U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC & ECONOMIC DIALOGUE: SHANGHAI OBSERVERS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000372 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR LOI/MEDEIROS STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD/WINTER/MCCARTIN/KATZ/MAIN USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, SZYMANSKI, MAC/OCEA TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA -- DOHNER/WINSHIP/YANG TREASURY FOR SED -- LOEVINGER/OWENS/VAN HEUVELEN TREASURY FOR IMFP -- SOBEL/CUSHMAN STATE PASS CEA FOR BLOCK STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK MANILA FOR ADB USED E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CH ECON EFIN EINV PGOV SUBJECT: U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC & ECONOMIC DIALOGUE: SHANGHAI OBSERVERS UNCERTAIN ABOUT FUTURE OUTCOMES ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Shanghai financial sector representatives generally acknowledge the symbolic and confidence-building value of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), although many are uncertain about the actual economic impact of the discussions. End summary. ============================================= ================== The S&ED Strikes the Right Tone . . . But Can It Hold the Tune? ============================================= ================== ¶2. (SBU) Our contacts in Shanghai's financial services sector -- including U.S. and European banks, domestic and international fund managers and securities houses, and Chinese scholars -- confirmed that S&ED messaging crafted in the United States has reached the intended audience in Shanghai. Many sources recognized or employed key U.S.-derived phrases such as "long-term, strategic engagement," or "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship." The overwhelming majority of our contacts emphasized that the Chinese attach great importance to the S&ED and appreciate the Obama Administration's efforts to set a positive tone -- one that recognizes differences between the two countries while striving to advance common goals. A contact at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), however, wondered how the U.S.-China relationship will shift once recovery is assured. He worried that the United States might be more aggressive towards China after the financial crisis, when the United States has less of a need for Chinese cooperation. ¶3. (SBU) Despite initially positive feedback, some of our contacts expressed uncertainty about the S&ED's ability to convert positive sentiment into tangible outcomes in both the short and long terms. For example, a vice chairman of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) praised the S&ED framework for what it set out to achieve, and said he was satisfied by the first round of the Dialogue. Yet, he also expressed fear that (i) the S&ED might just be a "talk shop", where nothing is actually accomplished, and (ii) that future meetings would digress into very specific, less strategic issues like its predecessor, the SED, did. The vice chairman expressed concern that the S&ED might be "old wine in a new bottle" -- that it would not live up to its goal of addressing the most important long-term strategic issues facing both countries. ============================================= ========== Concern on Market Economy Status, Safety of U.S. Assets ============================================= ========== ¶4. (SBU) Market Economy Status (MES) was the most frequently raised concern when discussing S&ED outcomes. Our Chinese contact at a securities house asked how China could be granted MES, while the vice chairman of SIIS pushed for a better sense of the timeline of when this could be achieved. He described the failure to grant China MES as another form of protectionism -- like regulation of high-tech trade or restrictive U.S. import SHANGHAI 00000372 002 OF 004 tariffs on Chinese tires -- to which China should not be subjected. This contact said he was concerned about increasing nationalism, protectionism, and trade conflicts between the United States and China, as well as the role the U.S. Congress plays in inflaming these issues. He advocated for educating domestic audiences in both the United States and China so that uninformed public opinion does not get in the way policy-making. ¶5. (SBU) Our contacts also raised the issue of China's role in international financial institutions. Our contact at SASS asked how reform of international financial architecture as mentioned in the Economic Joint Fact Sheet issued following the S&ED would come to fruition, given the fact that each country is acting according to its own interest and not necessarily in support of the whole system. He asked about what the United States will propose with regard to special drawing rights (SDR) and utilizing the renminbi as part of the SDR currency basket, adjusting IMF quotas, and "recognizing the demand" for moving away from the U.S. dollar as world's reserve currency. He stated that if the United States neglects the demand for stability in the markets by maintaining the hegemony of the dollar, sooner or later it could lead to another crisis. A few of our Chinese contacts sought insight into whether the United States will be shifting away from the G8 as the power base for an international economic governing body and towards the G20, due to the G8's "recent loss of credibility." ¶6. (SBU) Officials at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and other Chinese institutions stated their concern with requiring Chinese companies to conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAPP). According to one source, this regulation would impose a $10 million one-time cost on Chinese companies. This could be avoided if the United States were to accept Chinese accounting standards. ¶7. (SBU) A few contacts stressed the safety of U.S. assets as their primary concern. Our contact at SASS and a well-respected Shanghai-born source at a U.S. bank said some Chinese economists worry the U.S. Federal Reserve