DPRK REFUGEES: MORE DIVERSE, ELITE, AND RELIANT UPON BROKERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000119



SIPDIS





MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK



E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION

TAGS: CH, ECON, KN, KS, PGOV, PREF, PREL, RS

SUBJECT: DPRK REFUGEES: MORE DIVERSE, ELITE, AND RELIANT

UPON BROKERS



REF: A. SEOUL 179

B. 06 SEOUL 4283

C. SEOUL 129

D. 07 SEOUL 1141

E. SHENYANG 76



Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. REASONS 1.4(B/D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: DPRK refugees are increasingly diverse,

elite, and reliant upon well-connected broker networks,

according to ROK contacts. The network of brokers had

cornered the market on facilitating the trans-China leg of

North Korean border-crossers, driving the most obvious

evidence of DPRK-PRC movement further underground. Back in

China, contacts in NGOs and missionary groups who have

traditionally been the best source of information on the

situation in Northeast China said they are focusing less on

maintaining constant communication with border-crosser

networks and more on humanitarian aid projects on both sides

of the border. END SUMMARY.



2. (U) With meetings arranged via Embassy Seoul, ConGenOff

met with various DPRK-focused groups in the Republic of

Korea May 25-27 to discuss specific Northeast China-related

issues involving border-crossers. These groups included the

Hangyeore School (Ref A & B,) North Korean Intellectuals

Solidarity (NKIS) (Ref C,) and NKnet (Ref D.) ConGenOff

visited the Yanbian Autonomous Korean Prefecture June 18-24

to observe developments along the PRC-DPRK border on

the Tumen River.



DEFECTOR NUMBERS CONTINUE TO RISE: BROKERS MOVE SILENTLY

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3. (C) ConGenOff met with Hangyeore Middle/High School

principal Kwak Jong-moon (protect) on May 25 to share

impressions of the current situation on the PRC-DPRK border

since a previous meeting held in March 2008. (NOTE:

Hangyeore is a school that was opened specifically for

defectors.)



4. (C) Kwak suggested that the number of border-crossers in

the first quarter of 2009 was higher than during the same

period in 2008 and prior years and that Chinese authorities

were focusing less on rounding up or hunting North Korean

border-crossers than in the past. He said that when looking

at the middle/high school students the school had processed

this year, 2009 was one of the busiest and "most interesting"

years on record. Kwak explained that there are more defectors

from more diverse social strata attending the school, including

educated elites who no longer require the remedial education

that earlier defector children needed. He reported that they

hailed from regions all around North Korea, not just from

those adjacent to the PRC-DPRK border, that they had spent

very little time in China, if at all, and had not necessarily

transited the traditional routes through Southeast Asia.



5. (C) Kwak said that all of these factors could only be

explained by the emergence of a solid, experienced network

of brokers. Kwak said that almost all of the new influx of

defector-minors arriving at his school moved seamlessly

through a profit-motivated broker network that was

efficient, discreet, and likely difficult for outsiders such

as NGOs and missionaries to detect. Kwak said that many of

the recent defectors were dependants of those who had

successfully defected to South Korea and if the price was

right, a well-connected broker could get people out of the

DPRK to the ROK within weeks. Kwak said that cracking this

broker network was difficult for South Korean intelligence,

asserting that defectors would never reveal the name of

their broker, rather carrying this information to the

grave.



6. (C) Kwak maintained that presently nobody was getting out

of North Korea without the "right" connections and paying

substantial bribes. DPRK border guards would literally

light a path across the border for would-be VIP border-

crossers. To give an example of how well-coordinated the

broker network was, Kwak related the story of one person who

had crossed the Tumen River in the middle of the night and

had been greeted on a deserted stretch of gravel road by a

man who had been waiting on a motorcycle ready to offer his

services to anyone who might need transit to South Korea.

Even the defector had been surprised by the ease of finding



SHENYANG 00000119 002 OF 003





a broker. Kwak said that DPRK border-crossers were now

aware of the profit-driven nature of the broker business,

including the real risk of human-trafficking and other

hardships on the Chinese side, even in the event of a

successful crossing. With the exception of instances where

brokers received extraordinarily large payments, Kwak said

that almost all female border-crossers were subject to some

form of sexual abuse.



7. (C) Kwak said that the number of border-crossers was on

the rise and reiterated previous reports (Ref A and B) that

they were no longer motivated by hunger but by family

connections and/or ideology. Kwak said that the penalty for

a border-crosser who sought food but who had no contact with

South Koreans or other third-country nationals was a two-

year sentence at a light labor camp. The penalty for one

who had contact with South Koreans or other third-country

nationals was much more severe, while the penalty for anyone

involved with religion or proselytizing was death.



NKIS ELITE - MY FAMILY GOT HERE VIA BROKERS

--------------

8. (C) ConGenOff met with NKIS Representative Kim Heung-

kwang, a 2004 defector, Hamheung native, and graduate of

Kimchaek Engineering University on May 26 (see Ref D for

more information on this organization.) ConGenOff

subsequently met with ten other North Korean defectors in a

group setting.



