BULGARIA: F-16 ENDGAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000101

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: F-16 ENDGAME

REF: A. 2008 SOFIA 305

B. 2008 SOFIA 453

Classified By: Ambassador McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Bulgaria is in the final sprint of a
ten-year marathon to acquire new fighters. A successful deal
on F-16s will lock in a NATO-reinforcing U.S.-Bulgaria
defense relationship for at least a generation. Without it,
we will have a hole in NATO's southern tier: Bulgaria will
either maintain its crippled and expensive MiG-29 fleet and
remain wholly dependent on Russia; or Bulgaria will opt for
Gripen to get lucrative offsets. Neither is in U.S.
strategic interests. We are now on track to deliver a Letter
of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Bulgaria by mid-April. By
then, Bulgaria will have announced the date for its 2009
parliamentary elections; politicians will have survival
foremost in mind. We must quickly present the best, lowest
cost deal possible to avoid politicization during the
campaign and allow the government to justify its decision to
its public. A timely, low cost LOA will help the Defense
Minister and other F-16 backers prevail over instinctively
pro-Russian generals and offset-minded politicians who want
to steer Bulgaria away from the U.S. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) Bulgaria's embattled government is fast closing
up books as it heads to summer 2009 elections. One critical
decision it has to make in its final days is the acquisition
of multirole aircraft. What has been a ten year effort is
coming down to months and weeks. Miss this window and we'll
have to wait for a new government and re-start the process in
what will likely be a more difficult political environment
with a fractious government and parliament. The stakes are
high: whether Bulgaria has a NATO interoperable Air Force
and locks in a generational relationship with the United
States or whether we tolerate a hole in NATO's Black Sea
frontier. Today, the Bulgarian Air Force is incapable of
participating in NATO air missions outside its borders and
cannot operate without Russian support. Its fleet of aging
MiGs is completely dependent on Russia for all aspects of
operations and could be grounded instantly with a word from
Moscow -- a move President Medvedev specifically threatened
to take should Bulgaria restart arms sales to Georgia.


3. (C/NF) The Bulgarian government has categorically ruled
out elimination of its Air Force. It is determined to
modernize it, and will allocate resources to do so. Its
decisions over the next few months will determine the shape
of the Bulgarian Armed Forces for a generation. It is in the
U.S. strategic interest to ensure Bulgaria transitions to a
U.S. aircraft, locking it into a relationship with us that
will continue to deepen over time. Supporters of the F-16
buy do not see this as merely an airplane, but rather a
chance to completely overhaul a non-functioning portion of
their defense establishment; to make doctrine
NATO-interoperable; remove Russian-trained generals; and
expand U.S. training cooperation. Bulgaria agreed in 2006 to
allow U.S. forces access to its training facilities. The
Bulgarians are now interested in significantly expanding
bilateral Air Force cooperation and even creating a
multilateral hub for air training, giving the U.S. and NATO
partners access to unencumbered airspace and new training
opportunities that most other allies cannot offer.


4. (C/NF) The Defense Minister has made it clear that his
first choice is a U.S. fighter, specifically the F-16. But
should this prove impossible, Bulgaria will either continue
to pour money into MiG fighters (at least $100 million a year
for maintenance, parts, etc.) remaining dependent on Russia
and paying a steep premium for the privilege; or it will opt
for the generous offset packages of a European fighter, but
end up with a fleet of non-supportable and less-capable
fighters. Bulgaria has heard the arguments that it should
not spend its scarce resources on fighters at all and cease
to have an Air Force, but this is a political impossibility.
Bulgaria will purchase fighters. The only question is from
whom.


5. (C/NF) The F-16 is the clear choice of many key
decisionmakers here, but there are forces actively working to
undermine the purchase. Russian interests and rival
companies will rail against it, as will others on economic
grounds. We must present Bulgaria with a LOA that has the
lowest possible cost no later than mid-April. That will
provide the government the scope and space to decide before
elections and keep the issue from being overly politicized.
If a decision slips, then prospects for any U.S. deal erode
badly ) the dynamics of the campaign, election, and future
government formation (likely a weak co-habitation coalition)
will stall defense decisions indefinitely. Delay means
Russian influence will remain deep in the Bulgarian defense
establishment. Decisive action through a well crafted LOA
will cement a long-term security relationship in a
strategically important corner of Europe.
McEldowney