SINGAPORE'S COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM CLAIMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000982

SIPDIS

EAP/MTS - M. COPPOLA,
STATE FOR S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ASEC SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE'S COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM CLAIMS
ZERO RECIDIVISM, BUT SKEPTICS REMAIN

Classified By: EP Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for Reasons 1.4 (b, c and
d).


1. (S) Summary: Singapore claims its integrative approach to
counter-radicalization is effective at reducing extremism,
and that there has been zero recidivism among the 41
terrorists that have been released into the community on a
restricted basis. However, some independent observers are
skeptical of Singapore's counterterrorism approach and do not
believe that the GOS can successfully rehabilitate
terrorists. Analysts noted the increasing discontent and
radicalization among ethnic Malay youth and warn that some
Malays may be funding terrorism abroad by engaging in
distinctly non-Muslim criminal activities, such as loan
sharking. End Summary.

Rehabbing Terrorists - a Total Community Effort
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Singapore uses a total community approach to counter
extremism, Ustaz Mohamad Feisal and Salim Bin Mohamed Nasir,
Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) Counselors and now also
analysts at the International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR),told Poloff during a
briefing they gave on Singapore's RRG program. The
counterterrorism effort is divided into three distinct
sections: 1) government - which involves the Ministry of Home
Affairs (in the lead),the Ministry of Education, the
Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports, the Ministry of
Information, Communication and the Arts, the Ministry of
Manpower and Peoples' Associations; 2) community - which
involves the RRG and the Aftercare Group; and 3) academia -
which involves research on extremism by analysts at ICPVTR.


3. (SBU) Following the discovery of a homegrown Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) terrorist cell in Singapore in December, 2001,
officials from MHA's Internal Security Department (ISD)
approached prominent Muslim leaders Ustaz Ali and Ustaz Hasbi
to discuss JI's ideology and ways to counter radicalization
in Singapore, Feisal said. Admitting that the ISD did not
understand the religious nature of the JI extremists, the ISD
officials asked if the religious leaders would be willing to
recruit volunteers to meet with the detainees and their
families. The leaders agreed and the RRG was born.


4. (SBU) To date 38 volunteers (including Feisal and Nasir)
now serve as RRG "Religious Counselors" for JI detainees.
The Religious Counselors have conducted over 1,200 sessions
counseling sessions with ISA detainees, and 120 sessions with
the families of detainees, Feisal said. The detainees
generally exhibit the following tendencies: 1) a distorted
ideology; 2) promotion of violence as a means to affect
change; 3) simplistic paradigms - good versus evil, us versus
them; 4) exclusiveness; 5) feelings of bitterness,
resentment, hatred or anger. Many of the detainees were not
practicing Muslims before joining JI, and had often tried to
learn about Islam when they were recruited. The detainees
often had a limited, "cut and paste" knowledge of Islam,
Feisal said. Families of detainees are often economically
disadvantaged as they have lost their only breadwinner.


5. (C) Each counseling session lasts between one to
one-and-a-half hours, and the counselors focus on building a
rapport and teaching detainees about Islam. The main goal of
the counseling is to counter the detainees distorted
ideology. The ability to deradicalize extremists is directly
related to "how deeply they have been immersed in JI," Feisal
said. Some detainees, Feisal admitted, reject counseling and
can never be rehabilitated. Escaped and later recaptured (by
Malaysia) detainee and former head of Singapore's JI cell Mas
Selamat Kastari refused counseling, though his family
received it, Feisal said.

