Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09SHENYANG119 | 2009-07-08 04:46:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Shenyang |
VZCZCXRO8943 PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHSH #0119/01 1890446 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 080446Z JUL 09 ZDK FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8767 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0732 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0187 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0096 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0151 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000119 |
1. (C) SUMMARY: DPRK refugees are increasingly diverse,
elite, and reliant upon well-connected broker networks, according to ROK contacts. The network of brokers had cornered the market on facilitating the trans-China leg of North Korean border-crossers, driving the most obvious evidence of DPRK-PRC movement further underground. Back in China, contacts in NGOs and missionary groups who have traditionally been the best source of information on the situation in Northeast China said they are focusing less on maintaining constant communication with border-crosser networks and more on humanitarian aid projects on both sides of the border. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) With meetings arranged via Embassy Seoul, ConGenOff met with various DPRK-focused groups in the Republic of Korea May 25-27 to discuss specific Northeast China-related issues involving border-crossers. These groups included the Hangyeore School (Ref A & B,) North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS) (Ref C,) and NKnet (Ref D.) ConGenOff visited the Yanbian Autonomous Korean Prefecture June 18-24 to observe developments along the PRC-DPRK border on the Tumen River. DEFECTOR NUMBERS CONTINUE TO RISE: BROKERS MOVE SILENTLY -------------------------- -------------------------- 3. (C) ConGenOff met with Hangyeore Middle/High School principal Kwak Jong-moon (protect) on May 25 to share impressions of the current situation on the PRC-DPRK border since a previous meeting held in March 2008. (NOTE: Hangyeore is a school that was opened specifically for defectors.) 4. (C) Kwak suggested that the number of border-crossers in the first quarter of 2009 was higher than during the same period in 2008 and prior years and that Chinese authorities were focusing less on rounding up or hunting North Korean border-crossers than in the past. He said that when looking at the middle/high school students the school had processed this year, 2009 was one of the busiest and "most interesting" years on record. Kwak explained that there are more defectors from more diverse social strata attending the school, including educated elites who no longer require the remedial education that earlier defector children needed. He reported that they hailed from regions all around North Korea, not just from those adjacent to the PRC-DPRK border, that they had spent very little time in China, if at all, and had not necessarily transited the traditional routes through Southeast Asia. 5. (C) Kwak said that all of these factors could only be explained by the emergence of a solid, experienced network of brokers. Kwak said that almost all of the new influx of defector-minors arriving at his school moved seamlessly through a profit-motivated broker network that was efficient, discreet, and likely difficult for outsiders such as NGOs and missionaries to detect. Kwak said that many of the recent defectors were dependants of those who had successfully defected to South Korea and if the price was right, a well-connected broker could get people out of the DPRK to the ROK within weeks. Kwak said that cracking this broker network was difficult for South Korean intelligence, asserting that defectors would never reveal the name of their broker, rather carrying this information to the grave. 6. (C) Kwak maintained that presently nobody was getting out of North Korea without the "right" connections and paying substantial bribes. DPRK border guards would literally light a path across the border for would-be VIP border- crossers. To give an example of how well-coordinated the broker network was, Kwak related the story of one person who had crossed the Tumen River in the middle of the night and had been greeted on a deserted stretch of gravel road by a man who had been waiting on a motorcycle ready to offer his services to anyone who might need transit to South Korea. Even the defector had been surprised by the ease of finding SHENYANG 00000119 002 OF 003 a broker. Kwak said that DPRK border-crossers were now aware of the profit-driven nature of the broker business, including the real risk of human-trafficking and other hardships on the Chinese side, even in the event of a successful crossing. With the exception of instances where brokers received extraordinarily large payments, Kwak said that almost all female border-crossers were subject to some form of sexual abuse. 7. (C) Kwak said that the number of border-crossers was on the rise and reiterated previous reports (Ref A and B) that they were no longer motivated by hunger but by family connections and/or ideology. Kwak said that the penalty for a border-crosser who sought food but who had no contact with South Koreans or other third-country nationals was a two- year sentence at a light labor camp. The penalty for one who had contact with South Koreans or other third-country nationals was much more severe, while the penalty for anyone involved with religion or proselytizing was death. NKIS ELITE - MY FAMILY GOT HERE VIA BROKERS -------------------------- 8. (C) ConGenOff met with NKIS Representative Kim Heung- kwang, a 2004 defector, Hamheung native, and graduate of Kimchaek Engineering University on May 26 (see Ref D for more information on this organization.) ConGenOff subsequently met with ten other North Korean defectors in a group setting. 