SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

S E C R E T SKOPJE 000095


NOFORN

FOR DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5 (C)
TAGS: ASEC MK PTER
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)
FOR SKOPJE - SPRING 2009

REF: STATE 13023

Classified By: RSO Bart Brown for reason 1.5 (C)

(SBU) The following is Post's response to the SEPQ.
Responses are keyed off of reftel.

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE
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1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS


A. There is a small ethnic Serbian population in Macedonia
capable of carrying out anti-American demonstrations.

i. There have been no anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months.

ii. There have been no anti-American demonstrations near or
in front of the U.S. diplomatic facilities in the last 12
months.

iii. The average size of previous anti-American
demonstrations is approximately 25-50.

iv. One anti-American demonstration on July 28, 2006, was
based on U.S. support for Israel. In the past (late 1990's
and in 2001) larger scale demonstrations were triggered by
U.S. military actions and foreign policy initiatives.


B. Demonstrations are generally peaceful in nature.

i. There have been no violent demonstrations which resulted
in damage to USG facilities or personnel within recent years.

ii. The perimeter was penetrated during demonstrations in
March 1999 and July 2001. Since 2001, Chancery security has
been enhanced by the addition of perimeter security upgrades,
including new walls. There have been no similar
demonstrations since 2001.


C. There have been sporadic, small anti-government
demonstrations against the GOM throughout the past twelve
months.

i. Most anti-government demonstrations have occurred around
or in front of GOM official buildings, approximately one mile
from the Chancery compound.

ii. The average size of an anti-government demonstration is
between 200 and 500, but on a few occasions (none in the past
year) there have been demonstrations as large as 15,000 to
20,000.

iii. In general protests are peaceful. There have been a few
isolated cases of violence during anti-government protests.
Early this year in the city center of Skopje some protesters
turned violent and clashed with police in front of the
government building.

iv. No damage has occurred to USG properties in the past 12
months as a result of demonstrations.


2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS


A. Macedonia is not engaged in any armed conflicts.


B. There is no intrastate conflict and/or insurgency
currently in Macedonia.


C. N-A


D. N-A


3. (S/NF) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES


A. Law enforcement agencies are not as professional or well
trained as they need to be, but they are slowly improving.
Currently, Macedonian law enforcement agencies are working to
meet international standards through internal reforms and
training/assistance from the U.S. and other Western countries.


B. The Macedonian police have received, and continue to
receive, training from the USG through DS ATA, ILEA, ICITAP,
EXBS and other similar programs. The training has been
generally well received, but overall performance and
effectiveness of the police is hampered by inadequate
material support, corruption, inefficiency, and
over-centralization. The police have yet to implement the
"train the trainer" concept in order to maximize the
knowledge gained from various U.S. sponsored training.


C. Law enforcement agencies are confronted with widespread
corruption inside most agencies. This includes hiring and
firing based on political patronage. Graft and bribery are
reportedly commonplace, though the GOM has taken measures to
reduce such opportunities, in part with U.S. assistance.


D. GOM Intelligence Services are capable of deterring
terrorist actions. The Directorate of Security and
Counterintelligence (UBK) is professional and competent, but
remains politicized. In the event of ethnic strife, response
would likely be energetic but hampered by professional
shortcomings.


E. GOM Intelligence Services have been very cooperative with
Embassy requests for information and support.


F. Government of Macedonia (GOM) security services have been
successful on an operational level (i.e. infiltration and
intelligence gathering),and to a limited degree on a
tactical level. These successes continue to be against both
international terrorist targets and indigenous persons of
interest. There is a steady stream of reporting on transient
threats, but no major threat information. The northern border
region (Kosovo) continues to be a problematic area for the
GOM, with violent and criminal individuals and groups
operating in this area.


G. Host government has been responsive to embassy regarding
requests for information.


H. Overall security for the main airport in Skopje and the
secondary airport in Ohrid is rated as Average to Poor. The
lack of training and proper equipment limit airport
authorities professional capabilities in relation to
security. A high level of corruption throughout the police
services to include airport police detract from their ability
to provide effective and sound enforcement of rule of law.


I. Customs and immigration controls are generally ineffective
but are improving with USG assistance and training. Although
the U.S. Government is providing training and support to
develop Macedonian customs and immigration controls they have
a great deal to improve upon. Remote and porous borders with
Albania and Kosovo in combination with corruption and poorly
funded and equipped customs and immigration officers make it
very difficult for host government to enforce border security
and effective customs controls.


J. Border patrol forces are ineffective due to lack of
personnel, training, equipment and issues with corruption.
The border police are improving and have been deploying
automated systems (computer systems) at all entry points.

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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
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4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. There are no indigenous anti-American terrorist groups in
Macedonia.


B. N-A


C. N-A


D. N-A


E. N-A


F. N-A


G. N-A


5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. There are no other organized indigenous terrorist groups
in Macedonia; however, there are loosely-connected
individuals who have carried out activities consistent with
terrorism in the last year. These groups have been referred
to as extremists, criminal organizations/gangs and
terrorists. On various occasions they challenge host
government security forces to achieve their objectives or
goals.


B. One such group recently conducted an ambush on a three
person patrol from a special police unit (Alphas) in downtown
Skopje. One officer was fatally wounded and the two others
survived with serious injuries. On a similar note another
group carried out an attack in early 2008 in the central
Skopje region against members of the Tigers, an elite police
unit. This attack resulted in the death of one police
officer. These groups continue to demonstrate their desire
and ability to challenge the rule of law and carry out
violent actions against host government police forces.


C. No.


D. No.

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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
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6. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. No, see 6D.


B. N-A


C. No.


D. There is no evidence of traditional transnational
terrorist groups in Macedonia. There are NGOs in Macedonia
and the region which provide support to individuals who are
in, or sympathetic to some terrorist groups. These NGOs
include Al-Haramein, Al-Waqf Al-Islami, Bamiresia, and
others. Macedonia is also a known transit route into the
Balkans and Europe for identified extremists.


E. Most members of Macedonia's Islamic community are
pro-American. However, the community includes factions
sympathetic to terrorist groups. The Embassy enjoys good
relations with the Islamic community in Macedonia.


F. Serbian and Russian intelligence are present in Macedonia
and could try to use their influence to instigate
inflammatory reactions to Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo
independence, such as violent demonstrations.


G. A wide variety of weapons and explosives is readily
available both in Macedonia and in surrounding countries for
use by terrorist or criminal elements. Police routinely find
dated weapons caches around the country, mostly from the
hostilities in 1999 and 2001. Post assesses that various
weapon systems and explosives are locally available.


REEKER