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6. (C) Both Nasir and Feisal admitted that many detainees are
initially skeptical of the religious counselors, and
initially dismiss them as government stooges. Nasir
acknowledged that the primary religious body in Singapore,
the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS),conjures skepticism
in the eyes of many ethnic Malays because of its strong
connections with the government. The RRG counselors therefore
strive to minimize their government connections and make
clear to detainees that they are volunteers who are true
followers of Islam. Despite the obstacles, both Nasir and
Feisal said they have had success in "de-programming"
extremists. Deradicalization is a long-term process, often
taking many years, but eventually many detainees do come to
trust their counselors, Feisal said. In addition to meeting
with the religious counselors, detainees are also evaluated
by ISD case officers and psychologists. The three evaluators
meet regularly to discuss progress (or lack thereof) in the
rehabilitation process for each detainee. If all three
parties agree that the detainee is no longer a threat to
Singapore, the detainees are released and placed on
Restriction Orders (ROs).


7. (C) Detainees on RO status are closely monitored, must
regularly report in to their case officers, and must continue
to undergo religious counseling sessions. Several government
ministries (listed above) are actively involved in providing
the former detainees with generous skill and job training
assistance. "They are placed in positive environments,"
Feisal said. To date, 41 detainees have been released on
ROs. Feisal claimed the recidivism rate of released
detainees is zero, though he admits it is difficult to know
for certain whether a former detainee has again become
involved with extremism, if he does not engage in public acts
of violence.


8. (SBU) The RRG has produced two counter radicalization
manuals based on the experiences its counselors have had in
"de-programming" extremists, Nasir said. The manuals
describe the various phases detainees will move through in
their years-long rehabilitation process and provide
guidelines to assist counselors in what to focus on with
detainees at each phase. Both Feisal and Nasir were
circumspect when asked whether the RRG model could be used in
other countries, noting that Singapore being an island with a
large majority ethnic Chinese population was a unique case.
However, both counselors said that since most of the
extremists are distorting Islam, it is key for governments to
work with religious scholars and with leaders within the
Muslim community to ensure that counter-radicalization
efforts have any chance of success.


9. (C) Note: Singapore's captured terrorists are not put into
the regular prison system nor are they ever brought to trial.
A legacy of the British colonial system, Singapore's
Internal Security Act (ISA) permits preventive detention
without trial for the protection of public security, safety,
or the maintenance of public order. It gives broad
discretion to the Minister for Home Affairs to order
detention without filing charges if it is determined that a
person is a threat to national security. The initial
detention may be for up to two years and may be renewed
without limitation for additional periods of up to two years
at a time. Each of the extremists that the RRG counselors
have met with have been detained under the authority granted
by the ISA. Singapore is presently detaining twenty persons
under the ISA. End Note.

Aspects of Singapore's Program have Merits
--------------


10. (C) John Harrison, an Assistant Professor at ICPVTR told

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Poloff that Singapore is on the right track with its
integrated approach to counter-radicalization. When
confronting radicalization, you need more than just law
enforcement, otherwise all you can do is lock up the
extremists and throw away the key, he said. By confronting
their ideological deficiencies head on (through the RRG
counseling sessions),by assisting the families and
continuing to work with and monitor the detainees after they
are released, Singapore has done a good job of pulling folks
away from extremism, he said. The government is also keen to
avoid the creation of a second generation of radicals and is
smart to focus on ensuring the sons of detainees do not go
down the same path as their fathers, Harrison said.


11. (C) One issue that scares off western governments when
they look at Singapore RRG program is the word "religious,"
Harrison said. Western governments often view religion as an
area to avoid and are thus reluctant to take a closer look at
Singapore's program. It's a fallacy to look at the program
as one that strictly focuses on religion, he said. While
counselors do teach about Islam, the program is really about
de-radicalization, and you cannot pull someone away from
extremism unless you touch on all the reasons that have
driven a person to engage in violence. Harrison said he
recommended to the RRG that the name of the program be
changed to convey that it is truly a counter radicalization
program, but Singapore has not yet deigned to heed his
advice.

Israelis Not Impressed
--------------


12. (S) However, the program has its detractors. The RRG is
a joke, Israeli Embassy DCM Idit Abu lamented to Poloff. The
religious counselors are all either members of MUIS, or are
connected to the organization, and at least among ethnic
Malays in Singapore, MUIS is tainted, and everyone sees
religious counselors as government lackeys, she said.


