SEMINAR READOUT: CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS BURMA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000611 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH BM SN SUBJECT: SEMINAR READOUT: CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS BURMA REF: RANGOON 33 SINGAPORE 00000611 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Two visiting Chinese academics described China's policy toward Burma as creating strategic opportunities for China, but also supposedly promoting stability in Burma. The scholars, speaking at a seminar in Singapore, focused on Burma's strategic importance to China's energy security, border stability, and "Two-Oceans Strategy" to open links to the Indian Ocean. China is increasing its substantial investment in Burma and seeking ways to cooperate in areas such as education, science and technology and combating transnational crime. The Burmese government has struggled with some aspects of China's economic cooperation and exploitation of Burma's natural resources. One speaker noted that China sells heavy arms and equipment to Burma but not light weapons that could be used to "suppress the people." The seminar reflected a divide in views on Burma, with non-Western participants at the seminar expressing more support for China's approach and Western participants expressing dismay at comments saying Aung San Suu Kyi would be incapable of leading Burma even if given the chance. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore hosted a seminar on June 19 entitled "China's Policy Towards Myanmar: Objectives, Contents and Problems." Dr. LI Chenyang, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Yunnan University and visiting research fellow at EAI, led the seminar along with Dr. ZHAI Kun, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and a visiting research fellow at the ¶S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. The seminar provided an overview of China's interests and influence in Burma and was attended by approximately 25 people, including Singaporeans and Westerners. Dr. Li and Dr. Zhai outlined China's objectives toward Burma, the policy-making mechanisms in place, and mentioned some of the negative aspects of China's approach. Strategic Importance of Burma -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Li and Zhai emphasized the strategic importance of Burma to China's efforts to enhance its energy security, maintain border stability, and realize China's "Two-Oceans �A;Strategy." China has always been viewed as a one-ocean state, Li pointed out, but for strategic purposes it would like to be able to access both the Pacific and Indian oceans and become a two-ocean state "like Russia and the United States." China's relations with Burma also help it "cope" with India's rise, he added. China uses a "brotherly friendship" approach towards Burma and other countries in the developing world where China sees the greatest opportunities for its brand of diplomacy because it often encounters difficulties engaging with the West and developed nations, Li said. Formulating China Policy Toward Burma -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Li asserted that China formulates its policy towards Burma using input from diverse sources at all levels of government, including the Chinese Embassy in Burma, central government entities responsible for commercial and energy issues, and state and provincial levels of government. He said policymakers also incorporate input from think tanks and academics. Li acknowledged the special relationship Yunnan Province has as an immediate neighbor to Burma, but said that Yunnan's interests do not always align with or reflect the official policy of the central government. However, some problems that are especially acute in Yunnan, such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking and HIV/AIDS, have helped bring the strategic importance of Burma to the attention of the most senior levels of Chinese government, Li said. Economic Cooperation: David and Goliath -------------- ¶5. (SBU) China has invested at least USD 900 million in Burma, Li said, making it the fourth largest investor there after Thailand, the UK and Singapore. (Note: Embassy Rangoon estimated Chinese investment to be about USD 1.33 billion in 2008 (reftel).) Chinese economic and development activities include a USD 200 million investment in poppy-alternative agriculture projects, hydropower projects, and the Sino-Burma oil and gas pipeline, which, when it comes online, could carry about 200 million tons of oil to China SINGAPORE 00000611 002.2 OF 003 annually and reduce China's dependence on oil shipped through the Malacca Straits, Li said. China also sees room for more cooperation in areas such as education, science and technology, health, and countering non-traditional security threats like illegal immigration, transnational crime, and environment issues. ¶6. (SBU) Not all has been rosy in the relationship. Li and Zhai indicated that Burma's military government has been dissatisfied with some aspects of China's economic cooperation, the excessive exploitation of natural resources and timber smuggling. Li cited (without much elaboration) one instance in 2005 in which Burma asked Yunnan to suspend its timber imports because of the extent of the deforestation occurring in Burma. Li suggested that Yunnan rejected Burma's request without consulting the central Chinese government. Burma has accused China of being the root of its drug problems, alleging that Chinese are planting drug crops in minority controlled areas of Northern Burma and bringing the chemicals used for heroin processing into Burma, Li said. Military Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Li touched on China's military cooperation with Burma which has been ongoing since 1988. China does not maintain military bases in Burma but sells arms and provides training for military personnel. Li said that China sells military equipment and advanced weapons such as missiles and fighter planes, but does not supply light weapons, such as rifles, pistols or sub-machine guns that could be used to "suppress the people." Li stated that China has not conducted any joint military exercises with Burma aimed at countering India's or other countries' military capabilities. China's Political Influence on Burma's Future -------------- - ¶8. (SBU) Principles of "peaceful coexistence" guide China's interactions with Burma, Li and Zhai stated. Burma has won favor by supporting a One-China policy. China, in turn, does not interfere in Burma's internal affairs, but has offered suggestions on how to deal with "international pressure" and political demonstrations, Li said. China would like to see a stable, harmonious, and "democratic" Burma, but Li advised that the international community should create an environment conducive to democratization and not force democratization through interference and sanctions. China rejects "high-handed" measures that the United States and EU use in an effort to impose their will on Burma, Li said. In China's view, the more inclusive approach adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has value long-term, but ASEAN has no immediate ability to take a leadership role in Burma. Dr. Li called Singapore "the best friend to Burma," pointing out that Burmese money sits in Singapore's banks and Burmese leaders go to Singapore, not China, for medical treatment. ¶9. (SBU) The National League for Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi have no ability to lead Burma, Li and Zhai stated. China favors stability over democracy and fears that Burma could devolve into civil war and ethnic strife, and the human rights situation could worsen, if the military regime is forced out. Zhai speculated that multiparty talks on Burma would never get off the ground because it is difficult to identify which parties should participate and there is no urgent threat to motivate talks. Li stated several times that such talks were not in China's national interest, but he did not explain further. Seminar participants were quick to point out that China's Two-Oceans policy depends on China's preeminent influence over Burma's military regime and that China benefits from having two problematic buffer states -- Burma and North Korea -- sitting between it and two potential rival states -- India and South Korea. Reaction of Seminar Participants -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The two presentations elicited a strong response from the audience comprised of other academics, diplomats, students and businesspeople. Feelings were mixed regarding the overall message in the presentations. One European attendee called the seminar "depressing" as it sketched in high-relief China's considerable influence in Burma, which he assessed China has no interest in using for purposes other than its own self-interest. Many of the non-Western participants who appeared to be Singaporean or from elsewhere in Asia spoke in more supportive terms regarding China's approach to Burma and the value of stability above democracy SINGAPORE 00000611 003.2 OF 003 there. They echoed the belief that Aung San Suu Kyi is incapable of leading Burma, and several non-Western participants were very amused by the presenters' criticisms of U.S. and EU policies toward Burma. Some of the non-Western participants laughed aloud when Dr. Li mentioned China does not sell arms that the Burmese military regime can use to suppress the people. The seminar audience's views reflected only the opinions of a small group of local Singaporeans, Asians and Westerners, but the reaction to the presentations highlighted a divide among locals who track Burma policy issues. A Swiss participant who lives in Singapore remarked to Econoff that the division in the room was palpable with most of the Asians on one side of the issue and the Westerners on the other. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm SHIELDS