9. (C) Kim said he had been able to get his wife and

daughter out of DPRK through the aid of a broker. He said

he had paid the equivalent of USD 30,000 to the broker and

that his family had journeyed from Hamheung to Yanbian and

taken a flight from China headed to Seoul - all within the

span of a week. Kim thought the number of defectors leaving

North Korea was down overall, but that people sharing his

higher social status and educational background were fueling

the increase in successful defections to South Korea over

the last couple of years. (NOTE: Kim and other defectors'

willingness to front large amounts of money and maintain

secrecy might explain the phenomenon of visibly fewer North

Korean border-crossers but higher defector entry into South

Korea.)



10. (C) Most participants in the group session said they

disliked Sino-Koreans because they spearheaded the broker

networks. They acknowledged, however, that the network

could not operate without the services of the Sino-Koreans.

Kim and his colleagues alleged that claims of North Korean

death camps and extreme torture were greatly exaggerated.

He did not dispute the existence of limited occasions where

North Korean authorities had committed heinous abuses, but

he averred that they did not form a regular practice.



DAILY NK - ROKG VETS OUR ARTICLES, LESS DEFECTORS

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11. (C) NKnet's Secretary General Kim Yun-tae is a South

Korean who was previously a North Korean-sympathizer student

activist associated with the "Juchepa" (Juche Group) in the

early 1990s who had prior travel experience to Pyongyang

(Ref E.) NKnet publishes the Daily NK, one of the main

online publications covering North Korean issues and staffed

by former North Korean defectors. Kim said that South

Korean intelligence frequently perused the Daily NK and

regularly called to seek clarification and question or

dispute many of their articles. Kim admitted that his

organization provided only limited snapshots of border

society and other areas of the DPRK to which they had access

rather than the complete picture. When pressed, Kim

acknowledged that the situation on the Chinese side of the

border with respect to border-crossers was not as dire as

some reports depicted it.



12. (C) When asked what methods his group used to gather

information, Kim would not go into much detail, only

mentioning the burying of cell phones on hillsides for

people to dig up at night. He said that places like Dandong

and along the border in Jilin province were natural

gathering points for cross-border cell phone communication

and for meeting sources. He explained that he and some of

his colleagues relied upon their 1980s/1990s tactics of

evading South Korean intelligence to avoid excessive PRC and

DPRK surveillance. Kim said he would not compromise his



SHENYANG 00000119 003 OF 003





network by telling ConGenOff more about the group's

composition. He said he relied upon a diverse group of

individuals for information and that the Chinese government

had banned some of his staff from re-entering China (e.g.

North Korean defectors now in possession of South Korean

passports.) Kim added that Sino-Koreans were not to be

trusted as the broker networks were run by Sino-Koreans.



13. (C) Kim apologized if any of his group's articles seemed

to be inflammatory or hysterical, as if they were trying to

push a cause. When ConGenOff specifically raised a recent

article about a Yanbian Sino-Korean "helper" of refugees who

had gone "into hiding" due to increased Chinese public

security pressure since the mid-March detainment of two

American journalists, Kim stressed that such articles should

be taken in context as merely one person's account and that

a larger trend should not be extrapolated from one case.

When pressed further, Kim responded that he and NKnet had

honestly not heard much about defectors in general and not

that much since the mid-March detainment of the

journalists.



BORDER UPDATE ALONG THE TUMEN RIVER

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14. (C) In conversations with ConGenOff June 18-24, several

regular Consulate contacts in Yanji continued to profess a

lack of knowledge regarding recent border-crosser activity,

saying that it had been several years since such activity

was out in the open. Instead, these contacts said they

focus their efforts on various development and food aid

projects within North Korea, most of which continue to

operate unabated in North Hamgyeong Province and Rason. Our

Amcit contacts asked ConGenOff about the circumstances

surrounding the original detainment of the two American

journalists, saying they were unaware of any details in the

case.



15. (C) At Tumen on June 22, the Chinese security posture on

the border remained unchanged from previous visits (Ref E.)

Foreign tourists, including Westerners, were seen at the

Tumen/Namyang land crossing but were not allowed to go out

onto the bridge, unlike Chinese tourists. Further upstream,

ConGenOff noticed six armed People's Armed Police guards

standing watch on the main road closest to the point where

the June 16 Korean Central News Agency report placed the

journalists' arrest. Back in Tumen that afternoon,

ConGenOff observed one North Korean truck crossing over to

North Korea carrying a full load of small cardboard boxes.



16. (C) Recent heavy rains had caused landslides in several

areas along the border between Tumen/Namyang and

Kaishantun/Sambong, with work crews of up to 20 individuals

working to shore up hillsides on the North Korean side. In

its middle reaches, the Tumen River now occupies most of its

usually-dry riverbed, and the strong current created rapids

in several stretches, making crossing the river difficult.



WICKMAN