YANBIAN PRC ACADEMIC ON DPRK: NO WAY OUT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000183

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH EAID ECON EFIN KN KS PARM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: YANBIAN PRC ACADEMIC ON DPRK: NO WAY OUT,
NORTH KOREANS WANT LOANS

REF: 08 SHENYANG 185

Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a well-connected Chinese expert
on DPRK issues, the international community missed its
opportunity to negotiate away the North Korean nuclear
program in 2006. He questioned the U.S. "exit strategy" and
inquired if the United States could stomach a nuclear and
proliferating North Korea. He said the North Koreans are
most interested in receiving loans from multilateral
development banks and that bilateral agreements, such as
those struck during Premier Wen Jiabao's October 6 visit to
Pyongyang, are less desirable. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Consul General and ConGenOff traveled to Jilin
Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture October 15-
18 to participate in the celebration of Yanbian University's
60th anniversary. Notable guests included former Sino-
Korean State Ethnic Affairs Commission Chairman Li Dezhu,
Vice Minister of Education Lu Xin, Jilin Province Party
Secretary Wang Min, Kim Il-Sung University President Song
Ja-rip, and the Director of the North Korean Academy of
Social Sciences.

YOU GUYS BLEW IT: DPRK WON'T DENUCLEARIZE NOW
--------------


3. (C) The Consul General met with Professor and Dean of
Yanbian University's Northeast Asia Institute Jin Qiangyi on
October 16 on the sidelines of the anniversary festivities
during a short dinner that included Jin's colleague and the
university's Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) Director. Based
on a lifetime of experience working with North Korean
academic and governmental interlocutors, Jin said the
international community had lost its brief opportunity to
denuclearize North Korea, namely, the period before the DPRK
detonated its first explosive device in 2006. Prior to
2006, the North Koreans were never quite sure they would be
able to go nuclear and thus were still in a position to
"bargain away what they didn't have" in exchange for aid and
other inducements. Now that the DPRK has nuclear status,
it would be impossible for the North Koreans to voluntarily
give up their programs.


4. (C) Jin was also skeptical about the efficacy of UN
sanctions and international action to prevent proliferation,
on the one hand, and to reform the country, on the other.
On proliferation, Jin predicted that it would impossible to
stop the North Koreans from eventually transferring a
nuclear device to another party if they wanted to. He and
Li Zhonglin, the Sino-Korean Economics Chief of Jin's
institute, readily surmised that any DPRK use of nuclear
weapons, in an offensive, defensive, or even accidental
capacity would signal the destruction of the DPRK and the
Kim Jong-il regime. Even so, Jin doubted the United States
could or would be willing to do anything substantial should
the North Koreans manage to smuggle out any nuclear
technology. He also said that while China and other
regional Northeast Asian member states may not see great
immediate economic or political gains in dealing with North
Korea, with the passage of time it would be unrealistic to
expect they would avoid engaging in any self-interested
trade and interaction with the DPRK.

INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL LOANS FOR NORTH KOREA?
-------------- --------------


5. (C) On two separate occasions, Jin asked if the U.S.
would block any World Bank and IMF loans to North Korean
should something like ROK President Lee Myung-bak's "grand
bargain" go forward. Jin said he thought that the North
Korean state, before and after Kim Jong-Il's succession,
could indefinitely survive, pointing to the regime's ability
to weather serious systemic shocks over the past 15 years.
However, he did not think the DPRK was in a position to open
up or reform in the current international environment of
hostility, which encouraged the DPRK leadership to look
inward. Nor was Jin optimistic about the possibility for
change in the near future.


SHENYANG 00000183 002 OF 002


KIM JONG-IL AND WEN JIABAO ACCORDS: DON'T BE FOOLED
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6. (C) The various agreements with the DPRK announced by Wen
Jiabao evoked hardly a yawn and more than a little
skepticism from our guests. FAO Director Liu Mingzhu
laughed when ConGenOff asked about the Rason port
development proposals, saying "such proposals are made all
of the time" and that it remained to be seen if any of these
projects would ever come to fruition.


7. (C) When Professor Li Zhonglin elaborated on the
expulsion of the Chinese from Pier 3 in 2008 and the new
deal to bring them back to Pier 1 (reftel) in exchange for
Chinese funding to pave the road between Quanhe-Wonjongni
Land Port and Rason, Jin pointedly asked Li where he had
gotten this information. Li said that the Hunchun City FAO
had boasted to him earlier about the deal, prompting Jin to
chuckle and say "of course that is what the Hunchun FAO
wants you to believe." Li agreed with Jin and said that he
too found it unlikely that any of the Wen agreements would
lead to anything, pointing to the Quanhe-Wonjongni Land Port
bridge project as a prime example of North Korean delays and
disinterest in Chinese investment.


8. (C) Li said that the dilapidated 50-plus-year-old bridge
spanning the Tumen River needed to be replaced immediately
and that both the Chinese and North Korean authorities were
aware of its precarious situation. However, for the better
part of the last decade, even after the Chinese offered to
fund the vast majority of the bridge's replacement costs,
the North Koreans have refused to act on any of the
proposals.

WICKMAN