Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SINGAPORE876
2009-09-11 00:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW

Tags:  KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN 
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FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7186
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3049
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2259
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2385
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4296
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6008
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0051
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0257
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0052
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000876 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
EAP/MTS FOR MCOPPOLA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW
CONFERENCE 2010: SINGAPORE RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. SINGAPORE 817

C. SINGAPORE 770

Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000876 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MNSA EAP/MTS FOR MCOPPOLA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW CONFERENCE 2010: SINGAPORE RESPONSE REF: A. STATE 83600 ¶B. SINGAPORE 817 ¶C. SINGAPORE 770 Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Singapore is supportive of the United States' global counterproliferation agenda and promotes a targeted, risk-based approach to trade and cargo security initiatives. Singapore is a trade and financial services hub and has a key role to play in monitoring and preventing the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),related technologies, and advanced conventional weapons, as well as the financial resources that might support proliferation activities. Singapore is a member of the IAEA and a signatory or party to the: Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Chemical Weapons Convention; and Biological Weapons Convention. Singapore takes seriously UN-mandated obligations and fully implements UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) (Ref B). However, short of a UN mandate, Singapore is sometimes less forward leaning in its actions and is reluctant to sign on to certain multilateral programs, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) because of concerns about manpower and resource constraints. Singapore is mindful of its neighbors and prefers to address sensitive policy issues in the context of regional or multilateral fora. In response to the ref A action request regarding the 2010 NPT Conference, Post provides the following responses that Singapore MFA shared with Econoff on September 7. Post-only responses follow in the third paragraph. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) MFA International Organizations Directorate contacts provided the following responses to ref A questions for host governments: -- What is the host government's general attitude towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions? MFA: Working towards disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is ever more important in today's globalized world that is faced with increasing security threats, which include international terrorism from non-state actors. In this regard, Singapore places great importance on international cooperation to ensure that nuclear material �
A;and/or arms are not being used for illicit purposes. (i) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Singapore is party to the CTBT. We support the early entry into force of the CTBT and have consistently urged the remaining countries to sign and ratify the treaty as soon as possible. (ii) The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) Singapore understands that discussions on the FMCT are still on-going. If available, Singapore would appreciate it if the US could provide us with an update and more details on its progress. (iii) The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Singapore is party to the NPT. While Singapore accepts the right of sovereign countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, we believe that all countries should fulfill their obligations under the international agreements formulated to guard against nuclear proliferation. Given the rising cost of traditional sources of energy, nuclear energy has become an increasingly important part of the energy mix for many countries. With more nuclear power plants being constructed or planned for, the need for a robust system to ensure the safety and accountability of nuclear materials cannot be more important and pressing. Hence, the upcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2010 is timely as this would be an opportunity for parties to renew their commitments on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. We should also examine whether the system we have in place SINGAPORE 00000876 002 OF 004 to-date is still relevant and effective to deal with the new security threats that the international community is faced with. (iv) US-Russia arms control efforts Singapore is encouraged by recent US-Russia efforts to launch a new round of talks to reduce and limit their supply of strategic offensive arms. -- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts is the host government likely to take in upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review Conference in 2010? MFA: Singapore intends to participate in the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review Conference. Singapore's positions on the various issues are highlighted in the answers to the first question. -- With which countries does the host country work most closely on these issues? MFA: On non-proliferation and arms control related issues, Singapore works closely with the international community, relevant international organizations and key partners, such as the US. (Note: Post is aware that Japan and Australia also engage Singapore on nonproliferation and export-control related matters. For example, Japan recently included Singapore in a regional export control workshop. End Note.) -- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as defense and energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora? How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policy-making process work, and what is the interplay among government officials and agencies? MFA: As non-proliferation and arms control issues cut across different Ministries and agencies, Singapore has in place an inter-agency process, which enables the relevant government officials to meet, discuss and work closely together on these matters. (Note: Post's experience has been that MFA and Singapore Customs have the public lead on counterproliferation and export control-related matters. However, other GOS ministries or agencies, such as MinDef, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Transport (MOT),and the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) also have key roles. Past interagency meetings on counterproliferation topics have included representatives from MFA, SG Customs, Ministry of Defense, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, the National Environment Agency, the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC), Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),Ministry of Trade and Industry, and MHA. End Note.) -- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which issues? MFA: This would depend on which Ministry or agency the issue concerned falls under. (Note: Post's understanding is that MFA chairs inter-ministerial meetings on counterproliferation issues/cases, but that MHA, MAS, and MinDef are very important to the process. The AGC provides legal guidance to the GOS on matters including implementation of UNSCRs and reviews all export-control cases, so it is another important agency though the full extent of its role is not clear. End Note.) -- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control or nonproliferation issues? SINGAPORE 00000876 003 OF 004 MFA: Singapore adopts a holistic approach on policy issues. We take into consideration the views of relevant Ministries and agencies. We take our international obligations seriously. A key consideration is how to work with the international community to guard against nuclear proliferation. We believe that both international efforts should complement each other. -- How many people in host country's missions (New York, Geneva and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they? MFA: Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations: Colonel Sim Tiong Kian Counselor and Military Advisor Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN in New York SIM Tiong Kian@mfa.gov.sg Jonathan Tow First Secretary Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN in New York Jonathan TOW@mfa.gov.sg Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva: Syed Noureddin bin Syed Hassim Deputy Permanent Representative (UN) & Counsellor Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva Syed Noureddin SYED HASSIM@mfa.gov.sg Yvonne Ow First Secretary Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva Yvonne OW@mfa.gov.sg -- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key relevant meetings? MFA: Yes, the respective Ministries will send additional personnel to support our Mission staff at key meetings whenever necessary. -- What are the roles and influence of the host country's nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making? MFA: Singapore's policies are made after taking into consideration the views of relevant Ministries and agencies. Where applicable, we will also take into account reports and feedback from academia and NGOs. (Note: Singapore does not have a civil nuclear power industry. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Post provides the following responses to the ref A post-only questions: -- What are the key alliances with other governments on arms control and nonproliferation issues. For example, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)? Singapore is a member of the NAM and G-77, and often aligns itself with those groupings according to regional considerations, such as positions taken by neighbors like China and Indonesia. Singapore has voted in line with NAM positions on issues like defamation of religions. In areas such as arms control and nonproliferation, Singapore supports U.S. and like-minded countries' efforts to combat proliferation activities, and Singapore adheres to obligations under UNSCRs. However, where UNSCRs are perhaps vague about implementation, for example how "reasonable grounds" may be defined in UNSCR 1874, Singapore often takes a legalistic view and sets a high bar for the types of intelligence it considers "reasonable grounds" for action. In this way, it may have more in common with some NAM or G-77 states, and is not as forward leaning as the United States, Australia, and other like-minded countries on certain aspects SINGAPORE 00000876 004 OF 004 of counterproliferation efforts. -- To what extent does the host government appear to influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line? Singapore views itself as a small, potentially vulnerable state dependent on foreign investment and trade for survival, so it is keen to maintain good relations with larger actors in Asia, such as China and India. Singapore also prefers to work in the context of regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) when engaging immediate neighbors, including Indonesia and Malaysia, on policy matters. Therefore, Singapore is unlikely to take a strong, vocal position that diverges from a position shared by other regional players that are also NAM and G-77 members, even if Singapore privately disagrees with a NAM or G-77 approach to an issue. -- How much flexibility do the Missions to the UN, CD, and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives? MFA contacts have indicated that the Singapore representatives have some independence and flexibility when conducting their day-to-day business. However, the GOS is generally very controlled and coordinated when making public any policy positions or decisions. Post believes that most statements, discussions, and decisions are vetted and finalized through the relevant GOS agencies in Singapore. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm SHIELDS

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