Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SINGAPORE876
2009-09-11 00:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW

Tags:  KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN 
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FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7186
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3049
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2259
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2385
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4296
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6008
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0051
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0257
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0052
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000876 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
EAP/MTS FOR MCOPPOLA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW
CONFERENCE 2010: SINGAPORE RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. SINGAPORE 817

C. SINGAPORE 770

Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000876

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
EAP/MTS FOR MCOPPOLA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA SN
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW
CONFERENCE 2010: SINGAPORE RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. SINGAPORE 817

C. SINGAPORE 770

Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Singapore is supportive of the United
States' global counterproliferation agenda and promotes a
targeted, risk-based approach to trade and cargo security
initiatives. Singapore is a trade and financial services hub
and has a key role to play in monitoring and preventing the
flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),related
technologies, and advanced conventional weapons, as well as
the financial resources that might support proliferation
activities. Singapore is a member of the IAEA and a
signatory or party to the: Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT);
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Chemical
Weapons Convention; and Biological Weapons Convention.
Singapore takes seriously UN-mandated obligations and fully
implements UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) (Ref B).
However, short of a UN mandate, Singapore is sometimes less
forward leaning in its actions and is reluctant to sign on to
certain multilateral programs, such as the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) because of concerns about
manpower and resource constraints. Singapore is mindful of
its neighbors and prefers to address sensitive policy issues
in the context of regional or multilateral fora. In response
to the ref A action request regarding the 2010 NPT
Conference, Post provides the following responses that
Singapore MFA shared with Econoff on September 7. Post-only
responses follow in the third paragraph. End Summary.


2. (SBU) MFA International Organizations Directorate
contacts provided the following responses to ref A questions
for host governments:

-- What is the host government's general attitude towards
CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What
factors influence its attitudes and positions?

MFA: Working towards disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation is ever more important in today's
globalized world that is faced with increasing security
threats, which include international terrorism from non-state
actors. In this regard, Singapore places great importance on
international cooperation to ensure that nuclear material
and/or arms are not being used for illicit purposes.

(i) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Singapore is party to the CTBT. We support the early entry
into force of the CTBT and have consistently urged the

remaining countries to sign and ratify the treaty as soon as
possible.

(ii) The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

Singapore understands that discussions on the FMCT are still
on-going. If available, Singapore would appreciate it if the
US could provide us with an update and more details on its
progress.

(iii) The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Singapore is party to the NPT. While Singapore accepts the
right of sovereign countries to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, we believe that all countries should
fulfill their obligations under the international agreements
formulated to guard against nuclear proliferation. Given the
rising cost of traditional sources of energy, nuclear energy
has become an increasingly important part of the energy mix
for many countries. With more nuclear power plants being
constructed or planned for, the need for a robust system to
ensure the safety and accountability of nuclear materials
cannot be more important and pressing. Hence, the upcoming
NPT Review Conference in May 2010 is timely
as this would be an opportunity for parties to renew their
commitments on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. We
should also examine whether the system we have in place

SINGAPORE 00000876 002 OF 004


to-date is still relevant and effective to deal with the new
security threats that the international community is faced
with.

(iv) US-Russia arms control efforts

Singapore is encouraged by recent US-Russia efforts to launch
a new round of talks to reduce and limit their supply of
strategic offensive arms.

-- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms
control efforts is the host government likely to take in
upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the
UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review
Conference in 2010?

MFA: Singapore intends to participate in the Conference on
Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee,
and the NPT Review Conference. Singapore's positions on the
various issues are highlighted in the answers to the
first question.

-- With which countries does the host country work most
closely on these issues?

MFA: On non-proliferation and arms control related issues,
Singapore works closely with the international community,
relevant international organizations and key partners, such
as the US.

(Note: Post is aware that Japan and Australia also engage
Singapore on nonproliferation and export-control related
matters. For example, Japan recently included Singapore in a
regional export control workshop. End Note.)

-- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms
control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as defense and
energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora?
How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation
policy-making process work, and what is the interplay among
government officials and agencies?

MFA: As non-proliferation and arms control issues cut across
different Ministries and agencies, Singapore has in place an
inter-agency process, which enables the relevant government
officials to meet, discuss and work closely together on these
matters.

