PRC EXPERT FORESEES NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK POWER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000148

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC EXPERT FORESEES NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK POWER
TRANSFER

Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman Reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: Jilin Province's foremost Korean Peninsula
scholar does not foresee instability during the transfer of
power to DPRK leader Kim Jong-il's successor, but predicated
longer-term stability on an improved economic situation.
After his reshuffle of the military in early 2009, Kim has
renewed confidence in the allegiance of the military and
places a great deal of trust in his brother-in-law Chang
Sung-taek. However, a number of factors will keep the DPRK
from economic reform and recovery. The missile launch and
nuclear test, the international response, followed by the
recent release of the two American journalists, are part of a
familiar pattern by the North Koreans to engage the U.S. in
bilateral dialogue. Even if the U.S. were willing to conduct
bilateral talks with the DPRK, Zhang said, he had little
confidence that the North Koreans would abide by agreements.
End Summary.

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Kim Jong-un the Successor? Too Early to Tell
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2. (SBU) Embassy Beijing PolMinCouns and CG Shenyang PolOff
called on Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences (JASS)
Director of Northeast Asia Research Center and Director of
DPRK/ROK Studies Zhang Yushan on August 18. Professor Zhang
expressed confidence the most likely Kim Jong-il succession
scenario was that a small cadre composed of Kim Jong-il's
brother-in-law Chang Sung-taek and other military leaders
would run the country until the formal successor was fully
capable of taking over. Kim's shuffle of military leadership
in early 2009 had strengthened his confidence in his military
leadership. While all signs might point to the third son Kim
Jong-un as heir apparent, Professor Zhang said, it was too
early to say for sure. It was clear that Jong-un was
currently not capable of taking over. This being said, Kim
Jong-il now relied heavily on Chang, whose conservative
character and strict adherence to the military over economic
interests had had adverse effects on trade and economic
activity.

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The Meaning of the Nuclear Strategy
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3. (C) Zhang said he believed the DPRK was following the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear strategy of arming itself in
pursuit of its ultimate goal becoming a regional military and
political superpower. Possessing a nuclear weapon was a
precondition for said regional superpower status, according
to Zhang. Just as the DPRK still greatly feared the U.S., it
was also wary of its neighbors and would much rather
negotiate with them as a nuclear country. "It is all they
have," he said. Zhang described the recent missile and
nuclear tests and their aftermath, including the war of words
with the U.S., the subsequent release of the two captured
U.S. journalists, and the overtures it was making toward
South Korea, as part of a pattern followed by the DPRK
leadership. Zhang noted that while he too saw no feasible
channel for nuclear negotiations outside of the Six-Party
Talks, the DPRK would like to force the U.S. to bilateral
talks similar to those previously held in Singapore and
Berlin. Zhang said that the DPRK would like Japan removed
from Six-Party Talks and looked for friendlier counterparts
to take part in the negotiations.

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"The Needs of the Party and Needs of the People Are One"
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4. (C) On the economic front, Zhang noted that the DPRK
regime understood that North Korea's economic recovery was
key to continued stability and security. It had come under
increasing internal and external pressure to open up, but a
Chinese-style opening to investment and market reforms was
untenable for many reasons. First, Songun Politics, which
allocates most resources to the military, left little room
for economic experimentation. Second, the slight economic
improvements of 2005 and 2006 had been virtually wiped out by
natural disasters and the economic sanctions resulting from
the 2006 nuclear tests. While he saw no indication that
people were starving, the scarcity of goods and grains was
ever more apparent. Over the last few years, the country had
experienced intermittent floods and droughts that had
affected the balance between grain production and hydropower
against an increased reliance on coal power. With grain
production important to the ration system and coal production

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important to electricity production, balance had been hard to
find.


5. (C) When asked his views of the priority concerns of DPRK
leaders, Zhang first said the needs of the party leadership
and the needs of the people were one. He subsequently
allowed that the DPRK leadership would be unwilling to cede
any of its hold on power to the market. The need for control
and stability was too great, he said. Zhang said that since
Chang had returned to the core of the leadership, a series of
policies restricting markets and further tightening access to
trade goods had made a noticeable impact on the common
people. He also noted that even though the DPRK had opened
up Kaesong and Rajin as development zones, military leaders
lacked sufficient confidence in industrial workers to remain
a stable force in the face of economic change. Kim Jong-il
agreed with the military's assessment. Both zones were
plagued by underinvestment and sub-par management. Current
international sanctions and the lingering global financial
crisis further limited DPRK investment. Even if more
investment were to come its way, the country could not afford
the necessary infrastructure improvements. The Greater Tumen
Initiative Regional Development Cooperation Project--linking
Mongolia, Russia, the DPRK, the ROK, China and Japan through
water, rail, and land conduits -- had stalled. Supposedly an
excellent example of regional development cooperation, the
project lacked the necessary cooperation and but especially
lacked funding from the DPRK and Russia.

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Rumors and Questions
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6. (C) Zhang was interested in seeing whether the release of
the two U.S. journalists would be a turning point for the
U.S.-DPRK relationship. He also expressed interest in the
content of Kim Jong-il's meeting with former President
Clinton. Zhang expressed certainty that Kim Jong-il would
now want a good will gesture from the U.S., like assurances
for the safety of the DPRK. Zhang also wished to know
whether U.S. and DPRK would be open to bilateral negotiations
similar to those that occurred in Singapore and Berlin. In
his frank opinion, even if such talks could occur, the DPRK
could not be counted on to either honor or abide by
agreements reached at the negotiation table.

WICKMAN