(C) CHINA UNLIKELY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UN SANCTIONS ON NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000257 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR LOI E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM CH KN KS JA TW SUBJECT: (C) CHINA UNLIKELY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UN SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA: VIEWS FROM SHANGHAI REF: A) SHANGHAI 246; B) SHANGHAI 135 CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section Chief, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Shanghai scholars believe North Korea, for domestic political reasons, will not bow to international pressure in the near term over its recent provocative actions. Tension on the Korean peninsula is nearing a "climax," after which a "cooling down period" will be necessary to bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table. Even if new UN sanctions are announced, China will not fully enforce their implementation, said one scholar, since China needs North Korea as a "strategic buffer" against the United States and cannot afford to let the regime collapse. End summary. ¶2. (C) Poloff spoke with Liu Ming, Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia & Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) on June 9, and Shen Dingli, Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, in a separate discussion on June 9, about recent North Korean provocations and China's response. Liu is widely recognized as a leading scholar in Shanghai on North Korean issues, recently serving as the key presenter of a session on North Korea at a China-ROK-Japan-US quadrilateral conference jointly hosted by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) on May 12 in Shanghai. Shen is an expert on non-proliferation and security studies, and is often quoted in foreign and local media on these issues. (C) North Korea Will "Not Bow To Pressure" -------------- ¶3. (C) A strong international reaction to North Korea's recent nuclear test and missile launches (i.e., new UN sanctions) will be met by stronger North Korean "retaliation," warned Liu Ming of SASS during our discussion on June 9. North Korea will "not bow to international pressure," at least in the near term, as it proceeds with its goal of becoming a "prosperous and powerful state" by 2012. The DPRK needs to consolidate its nuclear power status to achieve this goal, said Liu. (C) Succession Issue -------------- ¶4. (C) Kim Jong-il (KJI) may also feel the need to speed up the process towards becoming a "prosperous and powerful state," as the succession issue comes to the fore amid his declining health, said Liu. On rumors that KJI's third son, Kim Jong-un (KJU),had been anointed KJI's successor, Liu said it is still media speculation but that, if true, the successor would have to prove his ability to boost the country's prestige in order to control the military and its generals. One way to achieve this, said Liu, is for KJU to preside over more nuclear and missile tests. (C) Approaching a "Climax" -------------- ¶5. (C) Liu does not think tension on the Korean peninsula has reached its "climax," but that this "turning point" may be reached with the announcement of new UN sanctions. Though he believes North Korea will retaliate in response to new sanctions, he is not sure what it would do, adding that there are "limitations" to its response since it had already conducted nuclear and missile tests. After the "climax" is reached, Liu does not exclude the possibility of a return to talks after a "calming down period." (C) China's Reaction -------------- ¶6. (C) Liu said during the May 12 conference that China is unwilling to take a hard line against North Korea, partly because Chinese officials, scholars, and the general public are SHANGHAI 00000257 002 OF 002 divided in their opinion of the DPRK. He feels that the timing is not right for behind-the-scenes diplomacy by China, and questioned "how much room" the United States would give China in its diplomatic dealings with the North. China is concerned about the risk of proliferation and will support, to some extent, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),though it will not join the initiative, predicted Liu during our June 9 discussion. (C) DPRK is China's "Strategic Buffer" Against U.S. -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Even if China supports new and tougher UN sanctions, China will not fully enforce their implementation since it does not want the North Korean regime to collapse, argued Shen Dingli on June 9. A DPRK collapse would portend redeployment of US forces from South Korea, possibly to bases closer to Taiwan. If the DPRK, China's "strategic buffer" against the United States, collapses, the United States will be able to refocus its attention on Taiwan. China needs to "buy more time" to develop its military to counter any possible US interference in Taiwan, said Shen. China remains concerned about pro-independence forces in Taiwan and is not certain that the recent warming of cross-Strait relations under Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou will continue, especially if Ma is ousted from the presidency at the next election. China is thus "hedging" against possible US interference in Taiwan using the North Korean card, and North Korea is happily manipulating China's "hedge," said Shen. (C) China Already Violating UN Sanctions? -------------- ¶8. (C) China has long been violating UN Security Council Resolution 1718 by exporting luxury goods to North Korea, claimed Shen. China remains North Korea's "only link" to the outside world, and China does not subject most cars and trucks to inspection at the North Korean border, he said. Shen also heard from one of his sources that China, whether knowingly or unknowingly, has been sending conventional arms, including tanks, to North Korea. (Note: Shen did not divulge the source of this information. End note.) China will not obstruct new UN sanctions since it wants to be viewed as a responsible player. Any new UN sanctions, however, will be a "paper tiger," since China's full support is needed for the sanctions to be effective, but China will violate these sanctions, Shen predicted. (C) China Looking for U.S. Support on Taiwan -------------- - ¶9. (C) The only way to break the logjam and get China's full support for stronger action against North Korea would be to eliminate North Korea's use as China's "strategic buffer" against the United States, added Shen. The United States can achieve this by announcing unequivocally that it supports the peaceful reunification of mainland China and Taiwan, said Shen. He acknowledged that this is a very difficult, "almost impossible," task at present, but that a US announcement need not be followed by any concrete action. Though only symbolic, a US announcement would raise the US-China partnership to a new level, argued Shen. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Shen Dingli readily admitted that his ideas are "in the minority," but argued that "sometimes the minority view turns out to be correct." None of the scholars in Shanghai that we have spoken to in recent weeks has a clear idea of what is happening inside North Korea. Their comments, however, reveal the depth of divergent views in China on how it should respond to the crisis. SCHUCHAT