin previewed his Washington visit with the Charge for 90 minutes on April 6. He asked for a strong public statement by the Secretary commending the substantially strengthened bilateral partnership over the past five years, underscoring that it will establish the foundation for the next Bulgarian government. He noted Bulgaria's contributions to international peace and security and the much improved trade and investment relationship. Bulgaria wants to start fast and strong with the Obama Administration. The Minister asked for a separate meeting with energy envoy Morningstar. He briefed on his April 2 trip to Turkmenistan on energy. End Summary.
2. (C) Afghanistan: At the NATO Summit, Bulgaria announced an additional OMLT that would be in place by September (NB this was already in the works) and a Role 2 medical team; it is looking for additional OMLTs for 2010 but requests U.S. training assistance. It favors consolidation for its forces at either Kabul or Khandahar and welcomes U.S. advice and assistance to making that happen, especially in defining the roles and missions. Responding to the Charge, he admitted that consolidation and increased training/equipment could lead to lifting caveats, but cautioned not to underestimate Sofia's political concerns. Bulgaria is looking hard at Afghan election support, possibly to include 100-110 troops that would deploy with the Italians in Herat. The government is committed to providing additional civilian assistance -- absolutely essential for Afghanistan -- but Bulgaria has limited capacity and funding. Few civilian experts have the experience or will to go to Afghanistan. The Charge encouraged Bulgaria to go the extra mile in providing troops and assistance; we had made quite modest requests and will look to step up coordination with the Bulgarian military but it needs clear political instructions to lean forward on planning.
3. (C) Energy Summit: Kalfin noted Bulgaria is in a careful balancing act on its April 24-25 Summit. The EU Commission adopted the hardest line against enumerating projects and pipelines at the April 2 working meeting; while the Summit would not endorse South Stream or include it in the Southern Gas Corridor, the Commission and Russia are sliding towards a contentious face-off.
4. (C) He briefed extensively on his recent visit to Turkmenistan. The Turkmen Deputy PM will attend the Summit as his President will stay home to host a UN-sponsored conference, shooting for attendance by 83 countries and over 140 companies plus UN and OSCE representatives. In contrast to his last visit 18 months ago, Kalfin found the Turkmen President more self-confident, but far less open to the EU and Azerbaijan, far more open to Russia and Iran, and quite sour on possible delimitation of the Caspian after the Azeris had not replied positively to his proposal. Based on new surveys and exploration, Turkmenistan believes it may have huge new reserves, potentially in the "trillions" of bcm; it's looking at building an 800-1000 km pipeline, but once it hits the border, it's up to the buyers to build pipelines and get it to markets. According to the Turkmens, Russia has committed to sell 50 billion bcm/year more gas than it now produces for export, meaning that it will buy from Turkmenistan or deveop new costly fields. Acknowledging South Stream's problems, Kalfin drily noted that if the Turkmen play these cards, Nabucco would face an infrastructure problem even if it bought sufficient Turkmen gas. He added that the Azeris are nervous over possible Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and re-looking at the Russia card.
5. (C) The Charge stressed that's why the Summit must focus on principles and policies. We have noted that PM Stanishev will travel to Moscow almost immediately after the Sofia Summit. Bulgaria has lots of deals in the works with Russia, but multiple signings do not result in viable projects -- financing and solid market economics do. Kalfin closed by noting that Iran has probed to get invited to the Sofia Summit, which will not happen.
6. (C) Western Balkans, Macedonia: Kalfin expressed concern that nationalist trends seem to be strengthening in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia; we should not take our eyes off those countries. On the Macedonia-Greece name dispute he was more pessimistic than last year, as Skopje has added new issues of identity to the dispute. He doubted that increased pressure on Athens would work, suggesting that Skopje isolate the name issue, leaving other questions for later.
7. (C) VWP: Kalfin will raise Visa Waiver, though he knows Bulgaria does not qualify: no biometric passport, refusal rate hovering at 18 percent, no data sharing agreements in place. But he would like us to highlight that our intent is still not to differentiate between European friends and hold out future VWP entry.
8. (C) UNESCO Seat: Ambassador Bokova is Bulgaria's candidate for UNESCO; she will participate in the Secretary's meeting. The Charge noted U.S. policy that we do not reveal our support or vote for UN elections.
9. (C) Comment: Kalfin was relaxed and confident, looking to highlight bilateral relations and boost the government as it hits the summer election cycle. As anticipated, Bulgaria made modest commitments on Afghanistan, but it will stick with us. On energy, it is struggling to hit all the right notes. It does not want to poke Moscow in the eye; nor can it afford any daylight with us. We should caution that we will look carefully and hard at Stanishev's Moscow visit where both natural gas and financing for the Russia-Bulgaria Belene nuclear project (very much in question) will be at center stage. As the government winds down, Bulgaria's credibility on energy is still unsettled; its international peace and security credentials are strong; and its determination to enhance our bilateral relations is very firm. We can set the policy compass points for Bulgaria through Kalfin's visit.
Karagiannis