PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000173 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS: CH EAID ECON KN KS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL AFFECT ENGAGEMENT Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a working-level Shenyang-based scholar, most Chinese scholars on Korean Peninsula affairs say that the issue of succession in North Korea is still unresolved. They believe that this uncertainty may undermine any DPRK forwardness in its multilateral or bilateral discussions and may prevent the North Koreans from making any real headway at the table. As far as what the current South Korean government has to offer, he and his colleagues maintain that the DPRK is simply uninterested. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) ConGenOff met with a working-level Northeast University scholar of Korean security issues on September ¶25. A graduate of Shandong University who later studied at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 2001 courtesy of the Chinese government, he had just returned from participating in a two-month series of seminars in Beijing where he worked with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholars assembled to discuss Northeast Asian security. One of the hottest topics amongst CASS Korea specialists was succession in North Korea. DPRK SUCCESSION ISSUE IS STILL UNRESOLVED -------------- ¶3. (C) Our contact said that he, like many of his CASS colleagues, does not think the DPRK is "ready" for real engagement with the United States, nor is the DPRK ready to pursue any new directions while the succession issue is unresolved. Our contact said this opinion was backed up by his fellow Kim Il-sung University exchangestudent alumni with whom he keeps in touch. Even though the regime is clearly elevating the profile of the third son, Kim Jong-un, they were unsure if he had ever really been selected as the successor, as has been widely reported in the Western media. They believe any confusion on this point will be a serious roadblock to any sort of real progress in negotiations, and their estimation is that the succession issue is at best unclear. ¶4. (C) Our contact said that he and his fellow Kim Il-sung University alumni are of the belief that as soon as Kim Jong-il is out of the picture, there will be significant and rational progress in the DPRK's relations with the outside world. As long as Kim survives, the DPRK would not actually want any substantive improvements in U.S.-DPRK relations. This is because any meaningful move toward normalization and/or friendly cultural and economic ties did not bode well for the continuation of the Kim regime. Thus, without any concrete plan for its own future, the DPRK under Kim Jong-il is not in a position to embark upon substantive engagement with the United States. ¶5. (C) At the same time, our contact said that he did not think the DPRK feared U.S.-DPRK engagement, per se, even if it led to an expanded U.S presence in Pyongyang. One of his exchange student classmates, a Chinese diplomat who had returned from an assignment in Pyongyang, told him that Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang were not free to move around town, but rather were hostages on their own compound who only moved when the DPRK authorities granted permission. Any American presence in Pyongyang would be equally meaningless. North Korean authorities would be happy to invite a skeleton crew of American diplomats who were basically under house arrest and unable to interact with anyone. As far as a possible North Korean presence in Washington goes, he said he and his colleague think that the North Koreans believe the DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN already fulfilled all the functions needed by the DPRK. SOUTH KOREA AND THE GRAND BARGAIN: YAWN -------------- ¶6. (C) Our contact said that the North Koreans no longer "care" about what the South Koreans and President Lee Myung- bak has to say. With regard to Lee's recent proposal of a "grand bargain," he said the North Koreans would simply "tune out" what the South Koreans were saying - they are "no longer interested". Although they might eventually respond with some sort of public relations attack of the proposal, SHENYANG 00000173 002 OF 002 he believed that, internally, the North Koreans simply do not care for, nor do they pay attention to, what the South Korean government "puppet" does or says. WICKMAN