9. (C) Kim said he had been able to get his wife and daughter out of DPRK through the aid of a broker. He said he had paid the equivalent of USD 30,000 to the broker and that his family had journeyed from Hamheung to Yanbian and taken a flight from China headed to Seoul - all within the span of a week. Kim thought the number of defectors leaving North Korea was down overall, but that people sharing his higher social status and educational background were fueling the increase in successful defections to South Korea over the last couple of years. (NOTE: Kim and other defectors' willingness to front large amounts of money and maintain secrecy might explain the phenomenon of visibly fewer North Korean border-crossers but higher defector entry into South Korea.) 10. (C) Most participants in the group session said they disliked Sino-Koreans because they spearheaded the broker networks. They acknowledged, however, that the network could not operate without the services of the Sino-Koreans. Kim and his colleagues alleged that claims of North Korean death camps and extreme torture were greatly exaggerated. He did not dispute the existence of limited occasions where North Korean authorities had committed heinous abuses, but he averred that they did not form a regular practice. DAILY NK - ROKG VETS OUR ARTICLES, LESS DEFECTORS -------------------------- -------------------------- 11. (C) NKnet's Secretary General Kim Yun-tae is a South Korean who was previously a North Korean-sympathizer student activist associated with the "Juchepa" (Juche Group) in the early 1990s who had prior travel experience to Pyongyang (Ref E.) NKnet publishes the Daily NK, one of the main online publications covering North Korean issues and staffed by former North Korean defectors. Kim said that South Korean intelligence frequently perused the Daily NK and regularly called to seek clarification and question or dispute many of their articles. Kim admitted that his organization provided only limited snapshots of border society and other areas of the DPRK to which they had access rather than the complete picture. When pressed, Kim acknowledged that the situation on the Chinese side of the border with respect to border-crossers was not as dire as some reports depicted it. 12. (C) When asked what methods his group used to gather information, Kim would not go into much detail, only mentioning the burying of cell phones on hillsides for people to dig up at night. He said that places like Dandong and along the border in Jilin province were natural gathering points for cross-border cell phone communication and for meeting sources. He explained that he and some of his colleagues relied upon their 1980s/1990s tactics of evading South Korean intelligence to avoid excessive PRC and DPRK surveillance. Kim said he would not compromise his SHENYANG 00000119 003 OF 003 network by telling ConGenOff more about the group's composition. He said he relied upon a diverse group of individuals for information and that the Chinese government had banned some of his staff from re-entering China (e.g. North Korean defectors now in possession of South Korean passports.) Kim added that Sino-Koreans were not to be trusted as the broker networks were run by Sino-Koreans. 13. (C) Kim apologized if any of his group's articles seemed to be inflammatory or hysterical, as if they were trying to push a cause. When ConGenOff specifically raised a recent article about a Yanbian Sino-Korean "helper" of refugees who had gone "into hiding" due to increased Chinese public security pressure since the mid-March detainment of two American journalists, Kim stressed that such articles should be taken in context as merely one person's account and that a larger trend should not be extrapolated from one case. When pressed further, Kim responded that he and NKnet had honestly not heard much about defectors in general and not that much since the mid-March detainment of the journalists. BORDER UPDATE ALONG THE TUMEN RIVER -------------------------- 14. (C) In conversations with ConGenOff June 18-24, several regular Consulate contacts in Yanji continued to profess a lack of knowledge regarding recent border-crosser activity, saying that it had been several years since such activity was out in the open. Instead, these contacts said they focus their efforts on various development and food aid projects within North Korea, most of which continue to operate unabated in North Hamgyeong Province and Rason. Our Amcit contacts asked ConGenOff about the circumstances surrounding the original detainment of the two American journalists, saying they were unaware of any details in the case. 15. (C) At Tumen on June 22, the Chinese security posture on the border remained unchanged from previous visits (Ref E.) Foreign tourists, including Westerners, were seen at the Tumen/Namyang land crossing but were not allowed to go out onto the bridge, unlike Chinese tourists. Further upstream, ConGenOff noticed six armed People's Armed Police guards standing watch on the main road closest to the point where the June 16 Korean Central News Agency report placed the journalists' arrest. Back in Tumen that afternoon, ConGenOff observed one North Korean truck crossing over to North Korea carrying a full load of small cardboard boxes. 16. (C) Recent heavy rains had caused landslides in several areas along the border between Tumen/Namyang and Kaishantun/Sambong, with work crews of up to 20 individuals working to shore up hillsides on the North Korean side. In its middle reaches, the Tumen River now occupies most of its usually-dry riverbed, and the strong current created rapids in several stretches, making crossing the river difficult. WICKMAN |