POLITICAL PESSIMISM AS 60TH ANNIVERSARY APPROACHES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SHANGHAI 000405 DEPT ALSO FOR EAP/CM, DRL NSC FOR BUSBY E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/2034 TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI CH SUBJECT: POLITICAL PESSIMISM AS 60TH ANNIVERSARY APPROACHES REF: A. (A) BEIJING 2731 ¶B. (B) BEIJING 633 ¶C. (C) 08 SHANGHAI 523 ¶D. (D) SHANGHAI 168 CLASSIFIED BY: BEATRICE CAMP, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. CONSULATE SHANGHAI, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The recent plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee and the upcoming 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC are mechanisms to protect the Party's legitimacy and reassert its supremacy over other political institutions, according to Shanghai contacts. Efforts to curb corruption are ineffective, they said. The contacts uniformly held negative views of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's leadership abilities. Shanghai's prospects for further political reform are dim because of the municipality's importance -- primarily fiscal -- to the Central Government. End Summary. OCTOBER 1 NOT A CAUSE TO CELEBRATE -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 24 discussion with the Consul General, Shanghai contacts expressed pessimistic views about political reform on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The October 1 National Day holiday, coming on the heels of the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Communist Party Central Committee that concluded September 18 (Ref A),is not a cause for celebration among proponents of reform, they said. Tongji University professor Zhu Dake, Shanghai Institute of American Studies President Ding Xinghao, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) World Economy Institute Deputy Director Xu Mingqi, and Shanghai University Institute of Peace Studies Director Zhu Xueqin said they are concerned about the Party's agenda, which appears to seek only to protect its own "legitimacy." ¶3. (C) Political reform advocate Zhang Renren of the Mulvanny Group separately told PolOff September 23 the Plenum was a "big disappointment" and the "over-the-top" nature of the October 1 events in Beijing -- including the strict security measures in the capital -- demonstrate the Chinese leadership's "lack of confidence." Recent events in Xinjiang have "shaken the Party's confidence," Zhang added. Zhu Dake told the Consul General the October 1 security measures are "unbelievable," referring in particular to the temporary closure of Beijing Capital International Airport on the morning of October 1 and the restriction on selling knives following reported attacks last week near Tiananmen Square. Observed Shanghai University professor Zhu Xueqin: "even after September 11, the United States did not take such drastic measures." ¶4. (C) Shi Feike, a Shanghai-based journalist at Southern Metropolitan Weekly (Nandu Zhouli),agreed "not much came out of the Plenum," telling PolOff on September 21 that as the 60th anniversary of the PRC approaches, there still are too many "vested interests" to make any real progress on political reform. According to Shi, recent "promises on cadre evaluation reform" lack substance, and "party building" (dangjian) efforts are worthless if the Party's only goal is to "remain in control for the foreseeable future." Renewed attention to the roles of the National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) may give some people optimism, but the Party will not allow these institutions to grow stronger, he said. MEMO TO NPC AND CPPCC -- REMEMBER WHO YOU WORK FOR -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Consulate contacts said any hopes the NPC and CPPCC might play a greater role in the Central Government were dashed by two major policy speeches this year. SASS scholar Xu Mingqi said a speech by NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo on March 9 was a "clear indicator" that the Communist Party "has no interest in genuine democracy," as Wu's speech emphasized the NPC serves the Party. Wu stressed the differences between China's NPC system and foreign legislatures, declaring that China would not "mechanically adopt" Western models (Ref B). Zhu Xueqin said the March speech was a direct response to Charter 08 signatories, who had called for greater political freedom in their December 2008 manifesto (Ref C). Ding Xinghao, a well-respected academic who has been focusing on U.S.-China relations since China's reform and opening period, characterized the speech as "unfortunate," further lamenting that Wu, an "honest man" was the leader the CCP directed to "deliver the message." There cannot be democracy if it "must be led by the CCP," said Xu Mingqi. ¶6. (C) Likewise, Chinese President Hu Jintao's speech on September 20 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the CPPCC delivered a strong message of the CPPCC's subservience to the Party. According to Zhu Xueqin, CPPCC members have been trying to be "more relevant" in recent months, but Hu's speech aimed to "put the organization in its place" as merely an institution to support the work of the CCP. Most Chinese citizens already believe the CPPCC is largely irrelevant in China's political system. There are efforts to highlight the contributions of other political parties, said Shi Feike, noting the non-CCP affiliation of Science and Technology Minister Wan Gang, the Chairman of the Zhigong Party. However, these "token" appointments have little influence in the political system, he said. "FOUNDATION OF A REPUBLIC" (OR "SEEING OLD MEN")? