PRC EXPERT FORESEES NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK POWER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000148 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ECON KN KS CH SUBJECT: PRC EXPERT FORESEES NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK POWER TRANSFER Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman Reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: Jilin Province's foremost Korean Peninsula scholar does not foresee instability during the transfer of power to DPRK leader Kim Jong-il's successor, but predicated longer-term stability on an improved economic situation. After his reshuffle of the military in early 2009, Kim has renewed confidence in the allegiance of the military and places a great deal of trust in his brother-in-law Chang Sung-taek. However, a number of factors will keep the DPRK from economic reform and recovery. The missile launch and nuclear test, the international response, followed by the recent release of the two American journalists, are part of a familiar pattern by the North Koreans to engage the U.S. in bilateral dialogue. Even if the U.S. were willing to conduct bilateral talks with the DPRK, Zhang said, he had little confidence that the North Koreans would abide by agreements. End Summary. -------------- -- Kim Jong-un the Successor? Too Early to Tell -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) Embassy Beijing PolMinCouns and CG Shenyang PolOff called on Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences (JASS) Director of Northeast Asia Research Center and Director of DPRK/ROK Studies Zhang Yushan on August 18. Professor Zhang expressed confidence the most likely Kim Jong-il succession scenario was that a small cadre composed of Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law Chang Sung-taek and other military leaders would run the country until the formal successor was fully capable of taking over. Kim's shuffle of military leadership in early 2009 had strengthened his confidence in his military leadership. While all signs might point to the third son Kim Jong-un as heir apparent, Professor Zhang said, it was too early to say for sure. It was clear that Jong-un was currently not capable of taking over. This being said, Kim Jong-il now relied heavily on Chang, whose conservative character and strict adherence to the military over economic interests had had adverse effects on trade and economic activity. -------------- The Meaning of the Nuclear Strategy -------------- ¶3. (C) Zhang said he believed the DPRK was following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear strategy of arming itself in pursuit of its ultimate goal becoming a regional military and political superpower. Possessing a nuclear weapon was a precondition for said regional superpower status, according to Zhang. Just as the DPRK still greatly feared the U.S., it was also wary of its neighbors and would much rather negotiate with them as a nuclear country. "It is all they have," he said. Zhang described the recent missile and nuclear tests and their aftermath, including the war of words with the U.S., the subsequent release of the two captured U.S. journalists, and the overtures it was making toward South Korea, as part of a pattern followed by the DPRK leadership. Zhang noted that while he too saw no feasible channel for nuclear negotiations outside of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK would like to force the U.S. to bilateral talks similar to those previously held in Singapore and Berlin. Zhang said that the DPRK would like Japan removed from Six-Party Talks and looked for friendlier counterparts to take part in the negotiations. -------------- -------------- "The Needs of the Party and Needs of the People Are One" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) On the economic front, Zhang noted that the DPRK regime understood that North Korea's economic recovery was key to continued stability and security. It had come under increasing internal and external pressure to open up, but a Chinese-style opening to investment and market reforms was untenable for many reasons. First, Songun Politics, which allocates most resources to the military, left little room for economic experimentation. Second, the slight economic improvements of 2005 and 2006 had been virtually wiped out by natural disasters and the economic sanctions resulting from the 2006 nuclear tests. While he saw no indication that people were starving, the scarcity of goods and grains was ever more apparent. Over the last few years, the country had experienced intermittent floods and droughts that had affected the balance between grain production and hydropower against an increased reliance on coal power. With grain production important to the ration system and coal production SHENYANG 00000148 002 OF 002 important to electricity production, balance had been hard to find. ¶5. (C) When asked his views of the priority concerns of DPRK leaders, Zhang first said the needs of the party leadership and the needs of the people were one. He subsequently allowed that the DPRK leadership would be unwilling to cede any of its hold on power to the market. The need for control and stability was too great, he said. Zhang said that since Chang had returned to the core of the leadership, a series of policies restricting markets and further tightening access to trade goods had made a noticeable impact on the common people. He also noted that even though the DPRK had opened up Kaesong and Rajin as development zones, military leaders lacked sufficient confidence in industrial workers to remain a stable force in the face of economic change. Kim Jong-il agreed with the military's assessment. Both zones were plagued by underinvestment and sub-par management. Current international sanctions and the lingering global financial crisis further limited DPRK investment. Even if more investment were to come its way, the country could not afford the necessary infrastructure improvements. The Greater Tumen Initiative Regional Development Cooperation Project--linking Mongolia, Russia, the DPRK, the ROK, China and Japan through water, rail, and land conduits -- had stalled. Supposedly an excellent example of regional development cooperation, the project lacked the necessary cooperation and but especially lacked funding from the DPRK and Russia. -------------- Rumors and Questions -------------- ¶6. (C) Zhang was interested in seeing whether the release of the two U.S. journalists would be a turning point for the U.S.-DPRK relationship. He also expressed interest in the content of Kim Jong-il's meeting with former President Clinton. Zhang expressed certainty that Kim Jong-il would now want a good will gesture from the U.S., like assurances for the safety of the DPRK. Zhang also wished to know whether U.S. and DPRK would be open to bilateral negotiations similar to those that occurred in Singapore and Berlin. In his frank opinion, even if such talks could occur, the DPRK could not be counted on to either honor or abide by agreements reached at the negotiation table. WICKMAN