DPRK CHARM IN NE CHINA: WE THINK WE WANT TO TRUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000161

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DPRK CHARM IN NE CHINA: WE THINK WE WANT TO TRUST
YOU

REF: SEOUL 1387

Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. Reasons 1.4(b)/(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A Shenyang-based DPRK diplomat sought out a
Korean-speaking Shenyang ConGenOff at social events on the
margins of two Chinese-sponsored trade fairs to make three
points: 1) the "political winds" in Pyongyang are changing,
and DPRK leader Kim Jong-il desires close ties and
friendship with the United States; 2) the Six-Party Talks
are no longer viable and should be scuttled; and 3) Kim
Jong-il would be ready to denuclearize in the event of U.S.-
DPRK normalization and improved ties. The North Korean
Consul General, meanwhile, has been uncharacteristically
friendly and direct in his engagement with the Consul
General, departing from his normal practice of communicating
only in Chinese. The North Korean diplomats may be acting
on new instructions, and we note that their line is very
similar to that used by Kim Jong-il with the Hyundai Asan
Chairwoman (reftel). END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


2. (C) Consul General and ConGenOffs traveled to northeast
China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture August 26-31 to
participate in a local trade fair and later to Changchun
September 1-3 to participate in a regional trade fair. DPRK
Consul General Ri Ki-bom and cultural affairs consul Jang
Kyong-il attended the same trade events. Both North Korean
diplomats took advantage of the Chinese seating the U.S. and
DPRK groups together at several representational events to
communicate with us more directly and easily than ever
before in Post memory. Consul General Ri joked expansively
with his Sino-Korean hosts and, uncharacteristically,
engaged in prolonged Korean banter with the Consul General
(previously Ri has clearly preferred to communicate in
Chinese). Consul Jang was explicit in showing a desire to
improve relations with the United States, speaking
extensively in Korean to ConGenOff on several occasions.

DPRK TO USG: WE THINK WE WANT TO TRUST YOU
--------------


3. (C) Over the course of several days, Jang Kyong-il, who
arrived a few months ago from Pyongyang, consistently
reiterated to ConGenOff that the "political winds" in
Pyongyang were changing and that Kim Jong-il and the
North Korean people wanted closer ties with the United
States. Claiming that the North Korean government was
increasingly nervous about the growing influence that
China had over its affairs, Jang said that the North
Korean government wanted to improve relations with the
United States. He said the Korean War had occurred more
than 60 years ago and that "bygones were bygones,"
concluding that today it was in the North Korean
government's best interest to improve relations with the
United States.

SIX-PARTY TALKS ARE NO LONGER AN OPTION
--------------


4. (C) The consul said that the Six-Party Talks were a non-
functioning, ineffectual tool and should be disbanded,
complaining that it was a forum for other groups, namely the
Japanese, to pressure the North Koreans on issues separate
from the immediate tasks at hand -- U.S.-DPRK normalization
and denuclearization. He said that Kim Jong-il wanted peace
and, in particular, peace and friendship with the United
States. The competing interests of Japan, South Korea, and
China had made said peace difficult to achieve. Jang said
that he believed China would be dead set against U.S.-DPRK
normalization because China enjoyed using the leverage of
the Six-Party Talks and geography to squeeze North Korea.

DPRK READY TO DENUCLEARIZE: IS THE USG READY TO NORMALIZE?
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In addressing the possibility of denuclearization in
the event of U.S.-DPRK normalization, Jang said he thought
Kim Jong-il would be more than willing to denuclearize in
the event of improved U.S.-DPRK ties and assurances of non-
aggression, with the caveat that this was his personal
opinion. He said that North Korea would never preemptively

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use nuclear weapons against another nation and that the
DPRK's nuclear program was purely for self-defense. As for
the non-aggression assurances, the consul said that the DPRK
truly feared the USG's military capabilities, citing Iraq
and Afghanistan as showcases of rapid-response American
military might. The consul opined that if the United States
and DPRK were able to improve cultural, economic and
political ties, the North Korean government would realize
that a non-aggression assurance was superfluous and back
off.


6. (C) Jang saw the fundamental roadblock in U.S.-DPRK
relations to be a lack of trust. He said that the DPRK
thought in 2000 that everything was set for a thaw in
relations, but after the inauguration of President Bush,
everything the North Koreans expected had been turned
upside-down. He saw Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of how
the fast-moving and unpredictable American political scene
was capable of changing at a moment's notice. Jang added,
however, that the DPRK appreciated working with trusted
State Department interlocutors who have engaged them over
the past couple of years.

DPRK ECONOMY: IMPROVED, BUT STILL CONCERNS
--------------


7. (C) When asked about the economic situation in North
Korea this summer and the "150-Day Battle," Jang averred
that electricity was in abundance and no longer being
rationed. However, as for the prospects of the upcoming
harvest, he looked away and said "General Kim Jong-il takes
care of everything, so one hopes the harvest should be
enough, right?"

WICKMAN