13. (S) Abu expressed doubt that Singapore could effectively
rehabilitate terrorists, stating that that any rehabilitation
program would require the government to enjoy a strong
relationship with the Muslim community; yet the Government of
Singapore does not even have a good understanding of ethnic
Malays in the country, let alone how and why some ethnic
Malay Singaporeans have turned to religious extremism, she
said.


14. (S) Noting Singaporeans' lack of experience in dealing
with terrorism, Abu linked her appraisal of Singapore's
anti-terrorist unit with the likelihood that Singapore could
effectively rehabilitate terrorists; "They are like children
with guns. It's all a big game to them, and they have only
avoided any serious terrorist incidents occurring here
through sheer luck." If they cannot identify them, how can
they reform them, she asked Poloff rhetorically.

Extremism on the Rise Among Malay Youth?
--------------


15. (S) Visiting National University of Singapore Senior
Research Fellow Gabriele Marranci also doubts the
effectiveness of Singapore's counterterrorism effort and
their ability to reform extremists. Marranci, an Italian
anthropologist, has conducted in-depth interviews with dozens
of extremists while researching terrorism in Europe over the
past ten years. Marranci has been in Singapore for over a
year, and to date has focused his research on disaffected
ethnic Malay youth. Marranci said while the government is
correct to focus on an integrated approach to counter
radicalization, the GOS is overconfident in its ability to
identify potential extremists and effectively monitor

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released detainees.


16. (S) Marranci expressed concerns that there is growing
discontentment among Malay youth that could provide fertile
ground for the recruitment of extremists in the future. Over
the past year, Marranci has interviewed 250 Malay youth (aged
13-28),240 of whom expressed a strong dissatisfaction with
life in Singapore and told Marranci they would emigrate if
they could. Many Malays feel marginalized in Singapore, and
extremist attitudes appear to be intensifying, he said.
Marranci said that when he first meets interviewees, they
almost all initially state that they are happy with their lot
in life. The tune changes however as Marranci establishes a
bond and wins the trust of his interviewees. Echoing others,
Marranci said Malays distrust MUIS and avoid expressing any
discontentment with the government while attending services
at local mosques. It is only privately that the Malay youth
express their growing disillusionment, he said. Some
disaffected Malays turn to crime, while others, who travel to
Malaysia and Indonesia, become radicalized after they come
into contact with extremists there, he said.


17. (S) Marranci noted with alarm that ethnic Malays are
increasingly involved in criminal activities that one does
not usually associate with Muslims, such as loan sharking.
Citing Singapore Police Force (SPF) sources, Marranci told
Poloff that 19 out of 54 syndicate organizations found to be
involved in loan sharking over the last two years were Malay.
While he admitted he has no proof, Marranci believes the
Malays' involvement in loan sharking could be an indicator of
a fund-raising attempt by extremists, most likely those
living outside of Singapore, he said. The GOS is not
concerned about the up-tick in ethnic Malay criminal
activities, because the authorities view the increase as an
indication of growing secularity among Malays, Marranci said.



18. (S) Despite repeated requests, the GOS has not yet
allowed Marranci to interview any of the ISA detainees.
Reflecting on his research into extremism in Europe, Marranci
told Poloff that he does not believe extremists can ever be
truly rehabilitated because if they are again confronted with
the stimuli which triggered the initial turn to violence,
extremists "inevitably relapse; they're like alcoholics,"
Marranci mused.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) It is easy for Singapore to claim a zero recidivism
rate and state its counter radicalization program is a
success since no terrorist incidents have occurred here.
However, the fact remains that no one really knows if
"deprogrammed" detainees will ever eventually fall off the
wagon. Most of the contacts we've met praised Singapore's
"integrative approach" to counter radicalization, but
Singapore's unique circumstances and the relative ease with
which the authorities can lock the place down make it
difficult to envision replication of anything more than
certain small segments of Singapore's counter-radicalization
effort. End Comment.

Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
KENGOTT