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The CPPCC played a central role in the nationalistic film, "Foundation of a Republic" (Jianguo Daye),which was released nationally on September 17 prior to the October 1 anniversary; Shanghai contacts said the Communist Party's cooperation with other parties, including the Democratic League and KMT, in the founding of the "New China" in 1949 was used to underscore the "legitimacy" of the regime. The movie is an interesting blend of history and entertainment, said Tongji University's Zhu Dake, but with so many movie stars in the film, the focus is more on the entertainment side. Netizens have paid considerable attention to the movie, said Shanghai University's Zhu Xueqin, but many of their viewpoints are cynical. One joke in circulation puns on the film's Chinese title, "Jianguo Daye," to make it mean "Saw All the Old Men." WHAT TO DO ABOUT CORRUPTION? -------------- ¶8. (C) One scene in the movie does have relevance for modern China, our contacts agreed. The significance of a discussion on corruption between Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was not lost on Shanghai's young moviegoers, they said. At the end of the conversation, Chiang Kai-shek says, "to take measures to counter corruption could hurt the Party (KMT), but avoiding anti-corruption measures could destroy the country." Zhu Dake told the Consul General his students clearly understood this commentary both as a statement about the rampant corruption of the KMT, as well as a reflection of the CCP's current situation. ¶9. (C) The difficulty is that the Party's tools to combat corruption remain limited because the problem is so endemic. Zhang Renren said he is skeptical of the government's anti-corruption efforts because local government corruption already is "completely out of control." Recommendations reportedly discussed during the Plenum to require local cadres to publicly announce the scope of their personal investments would be impossible, said journalist Shi Feike. "There will always be ways to hide assets," he said, adding that previous local government efforts to require public information on cadre assets in Hunan, Jiangsu, and Xinjiang all were stymied by "vested interests." ¶10. (C) For now, therefore, Shanghai scholars said, there will be only local battles over corruption. The downfall of local officials in recent years -- including Shanghai's own Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006 -- demonstrates that being an official has become a "high risk, high reward" proposition, Zhu Xueqin said. He expressed sympathy for officials, who must live with a constant feeling of insecurity. According to Xu Mingqi, corruption allegations continue to be used as tools to sack local officials, and the internet remains a means to expose cadres' transgressions (Ref D). WILL XI OR WON'T XI? -------------- ¶11. (C) Shanghai contacts all said former Shanghai Municipal and Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary Xi Jinping's failure to rise to the Vice Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) during the recent Plenum was not significant, but several contacts expressed concern about Xi's leadership abilities and the prospects for needed political reforms if Xi does in fact succeed Hu Jintao. Ding Xinghao lamented that Xi's only accomplishments in Zhejiang and Shanghai were the result of "doing nothing." Xi was cautious and simply tried "not to mess things up," Ding said. In Zhejiang particularly, residents scornfully noted that the province's rapid economic development during the period was in spite of, rather than because of, the Provincial Party Committee's leadership, Ding added. Zhu Xueqin said there is no chance Xi will be able (or willing) to promote needed political reforms if he ultimately is tapped to lead the Party. According to Xu Mingqi, the "situation is serious," because the stakes for Hu's successor -- whether Xi or not -- will be huge in the next 10-15 years when the Central Government will have to solve many social problems. ¶12. (C) Shi Feike still believes Xi will be Hu's successor, but supported the scholars' views, saying that "Xi is the guy because he's very cautious and sits in the back of the room with his arms folded -- he doesn't make mistakes." The most worrying aspect, according to Shi, is that "Xi's people" (advisors) are weak. Xi's primary assistant (mishu),for example, has been with him since before he was Party Secretary in Zhejiang, and the assistant is "just a yes man." No one is giving good advice to Xi on what he should or should not say or do, and that's alarming, Shi said. China needs leaders like Abraham Lincoln, Shi said, who have "moral courage" and "historic responsibility" (lishi zerengan). Or, as Ding Xinghao stated, China needs another leader like Deng Xiaoping with the personal authority to force change. Sensing Xi's weaknesses, other Party leaders are beginning to earnestly jockey for position, said Zhang Renren, citing Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang in particular as leaders who have been "active." SHANGHAI'S POLITICAL FATE TIED TO NATIONAL ECONOMY -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Our contacts said they are not optimistic about political reform in Shanghai in the near-term, primarily because the Central Government aims to keep Shanghai under tight control. Even as economic development flourishes in Shanghai, political reform lags behind Beijing and Guangzhou, said Zhu Xueqin. Observers can see the difference in Shanghai's degree of openness by reading the local newspapers, said Xu Mingqi. The Central Government's Propaganda Department does not allow Shanghai to have a more reform-minded newspaper such as Guangzhou's Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo),Xu said. "You would expect a developed area to be more open," he told the Consul General, "but Shanghai is more politically restricted." ¶14. (C) Shanghai remains too economically important to the Central Government to allow greater political reform, said Ding Xinghao. Beijing needs to control Shanghai because of Shanghai's contribution to Central Government revenue, estimated by our contacts to be 13 percent last year. Returning to one of the themes in "Jianguo Daye," Ding said that one of the reasons the KMT established its capital in Nanjing was its reliance on nearby Shanghai for funding. Shanghai may not contribute as much of the revenue as it once did, but its current contribution is enough to prompt Central Government concern about maintaining stability in Shanghai. As long as there is social stability and economic development in Shanghai, Xu said, there will be no political change. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Shanghai intellectuals are largely pessimistic about political implications of the recent Plenum and the upcoming October 1 holiday. Shanghai's own lack of progress on political reform is particularly discouraging. In the near-term, Shanghai's continued rapid economic growth is likely to mute public criticism of the political situation, and the city will continue to draw migrants not only from other parts of China but increasingly from foreign countries as well who are attracted by economic opportunities. In the medium- to long-term, however, Shanghai intellectuals are worried about unresolved social problems, especially the city's aging population and the lack of an adequate social safety net. It is primarily with these problems in mind that our Shanghai contacts express their concerns about the future of political reform, which they believe must move forward in order to give the public peaceful outlets for discontent. CAMP