will not be able to absorb extra liquidity when the U.S. economy recovers. Our Shanghai-born banking source stated his belief that the U.S. Federal Reserve can never de-lever its balance sheet, except at the expense of economic growth -- reinforcing the point that this will never happen, he said. He expressed concern that inflationary pressure in the U.S. would spread to the world economy. Our SASS contact also stated that quantitative easing should not be permitted, and noted the risk of inflation posed by some of the U.S. Federal Reserve's actions. In contrast, other financial sector contacts -- both American and Chinese -- dismissed fears of pending inflationary pressure in the United States. ¶8. (SBU) A number of conversations also revealed Chinese concerns related to the United States' fiscal deficit. The first question in a list of concerns raised by a general manager of a Shanghai securities house was "how can the United States SHANGHAI 00000372 003.2 OF 004 guarantee the safety of U.S. assets in light of the fiscal deficit?" A professor from Tongji University expressed Chinese worries about a possible depreciation in the value of Chinese investments in U.S. Treasuries. ============================================= ======== U.S. Financial Sector Concern About Market Access and Implementation of Outcomes ============================================= ======== ¶9. (SBU) For U.S. participants in Shanghai's financial services sector, market access for foreign banks in China remains a sticking point. Many were critical of the U.S. government for not doing more to advance this issue. Senior representatives from two U.S. banks and a third asset management fund declared that U.S. companies are still hindered by stringent control of ownership, slow licensing processes, and opaque approval systems. Our U.S. contacts routinely objected to restrictions on ownership of joint ventures and the 20 percent ownership cap imposed on individual financial firms' investments in local banks. ¶10. (SBU) Our U.S. sources in Shanghai, while recognizing the positive framework of the S&ED, frequently questioned how agreements coming out of the S&ED would actually be implemented, a concern that muted their full endorsement of the dialogue. Three contacts at a U.S. bank stated that implementation of some of the previous Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) outcomes remains unclear. For example, foreign banks were approved to underwrite Chinese corporate bonds in December 2008, through SED ¶V. However, eight months later, no U.S. bank has actually underwritten any corporate bonds. Several others expressed the view that more systematic processes and improved transparency are necessary to drive real progress on outcomes from the S&ED and also to advance Shanghai as an international financial center. One contact said that without a good system, U.S. banks will continue to work alone, forging one-off deals with the Chinese government that serve to box-out other U.S. financial sector participants. On a more positive note, several of our sources noted that getting new products to market has been slightly easier than trying to become an underwriter, but this process also lacks a systemized, transparent approach. ============================================= Fine-Tuning Market Liberalization Discussions ============================================= ¶11. (SBU) According to a contact at Gaohua Securities (Goldman's JV) and our source at SASS, the S&ED I agreement to liberalize interest rates is not critical to Shanghai's development as an international financial center. Our contacts argue that lending rates have been liberalized significantly. They explained that banks can charge different interest rates according to credit worthiness as long as they stay within the People's Bank of China's broad range of permissible rates. SHANGHAI 00000372 004 OF 004 Additionally, the liberalization of interest rates will not cause a shift in capital efficiency or an increase in domestic consumption, the SASS source said, because interest rates are high as compared to the rest of the world. (Comment: There remains a floor for lending rates, meaning the most creditworthy borrowers pay a higher interest rate than they otherwise would absent the controls. In addition, the difference between inflation-adjusted growth and lending rates in China, averaged over the course of a macroeconomic cycle, remains one of the highest in the world, contributing to excessively capital-intensive growth. End comment.) ¶12. (SBU) One of our contacts explained that it is more important to remove the ceiling on deposit rates than the floor on lending rates. The ceiling (currently 2.25%) is set by the People's Bank of China, and no bank is allowed to give higher rates. At this time, he said, even though banks have more money than they can lend, they still aim to increase market share. Yet they cannot attract deposits by increasing rates. To get around this, banks can and do create different incentive structures and products. For example, they might give cash rebates (both formal and informal) to corporate treasurers to attract deposits. (Comment: The inability of banks to compete on price constrains the growth of the most efficient banks. Furthermore, low inflation-adjusted returns on financial assets are one reason the growth of household income has trailed GDP growth, leading to a steady decline of household consumption as a percent of GDP. End comment.) ======= Comment ======= ¶13. (SBU) The S&ED is widely recognized by our Shanghai sources as an opportunity for the United States and China to work constructively on a host of financial issues of critical importance. However, our contacts are not yet convinced that the S&ED will be able to resolve issues of importance in a timely manner. The renewed emphasis on gaining Market Economy Status for China reflects deep-seated worries about U.S. measures that could inhibit China's capacity to exploit future U.S. demand for Chinese-made goods as the American economy recovers. CAMP