Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SHENYANG173
2009-09-30 03:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shenyang
Cable title:
PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL
VZCZCXRO7755 PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHSH #0173/01 2730336 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 300336Z SEP 09 FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8854 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0226 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0169 RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0119 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0178
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000173
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH EAID ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL
AFFECT ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b/d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000173
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH EAID ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL
AFFECT ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a working-level Shenyang-based
scholar, most Chinese scholars on Korean Peninsula affairs
say that the issue of succession in North Korea is still
unresolved. They believe that this uncertainty may
undermine any DPRK forwardness in its multilateral or
bilateral discussions and may prevent the North Koreans from
making any real headway at the table. As far as what the
current South Korean government has to offer, he and his
colleagues maintain that the DPRK is simply uninterested.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) ConGenOff met with a working-level Northeast
University scholar of Korean security issues on September
25. A graduate of Shandong University who later studied at
Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 2001 courtesy of the
Chinese government, he had just returned from participating
in a two-month series of seminars in Beijing where he worked
with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholars
assembled to discuss Northeast Asian security. One of the
hottest topics amongst CASS Korea specialists was succession
in North Korea.
DPRK SUCCESSION ISSUE IS STILL UNRESOLVED
--------------
3. (C) Our contact said that he, like many of his CASS
colleagues, does not think the DPRK is "ready" for real
engagement with the United States, nor is the DPRK ready to
pursue any new directions while the succession issue is
unresolved. Our contact said this opinion was backed up by
his fellow Kim Il-sung University exchangestudent alumni
with whom he keeps in touch. Even though the regime is
clearly elevating the profile of the third son, Kim Jong-un,
they were unsure if he had ever really been selected as the
successor, as has been widely reported in the Western media.
They believe any confusion on this point will be a serious
roadblock to any sort of real progress in negotiations, and
their estimation is that the succession issue is at best
unclear.
4. (C) Our contact said that he and his fellow Kim Il-sung
University alumni are of the belief that as soon as Kim
Jong-il is out of the picture, there will be significant and
rational progress in the DPRK's relations with the outside
world. As long as Kim survives, the DPRK would not actually
want any substantive improvements in U.S.-DPRK relations.
This is because any meaningful move toward normalization
and/or friendly cultural and economic ties did not bode well
for the continuation of the Kim regime. Thus, without any
concrete plan for its own future, the DPRK under Kim Jong-il
is not in a position to embark upon substantive engagement
with the United States.
5. (C) At the same time, our contact said that he did not
think the DPRK feared U.S.-DPRK engagement, per se, even if
it led to an expanded U.S presence in Pyongyang. One of his
exchange student classmates, a Chinese diplomat who had
returned from an assignment in Pyongyang, told him that
Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang were not free to move around
town, but rather were hostages on their own compound who
only moved when the DPRK authorities granted permission.
Any American presence in Pyongyang would be equally
meaningless. North Korean authorities would be happy to
invite a skeleton crew of American diplomats who were
basically under house arrest and unable to interact with
anyone. As far as a possible North Korean presence in
Washington goes, he said he and his colleague think that the
North Koreans believe the DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN
already fulfilled all the functions needed by the DPRK.
SOUTH KOREA AND THE GRAND BARGAIN: YAWN
--------------
6. (C) Our contact said that the North Koreans no longer
"care" about what the South Koreans and President Lee Myung-
bak has to say. With regard to Lee's recent proposal of a
"grand bargain," he said the North Koreans would simply
"tune out" what the South Koreans were saying - they are "no
longer interested". Although they might eventually respond
with some sort of public relations attack of the proposal,
SHENYANG 00000173 002 OF 002
he believed that, internally, the North Koreans simply do
not care for, nor do they pay attention to, what the South
Korean government "puppet" does or says.
WICKMAN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH EAID ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL
AFFECT ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a working-level Shenyang-based
scholar, most Chinese scholars on Korean Peninsula affairs
say that the issue of succession in North Korea is still
unresolved. They believe that this uncertainty may
undermine any DPRK forwardness in its multilateral or
bilateral discussions and may prevent the North Koreans from
making any real headway at the table. As far as what the
current South Korean government has to offer, he and his
colleagues maintain that the DPRK is simply uninterested.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) ConGenOff met with a working-level Northeast
University scholar of Korean security issues on September
25. A graduate of Shandong University who later studied at
Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 2001 courtesy of the
Chinese government, he had just returned from participating
in a two-month series of seminars in Beijing where he worked
with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholars
assembled to discuss Northeast Asian security. One of the
hottest topics amongst CASS Korea specialists was succession
in North Korea.
DPRK SUCCESSION ISSUE IS STILL UNRESOLVED
--------------
3. (C) Our contact said that he, like many of his CASS
colleagues, does not think the DPRK is "ready" for real
engagement with the United States, nor is the DPRK ready to
pursue any new directions while the succession issue is
unresolved. Our contact said this opinion was backed up by
his fellow Kim Il-sung University exchangestudent alumni
with whom he keeps in touch. Even though the regime is
clearly elevating the profile of the third son, Kim Jong-un,
they were unsure if he had ever really been selected as the
successor, as has been widely reported in the Western media.
They believe any confusion on this point will be a serious
roadblock to any sort of real progress in negotiations, and
their estimation is that the succession issue is at best
unclear.
4. (C) Our contact said that he and his fellow Kim Il-sung
University alumni are of the belief that as soon as Kim
Jong-il is out of the picture, there will be significant and
rational progress in the DPRK's relations with the outside
world. As long as Kim survives, the DPRK would not actually
want any substantive improvements in U.S.-DPRK relations.
This is because any meaningful move toward normalization
and/or friendly cultural and economic ties did not bode well
for the continuation of the Kim regime. Thus, without any
concrete plan for its own future, the DPRK under Kim Jong-il
is not in a position to embark upon substantive engagement
with the United States.
5. (C) At the same time, our contact said that he did not
think the DPRK feared U.S.-DPRK engagement, per se, even if
it led to an expanded U.S presence in Pyongyang. One of his
exchange student classmates, a Chinese diplomat who had
returned from an assignment in Pyongyang, told him that
Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang were not free to move around
town, but rather were hostages on their own compound who
only moved when the DPRK authorities granted permission.
Any American presence in Pyongyang would be equally
meaningless. North Korean authorities would be happy to
invite a skeleton crew of American diplomats who were
basically under house arrest and unable to interact with
anyone. As far as a possible North Korean presence in
Washington goes, he said he and his colleague think that the
North Koreans believe the DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN
already fulfilled all the functions needed by the DPRK.
SOUTH KOREA AND THE GRAND BARGAIN: YAWN
--------------
6. (C) Our contact said that the North Koreans no longer
"care" about what the South Koreans and President Lee Myung-
bak has to say. With regard to Lee's recent proposal of a
"grand bargain," he said the North Koreans would simply
"tune out" what the South Koreans were saying - they are "no
longer interested". Although they might eventually respond
with some sort of public relations attack of the proposal,
SHENYANG 00000173 002 OF 002
he believed that, internally, the North Koreans simply do
not care for, nor do they pay attention to, what the South
Korean government "puppet" does or says.
WICKMAN