(Note: Post's experience has been that MFA and Singapore
Customs have the public lead on counterproliferation and
export control-related matters. However, other GOS
ministries or agencies, such as MinDef, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Ministry of Transport (MOT),and the Maritime and
Port Authority (MPA) also have key roles. Past interagency
meetings on counterproliferation topics have included
representatives from MFA, SG Customs, Ministry of Defense,
Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, the National
Environment Agency, the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC),
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),Ministry of Trade and
Industry, and MHA. End Note.)

-- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on
which issues?

MFA: This would depend on which Ministry or agency the issue
concerned falls under.

(Note: Post's understanding is that MFA chairs
inter-ministerial meetings on counterproliferation
issues/cases, but that MHA, MAS, and MinDef are very
important to the process. The AGC provides legal guidance to
the GOS on matters including implementation of UNSCRs and
reviews all export-control cases, so it is another important
agency though the full extent of its role is not clear. End
Note.)

-- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection
of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control
or nonproliferation issues?

SINGAPORE 00000876 003 OF 004



MFA: Singapore adopts a holistic approach on policy issues.
We take into consideration the views of relevant
Ministries and agencies. We take our international
obligations seriously. A key consideration is how to work
with the international community to guard against nuclear
proliferation. We believe that both international efforts
should complement each other.

-- How many people in host country's missions (New York,
Geneva and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms
control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they?

MFA: Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations:

Colonel Sim Tiong Kian
Counselor and Military Advisor
Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN in New York
SIM Tiong Kian@mfa.gov.sg

Jonathan Tow
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN in New York
Jonathan TOW@mfa.gov.sg

Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva:

Syed Noureddin bin Syed Hassim
Deputy Permanent Representative (UN) & Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva
Syed Noureddin SYED HASSIM@mfa.gov.sg

Yvonne Ow
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Singapore in Geneva
Yvonne OW@mfa.gov.sg

-- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key
relevant meetings?

MFA: Yes, the respective Ministries will send additional
personnel to support our Mission staff at key meetings
whenever necessary.

-- What are the roles and influence of the host country's
nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and
non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation decision-making?

MFA: Singapore's policies are made after taking into
consideration the views of relevant Ministries and agencies.
Where applicable, we will also take into account reports and
feedback from academia and NGOs.

(Note: Singapore does not have a civil nuclear power
industry. End Note.)


3. (C) Post provides the following responses to the ref A
post-only questions:

-- What are the key alliances with other governments on arms
control and nonproliferation issues. For example, the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)?

Singapore is a member of the NAM and G-77, and often aligns
itself with those groupings according to regional
considerations, such as positions taken by neighbors like
China and Indonesia. Singapore has voted in line with NAM
positions on issues like defamation of religions. In areas
such as arms control and nonproliferation, Singapore supports
U.S. and like-minded countries' efforts to combat
proliferation activities, and Singapore adheres to
obligations under UNSCRs. However, where UNSCRs are perhaps
vague about implementation, for example how "reasonable
grounds" may be defined in UNSCR 1874, Singapore often takes
a legalistic view and sets a high bar for the types of
intelligence it considers "reasonable grounds" for action.
In this way, it may have more in common with some NAM or G-77
states, and is not as forward leaning as the United States,
Australia, and other like-minded countries on certain aspects

SINGAPORE 00000876 004 OF 004


of counterproliferation efforts.

-- To what extent does the host government appear to
influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line?

Singapore views itself as a small, potentially vulnerable
state dependent on foreign investment and trade for survival,
so it is keen to maintain good relations with larger actors
in Asia, such as China and India. Singapore also prefers to
work in the context of regional groupings like the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) when engaging
immediate neighbors, including Indonesia and Malaysia, on
policy matters. Therefore, Singapore is unlikely to take a
strong, vocal position that diverges from a position shared
by other regional players that are also NAM and G-77 members,
even if Singapore privately disagrees with a NAM or G-77
approach to an issue.

-- How much flexibility do the Missions to the UN, CD, and
IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to
receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need
further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives?

MFA contacts have indicated that the Singapore
representatives have some independence and flexibility when
conducting their day-to-day business. However, the GOS is
generally very controlled and coordinated when making public
any policy positions or decisions. Post believes that most
statements, discussions, and decisions are vetted and
finalized through the relevant GOS agencies in Singapore.

Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
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