SINGAPORE: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000180 NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2033 TAGS: ASEC PTER SUBJECT: SINGAPORE: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING, 2009 REF: A. STATE 13023 B. SINGAPORE 00145 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel L. Shields, Reasons 1.4 (c, d) ¶1. (S/NF) Post's reply is keyed to Reftel A: STATE 13023. - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. POLITICAL VIOLENCE - - - - - - - - - - - ¶I. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS ¶A. No. Singapore has a wide range of ethnic/religious communities. Singapore hosts significant numbers of Bangladeshi and Indonesian guest workers. Malay Muslims are a large minority (approximately 14 percent of the population). Anti-American sentiment exists in some quarters. However, the government closely monitors any indication of extremism, actively promotes moderation, and generally does not permit demonstrations. i. No. ii. No. iii. N/A. iv. N/A. ¶B. N/A. i. N/A. ii. N/A. ¶C. No. i. No. ii. N/A. iii. N/A. iv. N/A. II. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS ¶A. No. ¶B. N/A. ¶C. N/A. ¶D. N/A. III. (C) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES ¶A. Yes. The Singapore Police Force (SPF) appears to be sophisticated in its employment of technology to monitor suspected criminals and ensure law and order. But outside specialized units, the SPF does not appear to possess solid tactical and contingency planning capabilities. Requests for information for contingency planning commonly remain unanswered by SPF authorities. ¶B. Yes. U.S. training for Singaporeans has been effective. ¶C. No. ¶D. Yes. ¶E. Yes, Singapore cooperates on most occasions, although timeliness of response continues to be an issue. The lack of prompt official notification to the U.S. Government following the February 27, 2008, escape of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainee Mas Selamat Kastari from Singaporean custody highlights Singapore's reticence to share security and law enforcement information (reftel C). ¶F. Yes. Singapore currently has 20 JI members detained on a Detention Order under the Internal Security Act (ISA),40 other individuals controlled on a Restriction Order and six individuals controlled on a Suspension Directive. Indonesian authorities arrested Singaporean citizen Mohammad Hassan in late June 2008. We anticipate that he will eventually be extradited back to Singapore where local authorities will determine his status under Singapore's ISA. Authorities continue to vigorously pursue the JI detainee who escaped in February 2008 as well as Singapore JI members who fled the country in 2001 and 2002. In addition to these efforts, the GOS announced in January 2008 the arrests of three young men under the ISA for their involvement in activities that support terrorism. Previously, the GOS announced in June 2007 the detention of four JI members, and the detention (in February 2007) of a "self-radicalized" Singaporean who had traveled abroad with the intention of joining the Taliban. ¶G. Yes, but Post wants a more timely exchange of Information with GOS authorities. During 2008, the GOS became increasingly restrictive in the protective security support it would allow visiting U.S. security details to undertake to protect U.S. dignitaries. Also, the GOS has restricted the level of support it will provide to U.S. dignitary visitors. During a recent meeting with senior police officials, Post explained that the threat against American officials is different from that faced by officials from most other countries visiting Singapore and obtained verbal agreement from SPF officials that they would honor reasonable requests for Protective Security support and access for our visiting teams. The GOS currently provides two armed SPF Gurkhas at the Embassy during normal working hours and employs mobile police teams to patrol the Embassy area. Additionally, two SPF Gurkhas are posted at the Embassy Mission Residence when occupied by the Ambassador and at the residence of the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) when occupied by the DCM. In December 2008 SPF authorities informed Post that they will discontinue the Gurkha sentry support at American official facilities on 01 April 2009, and at two key American soft targets (Singapore American School and the American Club) on 01 June 2009 because authorities believe the security environment in the region has improved. In the meeting with senior SPF officials, the CDA and RSO explained that in light of the asymmetric nature of the threat against American interests worldwide, the Mission wanted to see the Gurkha support maintained. However, the SPF responded that it still intended to discontinue Gurkha sentry support at official and associated soft target unofficial facilities which currently enjoy the support. Missions affected by this decision include the U. S. Embassy, the British High Commission, the Australian High Commission and the Israeli Embassy (Ref B). Since November 2004, the police special operations command has added the Embassy (as well as the nearby UK and Australian High Commissions) to its random patrol list. Police armed with machine guns conduct patrols in a squad-size formation in the vicinity of the Embassy and there is no schedule/pattern to these patrols. During 2007 Singaporean authorities have assisted Post in investigating and resolving several suspicious protective intelligence events at Post facilities. In December 2008 the Singapore Civil Defense Force Hazardous Materials Unit responded to the Embassy to conduct a controlled opening and testing of a suspect "white powder" letter mailed from Texas. GOS authorities determined that the letter did not contain any substance which contained a chemical, biological or radiological agent. The SPF returned the letter to RSO for use in the U.S. investigation of the multiple mail incidents involving various domestic and overseas diplomatic facilities. ¶H. Excellent. ¶I. Effective. However, DHS (ICE) representative reports that, while the airlines do inspect transit passengers, documentation, the GOS does not arrest or detain anyone found with fraudulent travel documents (to include fraudulent U.S. passports or non-immigrant visas) on the grounds that these transit passengers have not attempted entry into Singapore and therefore have not broken Singaporean laws. The airlines on occasion do pass this information to the U.S. Embassy and the passengers are returned to their original point of embarkation. ¶J. Effective. - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - - - - - - - - - - - ¶I. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. The GOS has indicated that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) should not be considered fully eradicated within Singapore. ¶B. No. ¶C. N/A. ¶D. No. ¶E. No. ¶F. N/A. ¶G. N/A. II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. No, but individuals with known links to various groups have transited Singapore (see comment on transit passengers in paragraph 3). ¶B. N/A. ¶C. N/A. ¶D. N/A. - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶I. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM INDICATORS ¶A. None known at this time. See Section 6, paragraph I.A. ¶B. N/A. ¶C. No. ¶D. None known. ¶E. Yes. Some elements in some ethnic/religious groups may have pro-terrorist sympathies. There is an ethnic Tamil Indian population, some members of which may be sympathetic to Tamil terrorist groups in Sri Lanka. Additionally, Singapore's ethnic Malay and other Muslim population, including guest workers from Bangladesh and Indonesia, may have elements sympathetic to various radical Muslim organizations. ¶F. The potential threat is low. North Korea has a diplomatic presence here. Iran does not maintain a diplomatic presence in Singapore. The Iranian ambassador to Singapore is resident in Tehran. GOS authorities closely monitor all known foreign intelligence presence and threats and the threat of anti-American terrorist acts is low. ¶G. The GOS strictly controls weapons and explosives. While it would be difficult to bring in large quantities, smaller quantities could be smuggled in through traditional means used to smuggle drugs, cigarettes, and other contraband. ¶2. (S/NF) This message has been cleared by GRPO and Post's Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Councils. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm SHIELDS